Interreligious relations and governance of religion in Europe: Introduction

Abstract

In recent years, the growth and expansion of interreligious initiatives have received increasing scholarly attention worldwide, and interreligious actors and repertoires are gaining relevance within emerging governance regimes of religious diversity in Europe and beyond. However, empirical research in this field is still very limited. With the aim to fill this gap, this special issue gathers four original contributions aimed at critically describing, understanding and reflecting upon the rise of the ‘interreligious sector’ and its growing relevance to the governance of religious diversity in contemporary Europe.

Introduction

In recent years, the growth and expansion of interreligious initiatives have received increasing scholarly attention worldwide (Cheetham et al., 2013), and interreligious actors and repertoires are gaining relevance within emerging governance regimes of religious diversity in Europe and beyond (Griera and Forteza, 2011; Nagel, 2016). However, empirical research in this field is still very limited. Until now, most research on interreligious relations has been developed from a theological perspective (Cornille, 2013; Moyaert and Geldhof, 2015), and has aimed to examine the promises and the perils of interreligious initiatives in policy areas such as education (Byrne, 2011; Leirvik, 2008), peace-making processes (Bercovitch et al., 2009), or dialogical exchanges.

Despite some valuable exceptions (Halafoff, 2011; 2013; Lamine, 2004) sociological approaches to interreligious dynamics are still in the early stages. There are some studies that have implicitly dealt with interreligious issues through the analysis of multifaith rooms in public places (Cadge, 2018; Crompton, 2013; Gilliat-Ray, 2005) or shared sites of pilgrimage (Albera and Couroucil, 2012; Walton, 2016), but much less effort has been put in examining the involvement of interreligious actors in the governance of religion. However, this is changing. Currently, a growing number of researchers are conducting empirical research on interreligious initiatives and governance from a social science perspective, and our aim has been to include an important part of them in this issue of Social Compass.

More specifically the aim of this special issue is to critically describe, understand, and reflect upon the rise of the ‘interreligious sector’ (Prideaux and Dawson, in this issue) and its growing relevance to the governance of religious diversity. For comparative reasons, we focus our attention on Western Europe and have included case studies on different geographical contexts (Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the United Kingdom). The case studies included make use of a variety of methods and analytical perspectives, which provides a good overview of the recent trends and developments in this field.

Theoretical approach: between deprivatization and domestication

During the past decade, many European and international public bodies, such as the Council of Europe or the United Nations, have put considerable efforts in promoting multi- and interreligious initiatives, mainly on a local and regional level. Religion has become a matter of public concern, and the cultivation of multireligious coexistence has come to be increasingly considered as decisive to ensure social cohesion, inclusion, and peace. In this context, interreligious initiatives have gained momentum and public legitimacy as valuable tools for the governance of religious diversity.

Organized interreligious encounters are not a new phenomenon and their history can be traced back to the nineteenth century with the celebration of the World’s Religious Parliament in Chicago in 1893. Nevertheless, while the Parliament might be considered as the symbolic starting point for the interreligious movement worldwide (Seager, 1989), the contemporary global and rapid expansion of the interreligious movement did not start until much later. As Anna Halafoff (2013) points out, global multifaith engagement expanded dramatically during the 1990s, which is evidenced by the celebration of the II World Religious Parliament in 1993 and the formation of major multifaith organizations.

This global expansion of the interfaith movement corresponded with an increase of interreligious initiatives on the national and local levels. In this vein, several studies have pointed to the variety and expansion of organized interreligious encounters in Europe during the past decades (Griera and Forteza, 2011; Klinhammer et al., 2011; Lamine, 2004; Martikainen, 2013; Nagel, 2016; Nordin, 2017; Weller, 2009). In all of these studies the increasing involvement of interreligious actors in the governance of religious diversity was touched, but not explored in a systematic manner. As a matter of fact, the rise and popularity of interreligious initiatives as governance instruments have been closely connected to the diversification of European religious landscapes as a result of mass migration.

However, the actual prevalence of interreligious initiatives cannot simply be attributed to an increase in religious minorities in Europe. From a sociological perspective, there are several strands of discussion which offer complementary explanations, namely, the emphasis on processes of ‘religious deprivatization’ in ‘postsecular societies’, as well as the ‘securitization’ and domestication of religion, that is, Islam.

On the one hand, the new public role of the interreligious movement might be read as a consequence of what Casanova referred to as religious deprivatization (Casanova, 1994), and based upon the agency of religious groups in contemporary Europe. The diversification of the religious field due to globalization and transnational migration has severely transformed the religious landscape and given more visibility to religious minority groups. Although many European societies had already witnessed a significant growth of religious diversity after World War II, it has not been until fairly recently that addressing multiculturalism in terms of religion(s) has become a widespread political strategy all over Europe. Likewise, while there is substantial variation across European countries regarding their approach to religion, a consensus on the increasing relevance of religious issues for the governance of heterogeneous populations has emerged. Religion has entered the political agenda, and in this context, religious groups do not stand as passive players, but claim – and acquire – an active role in the public domain. As Grace Davie (2004: 80) points out ‘those who opt seriously for religion in European societies will want to make their views heard in public as well as private debate’. Furthermore, the agency of religious communities is reinforced by a political constellation where new liberal understandings about the role of religion in the contemporary public sphere are gaining credit, for example, with regard to social welfare (Beaumont and Cloke, 2012: 6).

Political and philosophical positions arguing about the compatibility between religious and secular domains of late modern societies have achieved popularity in the last decades. An important contribution was Habermas’ notion of a ‘postsecular society’, which paved the way for legitimating the public role of the interfaith movement (Habermas, 2006). From Habermas’ perspective, religious actors may participate in the democratic public sphere as far as they are able to translate religious reasons into secular arguments.

On the other hand, an alternative explanation for the new significance of interreligious actors refers to considerations on the global ‘securitization of religion’ (Hurd, 2010) and the implementation of techniques of liberal governmentality (Brown, 2006) aimed at regulating and domesticating the religious field. From this perspective, the rise of the interreligious domain needs to be understood in a post-9/11 world, where religious fields appear to gain political salience all around the globe. A growing number of international conflicts are increasingly framed as religious, and their impact reaches European countries at various levels, ranging from bilateral diplomatic conflicts to tensions within local communities or an increase of Islamophobia and other forms of religious prejudice. The examples abound and are of a very different nature: from the Mohammed cartoons affair, to the terrorist attacks in European cities or the incidents after Pope Benedict XVI’s speech about Islam in Ratisbona in 2006 to name just a few. In this regard, as Levitt and Merry (2009: 452) argue: ‘Ways of thinking about problems are generally path dependent: once a problem is framed as religious it tends to stay on that path’. Therefore, is not by accident, that in this context, policymakers and civil society actors increasingly identify interreligious repertoires as strategic ‘solutions’ for mitigating religious tensions and fostering a climate of tolerance and peaceful coexistence.

Interreligious relations and governance regimes: lines of inquiry

As mentioned earlier, the articles selected for this special issue set out to systematically describe and understand the characteristics and the role of the ‘interreligious sector’ (Prideaux and Dawson, in this issue) in the governance of religion. While each article focuses on a different(s) geographical setting(s) there are some general lines which run through all of the cases and which we will briefly summarize in a comparative perspective.

Inter-what? Local constellations and repertoires of the interreligious movement

The case studies included share an understanding of the multifaceted nature of the interreligious movement and its internal diversity and complexity. This is reflected in a variety of terms used to denote the semantic field of the phenomenon, such as interreligious, interfaith, multifaith and interconvictional. Each of these terms carries specific connotations and their use resonates with territorial specificities (e.g. while ‘interfaith’ is more common in the United Kingdom, ‘interreligious’ is more widespread in Germany or Italy), but also different political or theological positions. For instance, in the case of France or Catalonia the term ‘interconvictional’ reflects the intention to include non-religious voices into the dialogue. ¹ Regardless of these semantic differences, however, it is more than obvious that there is (in the words of Wittgenstein) an ‘air of resemblance’ which encompasses all of these initiatives, encounters and activities.

Generally speaking, these initiatives share three characteristics, as they (1) include the participation of persons or parties belonging to at least two different religious traditions (or life stances in a broader sense), (2) exhibit a minimum of planning, duration and coherence compared to situative incidents of interreligious encounter and (3) are driven by the will to foster interaction among religiously diverse people in order to bring forth specific consequences, such as mutual understanding or community cohesion.

As a matter of fact, interreligious initiatives can be involved in a variety of activities, such as neighborhood gatherings, dialogue meetings, peace prayers, school services or festivals (Nagel, 2015: 209–211). Likewise, there can be different motivations for religious communities to join the interreligious sector. In an earlier contribution Nagel and Kalender (2014: 96–97) have suggested distinguishing between political interests (using the interreligious domain to promote concrete political goals), symbolic interests (improving the public image of religion in general and one’s own religious tradition in particular), dialogue-oriented interests (acquiring knowledge about each other and fostering mutual understanding) and communitarian interests (building faith-based social capital and promote social cohesion).

In a similar vein, Griera et al. (in this issue) have developed a typology to identify the principal repertoires of action of interreligious groups which partly overlap with the distinctions noted in the previous paragraph. These repertoires include: (1) theological interreligious dialogue, (2) work for social cohesion and brokerage, (3) activities aimed at raising awareness, (4) ceremonial and performative politics and (5) lobbying for the religious groups’ rights and interests. Most of the activities which are aiming to reach a broader audience (2, 3 and 4) rely on external institutional support and tend to be organized in partnership with local governments. On the contrary, those activities aimed to either cultivate interreligious dialogue and foster personal change or directly advance the agenda of a specific religious community, are usually developed without the direct support of public authorities.

Representation and the role of majority churches

Apart from the semantic field and the repertoires of action, the multifaceted nature of the interreligious domain is also reflected by a variety of structural conditions. For instance, the German case study points to a considerable range of what might be called the institutional density of interreligious initiatives reaching from grassroots discussion circles on the level of local neighborhoods to interreligious bodies which have been supported – or even initiated – by state actors. Similar observations concerning different degrees of institutional density can be found in all of the case studies in this special issue.

The case study on Leeds (UK) by Prideaux and Dawson makes an important point in connecting the institutional density of interreligious initiatives with a particular mode of membership and representation: The authors distinguish between two types of interfaith organizations, that is, ‘fellowships’ which are based on individual membership and ‘personal religious and spiritual engagement with those from other religions’, and ‘representative bodies’ composed of corporate members which entails challenges of representation. Most of the case studies address the representative mode as a challenge as it may purport the dominance of established actors, such as the majority churches, and lead to an exclusion of socially stigmatized religious groups (e.g. Jehovah’s Witnesses or certain Muslim associations). On the other hand, the Scandinavian and German case studies indicate that bottom-up initiatives based on individual membership appear to be more inclusive. Moreover, Galal et al. (in this issue) hold that ‘representative’ bodies are more likely to be found at the national level, whereas grass-roots organizations more frequently emerge at the local level.

Besides the current variety of interfaith organizations, there is a common thread that runs through all the cases in the special issue, namely the dominant presence and privileged position of Christian majority churches in the interreligious milieu. All of the articles show that majority churches play a pivotal role in the promotion and development of interreligious initiatives mainly for two reasons: first, Christian majority churches usually have more resources available for this purpose in economic terms but also in social and political terms. Second, Christian churches still have a dominant position in most Western European countries. This is what Koers and Nagel (in this issue) call the structural asymmetry between Christian and non-Christian actors, which ‘purports a hegemonic role division between a Christian host and their Muslim (Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu, Bahá’í or other) guest’.

In general terms, it is interesting to note that Christian majority churches have been very receptive to interreligious dialogue in Europe in recent years. This is not by coincidence since the public legitimacy of the ‘interreligious sector’ has also served majority Christian churches to acquire new public visibility and recognition. To some extent, through fostering interreligious dynamics, the church has also carved out a place for religion in the secular public domain. In this regard, hospitality and advocacy for religious diversity may form part of a strategy to legitimize the role of the established churches in an increasingly secular public space. However, as it has also been shown in several articles, Christian churches are not monolithic and exhibit a wide range of positions and stances toward interreligious dialogue. This diversity is also reflected in church actors pursuing a variety of strategies at the same time. The case of Barcelona is particularly illustrative in this regard: while Catholic hierarchies have been intensively involved in building ‘representative’ interfaith bodies composed of (mostly male) religious leaders of Abrahamic religious traditions, the ‘progressive’ Catholic milieu has fostered grassroots interfaith organizations open to a broad number of religious minorities and ‘life stances’. Thus, while it seems that there is an increasing consensus in terms of the relevance of interreligious dialogue within Christian churches, there are significant variations concerning its conception and forms of implementation.

Interreligious initiatives and the governance of religious diversity: conditions and effects

All contributions in this special issue put a special focus on the role of interreligious initiatives in the governance of religious diversity. In doing so, they exhibit various modes of governance reaching from technical, organizational or financial support of existing initiatives to the creation of new interreligious bodies in order to foster social cohesion across religious lines. At the same time, the case studies show that it is not always easy to demarcate the interreligious governance of religious diversity from other strategies, such as forms of bi- or multilateral collaboration of state actors with one or more religious communities. As a matter of fact, the new role of interreligious initiatives as governance instruments makes the interreligious sector more sensitive to overall political developments and will change not only those initiatives which participate, but also those which chose not to partner with state actors.

Many of the case studies illustrate that the rise and characteristics of interreligious initiatives are highly dependent upon specific political and institutional opportunity structures. While the British case study unpacks how the opening of a policy window for religious issues in the United Kingdom has transformed the interreligious landscape, the cases of Turin and Barcelona show the relevance of the celebration of the Olympic Games as a crucial point of departure for generating interreligious infrastructures on the local and regional levels. At the same time, some of the Scandinavian case studies illustrate how large-scale national developments, such as the abolition of the state church, give rise to new interreligious structures on various levels. In a similar vein, the German case study indicates how the model of contract governance (i.e. a federal state signing a contract with a religious association) is being extended to Muslim communities and how these changes in the religious field may challenge local interreligious activism.

The case studies in this special issue suggest that the specific development of interreligious governance regimes in European cities might be explained by the dynamic interplay among three main domains: the state-church model of each country, the particular configuration of the religious field in each city, and the urban policy agendas (and the role of religion within it). Concerning this last point, Prideaux and Dawson (in this issue) put forward that the expansion of interreligious activism in local arenas in the United Kingdom, and the specific forms it takes, is strongly associated with three urban policy agendas which may to a certain extent be generalized for other urban settings in Western Europe, too. The first is the agenda of social order aimed at domesticating urban populations, and closely related to the securitization of religion. The second agenda, in contrast, is one of cultural empowerment. It is, for instance, connected to the boost of interreligious social capital and the organization of festivals, events or other public gatherings which offer visibility to religious or cultural minority groups – which is also sometimes linked to processes of marketing the city by framing cultural diversity as a particular asset. Finally, there is an agenda of social provision which goes in line with processes of co-responsibilization of communities for ensuring social and cultural welfare. Under this framework, interreligious actors act as providers of services, and act in public–private partnerships to facilitate public services to an increasingly diverse population.

Potential consequences and further avenues of research

On a normative level, the political discovery of interreligious initiatives as a governance instrument has caused quite a bit of controversy: While some authors think of these initiatives as ‘means of cooperative problem solving’ (Klinhammer et al., 2011) others fear a thorough colonialization of the interreligious lifeworld through the imperial logics of integration politics (Tezcan, 2006). At the same time, and beyond the normative debate, it is somewhat obvious that state actors are increasingly unable to cope with the postsecular constellation of multifaith societies and look for partners compensating for their own religious illiteracy (Griera and Forteza, 2011). To some extent, as James Beckford (2015) notices, religion is currently simultaneously perceived as a ‘problem to be managed’, but also as a ‘resource’ that may help to deal with social problems and increase social cohesion and social capital. This double condition of the religious field opens the door to an active and ‘legitimate’ public participation of interreligious initiatives in the governance of contemporary multifaith societies. At the same time, it may encourage a merely instrumental use of the ‘interreligious sector’ in order to advance hegemonic agendas on social cohesion (Beckford, 2015; Burchardt, 2017; Dinham and Lowndes, 2008).

In general terms, the articles included in this special issue do not take a normative stance, and aim for a nuanced analysis of the complex processes which are at stake. Nevertheless, they touch some of the main arguments in favor of and against the inclusion of interreligious initiatives in the governance of religious diversity.

On the up-side, the collaboration with interreligious groups can be seen as an instance of good participatory governance which improves the democratic quality of (mostly local) decision-making. On the one hand the multireligious composition of these groups enables state actors to reach out to minority populations (e.g. immigrant communities) which have long been invisible and therefore had little voice in the public sphere. On the other hand, the vivid grassroots nature of many interreligious initiatives (particularly when they emerged ‘bottom up’) could help to bring civil society back to the fore. Last but not least, public–private collaboration can expand the scope of action of interreligious initiatives, be it through financial or technical assistance or via the symbolic recognition of their work.

On the downside, many of the case studies suggest that the collaboration with state actors may lead to severe structural transformations within interreligious initiatives and trigger processes of formalization, hierarchization and oligarchization. For instance, the authors of the German case study conclude that interfaith governance may reinforce religious or denominational cleavages and purport hegemonic models of legitimate public religions, such as the ‘Abrahamic’ or ‘World Religions’ model. Likewise, the authors of the British case study claim that interfaith governance ‘should welcome rather than inhibit diversity and thereby avoid the kind of socio-political homogenization that demands the same thing from otherwise very different entities’. At the same time the case of Norway suggests that the participation of religious minorities was more balanced in top-down initiatives, whereas bottom-up measures of interreligious cooperation would easily become dominated by the majority church. Finally, the case of Turin shows how the interreligious domain initially pivoted around a single institution, which almost monopolized multireligious representation in the public sphere

All in all, the inclusion of the interreligious sector into the governance of religious diversity is closely aligned with processes of religious formatting (Fabretti, 2015), which favor the public participation of those religious communities who fit into secular imaginations of a ‘good religion’. In a similar vein, the dominant role of majority churches in the interreligious sector may reinforce existing power imbalances among religious groups and purport the Christian model of religion (institutionalized and stratified organization, historical-critical exegesis, academic theology and a strong professional culture) as an implicit benchmark.

Likewise, the increasing consideration of religious (and interreligious) actors ‘as partners in the delivery of various services and the development of social enterprise’ (Beckford, 2015: 230) might be seen as contributing to reproduce neoliberal rationalities (Williams et al., 2012). The ‘outsourcing’ of policies to achieve community cohesion and social peace from the government to the interreligious sector might foster the implementation of ready-made formulas adapted to fit prevalent neoliberal dominant agendas. The extension of public–private collaborations in this domain might have three consequences: (1) to grant plausibility to a cultural and religious narrative for accounting of contemporary social problems – which might hide economic or political causes, (2) to generate institutional dependence which might foster bureaucratization and (3) to facilitate processes of cooptation which might reduce critical voices. However, we have to be cautious in this interpretation since the case studies in this special issue exhibit some heterogeneity and an ongoing transformation in the interplay between the (inter-) religious and the political sphere.

As a matter of fact, it is hardly possible at the moment to estimate whether the beneficial or the harmful effects of the inclusion of interreligious initiatives in the governance of religious diversity will prevail. What is already clear, however, is that the matter calls for further empirical investigation. Future research on interfaith governance should account for institutional transformations within the interreligious realm, but also unpack the micropolitics of interreligious interaction as well as the power dynamics embedded in the ceremonialization of interreligious tolerance.