Another Christian right? The politicization of Korean Protestantism in contemporary global society

Abstract

The author explores the political rise of conservative Protestantism in the larger context of Protestant Christianity’s reconfiguration in Korea. The incorporation of East Asia into the modern world resulted not only in the failure to establish a single Korean state, but also in the rise of the category ‘religion’ in this region. The remarkable growth of Korean Protestantism was, in large part, due to its great contribution, as a model religion, to the building of Korea as a modern nation. Since the late 1980s, however, the public has lost confidence in it and there has been a rise in discourses of nation re-building that give great emphasis to indigenous cultures and regional resources. Meanwhile, Protestant Churches have emerged as a key opponent to nationalist aspirations and programmes for social reform. The re-politicization of Protestantism in post-Cold War South Korea reflects the extent of the insecurity stemming from of Korea’s shifting place in a newly globalized East Asia. Religion makes the re-entry of Korea into the late-modern world at once dynamic and unpredictable.

Introduction

The political attitude of Protestantism in Korea, and of its mainline Churches in particular, was for a long time to advocate a separation of Church and State – the sacred-secular divide (Kang, 2007: 47; Lee, 1991: 19). In recent years, however, Protestant Churches have publicly expressed critical opinions against democratic governments, particularly those of Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008), and against the liberated social milieu of South Korea. One of the Protestant leaders who best illustrate this religious change is the Revd Kim Hong Do of the Kumnan Methodist Church ¹ in Seoul. In preparation for the presidential election ² on 19th December 2007, Revd Kim delivered a politically charged sermon at the church’s Sunday service on 8th July in the same year, entitled ‘What if reunification is achieved under communism?’:

How many Reds are there in the National Assembly and among the cabinet members? [The Roh Moo-hyun government] has awarded medals and paid compensation to the spies and commies … The presidential election at the end of this year is the moment to decide the fate of this country. [We] have to pray that the lefties of the pro-communist, pro-North Korea and the anti-USA [factions] will not re-seize power. … After standing against God and attempting to usurp the throne of God, the Red Dragon, Satan, is damned and thrown out of heaven to earth. … The Communist Party of North Korea, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are the very subordinates of the Red Dragon. We now stand at a crossroads and must decide whether or not we are trampled by the force of the Red Dragon … The pro-North Korea lefties will try to make Mr Lee Myung-bak ³ not run in the presidential election. … We have to pray that the elder [Mr Lee], who has faith in Jesus, becomes President. … It would be preferable to be dead than to have our faith suppressed under the communist rule after reunification is achieved by the Reds.

In this sermon not only did Revd Kim dramatize the nation’s political situation by connecting the conservatives’ possible loss of the presidential election with such biblical symbols as the Red Dragon, Devil, and Satan, but he also urged that ‘people of God’ vote for Lee Myung-bak to be President. On top of that, he organized and supported a series of political rallies, along with other evangelical leaders such as the Revd Cho Yonggi, the minister of Yoido Full Gospel Church, one of the world’s largest churches (Kim, 2003). Why did Revd Kim invoke such Christian imagery? What made Korean Protestants shift from their conventionally passive attitude on political matters to such positive involvement? The recent rise of conservative Protestantism in Korean politics reminds us of the role of the Christian Right in US politics today. Keeping in mind that religion has become active in contemporary global politics (Haynes, 2000), this article offers an account of this religio-political mobilization from the perspective of the long-term fluctuation in Protestantism a globalized Korea.

Theoretical framework of religious change in the modern global context

In order to conduct a comparatively and theoretically informed investigation of contemporary religious politics, I attempt to organize a theoretical framework, drawing upon some scholarly ideas of how religion engages in the modern challenge of globalization. My analysis of the political dynamics of Korean Protestantism posits that the entry and re-entry of Korea into modern global society provides a fundamental impetus for religious change. With that in mind, the problem of the political surge in Korean Protestantism is broken up into three overlapping dimensions. First, the functional differentiation of society defines the relationship between politics and religion in many contemporary societies, including Korea. At the same time, it is important to note that the mode of modern secularism is diversely conditioned by the cultural and historical peculiarities of each society (Casanova, 2006). Second, as ‘religion’ globally appears as a distinct and differentiated domain of communication (Beyer, 2006: 18–116), four different ways of practising religion are observed in the modern world, ranging from ‘social movement religion’ and ‘organized religion’ to ‘politicized religion’ and ‘communication/individualistic religion’ (Beyer, 2003: 53–58). This typology of global religion places the recent political rise of Korean Protestantism in the context of its longitudinal reconfiguration. The third dimension is concerned with a variety of politicized religion. Religious movements have emerged from the transformation of the world order because individuals and groups find a refuge for themselves under the protection or tutelage of religion (Wuthnow, 1982). ⁴ Among the different political functions presented by Wuthnow ⁵ , ‘counter-reform’ and ‘sectarianism’ seem to characterize the political nature of the re-politicization of mainline Protestantism in newly globalized Korea. Drawing upon these theoretical propositions, I attempt to analyse the reconstruction of Korean Protestantism in the contemporary global context.

The formation of Protestantism in a globalized Korea

The collapse of the Confucian state and the opening of Korea’s ports were among the critical events that formulated the development of modern Korea in the 18th and 19th centuries. In the 20th century, Korea underwent a social upheaval quite different from that which many Western societies experienced. A notable difference was its high degree of subordination to external powers. Even though possibilities for subjective transformation, such as Silhak (the realist school of Confucianism) and Tonghak (Eastern Learning), existed in late Chosŏn Korea, they did not result in the establishment of a single modern state on the Korean peninsula. One of the reasons, similar to Qing China’s experience decades earlier, is that before Koreans could make preparations to build an independent country, Korea became an arena for competition between imperialist powers. The reconfiguration of Korean Protestantism is critically related to the transformation of national society in that new world.

Social movement religion in the Confucian and colonial regimes

Since the 18th century, new ideas and technologies had been transplanted from the West to East Asia. One of those was the term ‘religion’, a new category which had not existed in pre-modern Korea (Jang, 1992). As Casanova suggests elsewhere (1994), Korean ‘religions’ also formed distinct identities and places within the differentiated realm of religion. In the new secular world, Christianity, and Protestantism in particular, was the religious tradition that was most aware of its distinctive roles. It has been well documented that Protestant Churches have played a comprehensive role in developing Korea, especially its civil society, since their introduction to the country (Buswell and Lee, 2006; Lee, 1991). For most of the 20th century, Protestantism was widely considered a ‘model religion’ in Korea in so far as other religions happened to follow the forms, strategies and behaviors of this Western-introduced tradition (Baker, 2006; Beyer, 2006).

The history of Korean Protestantism began with Horace N Allen, a medical missionary dispatched from the American Presbyterian Church in 1884. At that time, the Western penetration of the East created a sense of crisis in Korea. To counter this challenge, education and medicine, the two principal fields of human welfare, were highlighted as alternative places for Protestant propagation. Those ‘indirect’ missionary activities were also a consequence of learning from the failures of Catholic missions, which had claimed lots of victims and martyrs in the 18th and 19th centuries. ⁶ Avoiding the tragic errors in this ‘clash of civilizations’, Protestantism began to spread through the hermit kingdom at the turn of the 20th century (Institute of Korean Church History Studies, 1989: 170–190; Park, 2003: 117–138). According to many Korean intellectuals and nationalist pioneers, including members of Kaehwapa (the Modernization Faction), it was not just a religious organization, but rather the ‘social movement religion’ (Beyer, 2003), that is, an invaluable programmatic entity that could achieve ‘national prosperity and defense’, civilize the ‘collapsed society’ and thereby save their nation from being crushed between strong powers. This idea of Protestantism going beyond its organizational boundaries proliferated among the Korean populace, particularly enlightenment thinkers and nationalist activists.

Korea’s integration into the modern world took the form of colonial subjugation, as it became a protectorate of Japan in 1905, and five years later was annexed by that country. The colonization was, of course, not for the benefit of the Korean people, but to establish a base for Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, China and other Asian regions. The Japanese rulers imposed a violent, imperialist form of ‘development’ on the Korean peninsula. Attempts at rescuing Korea were made by Korean socialists, nationalist enlightenment thinkers, independence fighters and religionists, who tried to take back their country from the Japanese colonizers. The religionists, who included Confucian and Christian patriots and adherents to new national religions such as ch’ŏndogyo and Taejonggyo, were a significant element of the Korean nationalist forces (Baker, 2008: 78–93).

The Japanese annexation of Korea led to internal crises which, in turn, made Protestantism the strategic stronghold of nationalist activities. Schools founded by Protestant pioneers, such as the Osan School and Ewha School, produced many patriotic reformists and independence fighters. Other Protestant institutions and nationalist groups that had close connections with them, such as the YMCA, Sinminhoe (New People’s Society) and Hŭngsadan (Society for the Fostering of Activities) became the centres of ‘new thoughts’ as well as of various independence and reformist movements. Whether conservative or liberal, the majority of Protestants identified themselves not as religious sectarians, but rather as ‘new religionists’ who were dedicated to working for the entire national community and its independence beyond the collective interests (Institute of Korean Church History Studies, 1989: 123ff; Korea Institute of Religion and Culture, 1998: 306–313).

Model of organized religion in Cold War globalization

Japan’s hold on Korea was so tight throughout much of its rule that the independence of Korea finally materialized not at the hands of the Koreans, but as a result of the advance of the US Army below the 38th parallel and the USSR’s Red Army above that line. The division of Korea was one of the regional consequences of the global transition to a Cold War order. Two Koreas came to be incorporated into the two opposing worldwide political networks. While the North proceeded towards a more independent socialist way called Juche (self-reliance), maintaining its ‘blood’ alliance with China and the Soviet Union and participating in the Non-Aligned Movement, the South adopted the liberal capitalist system led by the USA, Japan and other ‘advanced’, Westernized countries, exploiting its self-appointed role of ‘defender of the Free World’ through its strategic position at the gateway to Northeast Asia. It was a local particularization of post-war globalization that South Korea became a pro-US, anti-communist, and military-dictatorial country that took Western and other advanced societies as its development model (Cumings, 2005: 185–231, 404–447).

The post-war world provided favourable conditions for Protestantism to emerge as a representative form of religion in the southern part of the Korean peninsula. The Korean War (1950–1953) destroyed industrial plants and the infrastructure and in turn caused an economic and social Dark Age in the South. In the aftermath of the war, therefore, the new government was faced with the difficult challenge of fully supporting the welfare of its nationals on account of a lack of economic and institutional resources. A large portion of the voluntary sector, including religions such as Confucianism and Buddhism, felt helpless for similar reasons. On the other hand, Protestant institutions received considerable material support from their ‘mother churches’ in the USA and other Western countries as well as from the US Army stationed in the South, and the South Korean government supported their humanitarian activities with its limited resources. As one of the most resourceful non-governmental organizations, Protestantism could comprehensively deal with various social issues, from education and social welfare to medicine, media and politics, in post-colonial society (Kang, 1994).

Protestantism played the role of ‘guardian of modern values’ such as democracy and human rights. Minjung theology ⁷ , the Urban Industrial Missions ⁸ and the reunification movement of progressive Protestant Churches left a positive impression on the minds of liberal citizens, especially when secular civil society was unable to join the democratization movement on account of severe oppression by the dictatorial regimes of the 1970s and 1980s (Küster, 2010; Park, 2003: 188–199). The progressive Churches that consistently participated in the democratization movement, especially during the Park Chung-hee regime (1961–1979), formed the minority of Korean Protestantism. The silent majority consisted of those religious conservatives who, though imbued with anti-communist ideology and the theology of prosperity, judged interference in politics as not conforming to the Gospel (Kang, 2013: 261–293; Küster, 2010: 16).

Keeping a close relationship with the political establishment, mainline Protestantism proceeded not only to assimilate elements of Korea’s traditional culture, in order to console Koreans who had lost a sense of direction in the rapid process of industrialization, but also to accept the capitalist market logic and the ideology of anti-communism. These developments contributed to configuring Protestantism as a model of ‘organized religion’ in Korea’s religious market (Buswell and Lee, 2006: 195ff.; Jang, 2004). The anti-communist orientation of Protestantism played a major role in solidifying its institutional foundation in South Korea; a majority of Korean Protestants were satisfied with the conservative and anti-communist political milieu that was sustained by the Cold War system. There was usually no urgency among them to mobilize themselves on political issues. So, during the military dictatorships, maintaining the status quo was beneficial for the establishment of Protestantism, which frequently argued that the separation of State and Church was biblical from the viewpoint of ‘authentic’ Protestant theology. Wolnamin Christians, who had migrated from the North to the South between the Liberation and the Korean War, and especially those who were wealthy or had antagonized the Communist Party, were solid supporters of anti-communism in both Protestant churches and Korean society in general (Kang, 2007).

The great tide of economic development, combined with traditional religious culture, had a profound impact on the growth of Protestant Churches, Pentecostal ones in particular. The rapid industrialization and urbanization of post-colonial society produced a lot of ‘stragglers’ – individuals who had difficulty in establishing their social loci in that bewildering world – who recognized Protestant Churches as a potent resource for the recovery of direction and empowerment. The Churches emphasized a ‘this-worldly-oriented’ vision, which helped them to cope with the new circumstances. Becoming ‘children of Jesus Christ’ meant getting more Ch’ukbok (blessing) for a healthier and richer life. Like commercial businesses, the Churches drove their adherents to take action to pack the church buildings with people. Feverish revival services and strong religious enthusiasm combined with the hierarchal and patriarchal human relationship between the clergy and the laity, which seemed to be influenced by Korea’s Shamanic and Confucian traditions, contributed to the rapid quantitative growth of Protestant Churches. Those traditional factors greatly attracted people, especially uprooted migrants who had recently come to the mega cities such as Seoul, leaving their rural hometowns where they had grown up in a socio-cultural environment rooted in those religious traditions. Yoido Full Gospel Church in Seoul was one of the most successful cases of this religio-syncretistic entrepreneurship (Cox, 1995: 213–234; Martin, 2002: 160–163).

In short, in response to Korea’s changing position in global society in the 20th century, Protestantism transformed its formative characteristic as a ‘social movement religion’, which was in conflict with the Confucian and colonial establishment, into the model of an ‘organized religion’, which had a close relationship with the ruling elites and the culture of modern capitalism. Its rapid growth in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was a logical consequence of the religio-political economy of the global Cold War. For many Koreans, conversion to Protestantism represented an effective method of becoming a modern individual, with greater mobility, resources and freedom. Since the 1990s, however, signs of the weakening of Protestantism’s plausibility structure have been widely observed in the South.

The political resurgence of Korean Protestantism in contemporary global society

After the end of Cold War in the late 1980s, the idea of considering advanced Western societies as the model for Korea’s modernization became increasingly questionable. As the multiplicity of modern civilizations was being globally recognized (Eisenstadt, 2000; Huntington, 1996), East Asian societies, including Korea, began to construct an ‘East Asian civilization’. In that regional context, the military tension between the two Koreas softened, and the economic growth of South Korea engendered the ‘Asian Tiger’ phenomenon. With the advance of the liberal governments in the 1990s and 2000s, hopes of democratization and rationalization escalated in many quarters of South Korea, ranging from the military and the government to the press and corporations and even to religion. This national transformation within the context of late-modern East Asia challenged the social, religious and political standing of Korean Protestantism.

The rise of alternative modernities in post-Cold War Korea

For many Koreans today, the ‘modern civilization’ which the new, democratized republic desires to maintain is no longer something founded on Western values and cultures but ‘something uniquely Korean while at the same time universal’. This social transition to ‘Korean alternative modernity’ has increasingly introduced individuals and groups to novel discourses of different identities, cultural representations and political choices. Supported by varied public slogans or imaginaries, such as ‘asiajŏk kach’i’ (Asian value), ‘ch’amyŏ minjujuŭi’ (participatory democracy), ‘tayangsŏng’ (diversity), ‘kaehyŏk’ (reformation), ‘uri kŏsi choŭn kŏt’ (Our things are good things), ‘The most Korean, the most global’, ‘Think global, act local’ and ‘alternative cultures’, critical individuals, reformist civic organizations and democratic governments collectively attempted to create a more politically liberal and culturally inclusive social atmosphere. In this milieu, a great number of younger Koreans, in particular the 386 generation ⁹ , and a slight majority of Koreans overall elected more liberal political leaderships at the two presidential elections in 1997 and in 2002. ¹⁰

Both online and off-line spaces created with help of the internet and mobile technologies have been increasingly situated as one of the most important originators of such societal changes. For example, the series of events that took place in 2002 – the intense anti-American sentiment after a US armoured vehicle accidentally killed two middle school girls, the inflation of nationalist pride over the Korea–Japan World Cup soccer game, the rise of internet media such as OhmyNews ¹¹ , and the unexpected election of the political maverick Rho Moo-hyun as President – would not have been possible without the existence of cyberspace and new communication and information technologies. In sum, socio-cultural efforts to make social progress closely more autonomous by basing it on indigenous resources, local communities and new media and technological conditions have taken place extensively in post-Cold War South Korea.

However, it seems that South Korea’s new track is not the result of a linear process of distinct separation from Western-style modernization. Rather, the older framework for progress has continued in many parts of Korean society. The nation is not fully convinced that it can create an alternative mode of development by relying on traditional cultures and regional resources. What has in fact taken place is a more complex process, accompanied by die-hard nostalgia for ‘past glory’, strong attachments to the inheritance of the earlier development period and serious doubts as to whether the attempts at creating a ‘new modernity’ will succeed (König, 2000). While Korean conservatives have continued to consider ideologies such as anti-communism and pro-Americanism as formative elements of the ‘true identity’ of Taehanmin’guk (the great Republic of Korea), Protestant Churches have positioned themselves as the last bastion of ‘real Korean-ness’ (Eom, 2004: 96–99).

The decline of Protestantism in the era of democratization

The rising liberal trends corresponding with the changed position of South Korea in late-modern global society put extensive pressure on conservative Protestant Churches. Since the 1990s, the expressions of dissatisfaction with Protestantism have grown louder from various corners of society. In the new millennium, Protestantism has emerged as a symbol of scandal, corruption, anti-reform, social friction and national and global conflict. In the end, Protestantism has become the most spurned religion among non-religious adherents in South Korea today. ¹²

A categorization of the problems of Korean Protestantism will be helpful in understanding the contour of this religious issue. I differentiate four types: (1) the individual-ethical, (2) the conflict-within-the-church, (3) the conflict-with-other-religions and (4) the feud-with-the-public-at-large. In the ‘individual-ethical’ type are the countless scandals relating to tax-evasion, the embezzlement of church offerings, adultery and other matters of morality among the Protestant clergy and lay leaders that have been widely reported in the mass media. For many Koreans, these are unsettling stories that disclose the ‘hidden real nature’ of the corrupt religion. In the ‘conflict-within-the-church’ type are the great many schisms that exist within the Protestant Churches, between denominations and within Protestantism as a whole, resulting from the process of leadership formation in a certain denomination or inter-denominational body, from the selection of elders or helpers in a church or from various administrative issues in the Protestant institutions, the denominations, the churches or the joint associations, which are also well known. The ‘conflict-with-other-religions’ category includes the actions of militant Protestants who have cut the heads off countless Buddha statues in Buddhist temples and Tan’gun statues ¹³ in schools and other public institutions, as well as causing serious damage to Buddhist temples and the buildings of other religions, considered by Protestant fundamentalists to be ‘shrines of the Devil’, some of which have even been burned down. The final type is the ‘feud-with-the-public-at-large’ type, exemplified by the conflict between the fervent missionary work of Protestant institutions and State foreign policy, for example when the Protestant Churches announce religious gatherings such as ‘international conferences’ or conduct overseas missions in troubled regions like Iraq and Afghanistan ¹⁴ , and by clashes between the administrators of Protestant-affiliated schools which impose upon every student the duty to participate in their religious services and non-Christian students who do not want to take part in them.

The above-mentioned technological advances have aggravated the situation. Koreans have taken advantage of the liberation of public media by disseminating anti-Protestant discourse. On the internet are many ‘anti-Christian cafes’, which reiterate the criticisms against the arbitrary and unethical activities of Korean Protestants. The rapid spread of this kind of internet culture has created fertile soil for anti-Christian activities and sentiments (Lee, 2004). One consequence of this public discussion on the anti-sociality and ‘egoism’ of Protestantism has been the fixation on a social cognitive structure that regards Protestantism as, far from the model religion, a crucial obstacle threatening social stability, cultural diversity, national integration and the sustainable development of the Korean nation in the 21st century (Lee, 2006).

In that context, voices warning of a decrease in church growth began to resonate within Protestant Churches in the 1990s. The population statistics issued by Statistics Korea in 2006 confirmed that the Churches’ worries about a decrease in Protestant membership numbers were well founded. ¹⁵ According to the government statistics, Protestantism was the only major religion to have declined between 1995 and 2005 while the number of adherents to all its rivals increased. It marked the first-ever decline in the Korean Protestant population. In contrast, Catholicism, a principal rival of Protestantism, showed the largest growth in its membership, probably as a result of its efforts to serve Koreans and indigenize itself. ¹⁶ Witnessing the decline, Korean Protestants have come to recognize the extent of the negative view of Protestantism in the country. All these factors have been a great impetus to Korean Protestantism to change its conventionally passive attitude toward political issues.

Aspects of the re-politicization

The transformation of the nation-state in the post-Cold War world has made Protestant Churches critically aware of their deteriorated status in South Korean society. Their reaction to this crisis has diverged into two responses. One has been a counter-action to the ‘attacks’ against Protestantism, while the other has been a more ‘introspective’ response that reflects on those ethical issues and the social and interreligious conflicts the Protestant Churches have caused. According to Beyer’s typology of global religion (2003), the type of ‘politicized religion’ applies to the conservative, protective response, while ‘communitarian/individualist religion’ ¹⁷ fits the liberal and reflective one.

By politicized religion, Beyer means religion that aims to make the State and its structures instruments for enforcing the precepts and practices of the religion in question. Protestant conservative forces in democratized South Korea first appeared to be a form of resistance to the extensive social pressure restricting the Church to the domain of religion. They have since developed a more dynamic polity to change the laissez-faire socio-political milieu to a more conservative social environment that not only does not damage the social reputation of Protestant Churches but also increases their social influence and propagating potential (Beyer, 2003: 55–56; Casanova, 1994: 19). In a sense, such a politicization of religion takes on the characteristics of a ‘counter-reform movement’ and ‘sectarianism’ (Wuthnow, 1982: 51–60). Protestant Churches have opposed the ‘reform force’ which penetrated into the centre of state power in the 1990s and 2000s. Also, they have revealed a sectarian nature in neglecting the general national community, other social and religious groups or identities, and even other Churches and denominations within the Christian tradition. In short, Protestantism has come to be regarded as a ‘politicized sectarian and counter-reform religion’ in today’s South Korea.

The liberalization of this East Asian society has greatly upset its many conservatives, including the Protestant establishment, and conservative religionists have refused to accept the liberated social milieu, which is accompanied by the rise of such ideas as religious pluralism, gender equality, de-anti-communism and the acceptance of North Korea as a ‘brother country’. Rather, they have stuck to such ideologies as biblical literalism, the verbal inspiration theory of the Bible, anti-communism, anti-North Korea-ism, and pro-Americanism. The older generations, yearning for the passions and ideologies of the Cold War era, have increasingly regarded Protestantism as the last bastion of genuine Korean-ness, from which a rearguard action must be fought to overturn the political, social and cultural ‘decline’ of South Korea. Ultimately, the Protestant Churches have emerged as representatives of the conservative right wing. ¹⁸

Kang In-cheol, a Korean sociologist of religion, points out the differences in the nature of conservative Protestantism’s politicization in the 1990s and 2000s (Kang, 2007). The 1990s were characterized by the advent of the Christian Council of Korea (CCK, Han’guk kidokgyo ch’ongyŏnhap’oe), the massive interdenominational body that united conservative Protestant denominations ¹⁹ ; the new millennium is marked by the formation of the ‘professional social movements’ (2007: 26–48). Among the various religion-based groups, the CCK, founded on 28th December 1989, was one of the most politically influential organizations in post-Cold War South Korea ²⁰ . The CCK staunchly opposed various reforming or progressive bills and policies proposed by the liberal governments, from the ‘Sunshine Policy’ toward North Korea to the reformation of the Private School Act ²¹ and the abolition of the National Security Law, an allegedly wrongful law which human rights groups such as Amnesty International have consistently urged the South Korean government to abrogate. However, its method of engaging in political matters was not one of direct participation with the intention of producing a new government and national identity.

In the 2000s, the rise of the Christian Social Responsibility party (CSR, Kidokgyo sahoe ch’aekim) ²² and the New Right Union (NRU, Nyurait jŏn’guk yŏnhap) ²³ showed that the political intervention of Protestant conservatives had reached the level of a ‘professional social movement organization’. The CSR and the NRU were founded in November 2005 with the shared idea that the general social situation in the Korean peninsula must be changed. These religio-civic organizations advocated direct political involvement – in the short term to overthrow the allegedly ‘left-wing’ Roh Moo-hyun government ²⁴ and over the long term to create a ‘liberal democracy’ which they claimed to be the central value of the constitution of the Republic of Korea. All three organizations, that is, the CCK, the CSR and the NRU, which mostly consist of conservative evangelical Protestants, shared the political view that, since the 1990s, South Korea had undergone radical change such that it was now negating its ‘true identity’ and the original spirit of the ROK constitution. In their religio-political rhetoric, South Korea had moved to the extreme left over the past 20 years and the liberal South Korean governments, particularly the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, had led this ‘undesirable’ flow.

One of their usual arguments was that both the ROK government and South Korean society at large must not allow ‘communism’ in Korea. A prerequisite for this was that the North Korean communist regime should be removed from the Korean peninsula as soon as possible. Some hardliners even contended that all of the engagement policies towards the North, known collectively as the ‘Sunshine Policy’, should have immediately been halted ²⁵ , and all the humanitarian support for the North Korean people should also have been delayed until a variety of problems relating to North Korean politics were resolved – problems such as nuclear weapons exploitation, ballistic missile experimentation (for example, the Taep’odong missile) and human rights issues. At the same time, they insisted that South Korea should ‘restore’ the ‘traditional’ ROK–USA alliance by pursuing pro-American policies, for example the Free Trade Agreement with the USA, increased support for US troops in Korea, and global cooperation with the USA in such matters as the ‘War on Terror’. They further maintained that, since the 1990s, the liberal governments had almost destroyed the ROK–USA alliance, and that this was a stark example of how the liberal governments had failed to maintain the ‘true’ identity of the Republic of Korea (Ryu, 2004).

Against this backdrop, Protestant forces have held large political gatherings in combination with other conservative groups. Kang contends that conservative Protestant Churches have emerged as one of the representative leaders of the entire right-wing force in late-modern South Korea (2007: 5–32). Particularly since 2003, it has played a decisive role in organizing a series of massive political rallies against both the liberal governments and the liberated socio-political milieu, mobilizing hundreds of thousands of Protestant believers and thereby successfully attracting national attention. The paragraph quoted below not only articulates the form that mainstream Protestantism took in a political demonstration held in Seoul Plaza, in the heart of the capital, but also reveals the degree to which it was involved in mobilizing conservative forces:

The ‘patriot Christian force’ and the ‘patriot social force’ used to confirm their firm solidarity by co-hosting the Prayer Convention for Saving the Nation and the Rally to Defend the National Security Law on October 4 [2004]. At that time, the CCK took responsibility for the sound facilities, screens, and speakers while the National Conference for Anti-Nuclear and Anti-Kim (NCANAK, Panhaek pan’gim kungmin hyŏbŭihoe) ²⁶ took responsibility for the stage, hanging banners, and other facilities. The CCK also took responsibility for the mobilization of the masses while the NCANAK handled advertisement and propagation. A person connected with the CCK said ‘this is not the time to push through the four legislative reform bills; however, they are doing this’ and ‘the [Roh Moo-hyun] government seems to be trying to overturn this country through broadcasting in lieu of the violent force. We are also actively sharing opinions with many like-minded persons outside the churches’. (Kim, 2004: 30)

In the face of the transformation of South Korean society, accompanied by a shift in the nation’s religious attitudes, Protestant Churches have attempted to restore the democratized society to social conditions favourable to itself, by playing a central role in public debates and political rallies.

The success of conservative Protestantism

In order to reverse the liberated socio-political situation, one of the priorities of Korean Protestantism has been to re-construct the national political power structure. On 20th December 2007, Lee Myung-bak, a Protestant conservative, was elected President of the Republic of Korea with the overwhelming support of Protestants. Lee’s presidential victory put an end to the ‘era of reform’ that had lasted since the late 1980s, in particular the ten years of the Kim Dae-jung and Rho Moo-hyun administrations. It is important to note that Lee Myung-bak was considered a representative of ‘old-fashioned’ development; in the eyes of many progressive Koreans, he was nothing but a symbol of the past era of ‘developmental dictatorship’ (kaebal tokjae). Nevertheless, Lee won a decisive victory at the presidential election. How could he be elected in the new era of democracy and reform? Did this mean that South Koreans wanted to return to a pre-democratic Korean society, like the religious fundamentalists who missed the ‘good old times’?

The political success of conservative Protestant Churches testifies that South Korea’s socio-political transition is never unilinear; rather, it is a complex process, particularly in terms of constructing East Asian civilizational modernities. In a sense, South Korea is sandwiched between the maritime forces (USA, Taiwan and Japan) and the continental forces (China, Russia and North Korea) in the geopolitics of contemporary East Asia. Although the USA and Japan have been South Korea’s conventional allies, there is a general recognition of the urgent need for new markets, new resources and new partnerships for its rising prosperity. Many South Koreans admit that, though once considered a dire threat, China, Russia and North Korea have increasingly risen as possible strategic partners for regional peace and security and the sustainable development of the nation-state. Nevertheless, it seems that having recognized the difficulty of making predictions in newly globalized East Asia, South Koreans, led by those religious conservatives, have, especially through the 2007 presidential election, confirmed that their country should not limit its future to possibilities of development exclusively based on indigenous, liberal and/or new regional resources. Although various civil and national efforts toward the complete realization of ‘Korean cultural modernity’ have continued, the ideological and religious legacy of the Cold War is still greatly influential in many parts of the nation-state today. In South Koreans’ continued exertions to create a single Korean nation, the location of Protestantism in the nation has become more and more problematic as many of them, especially secular liberalists and younger progressive citizens, have found it difficult to discard the religio-ideological vestiges of the bygone era when their parents’ generation aimed for Western-style development. Accordingly, the successful re-politicization of Korean Protestantism demonstrates the critical role of religion in shaping and representing Korean modernism and, in particular, Korean nationalism in post-Cold War South Korea.

Conclusion

It is globally observed that religion in late-modern times is expected to play a role as an alternative means of political communication. The confluence of societies with the global social system works as a powerful force impacting on the way in which religionists respond to the secularizing world. As the American Christian Right and the Islamic Revolution in Iran indicate, religion in modern times is asked to provide ideals and resources to enable nations and groups to cope with crises created by the inexorable processes of globalization. The contemporary reformulation of religion is therefore contingent upon not only the transcendental logic of tradition, but also the immanent historical condition in which the religion is embedded, in the globalizing modern world.

In contrast to the situation in neighbouring countries such as China and Japan, religion became a constructive part of Korean nationalism in the 20th century. In the first half of the century, Korean enlightenment thinkers and nationalist activists considered Protestantism to be a modern movement that could free the Korean nation from the yoke of Japanese colonialism. After the 1945 liberation, Protestantism rapidly grew as a model religion in a context in which a majority of South Koreans regarded the ideal of national development as Westernization. However, since the end of the Cold War, in a new democratic political setting, Koreans have sought different paths of development based on their own cultural and regional foundations in a newly globalized world. Meanwhile, Protestant Churches’ status as representatives of modern civilization has gradually sunk. Contrary to the overall religious renaissance of late-modern South Korea, Protestantism has become the only religion that is declining in both numbers and reputation.

The new socio-cultural milieu has prompted Protestantism to apply a different strategy to revitalize itself in South Korea, parting from its traditionally passive attitude towards politics. Conservative Protestant Churches have emerged as an active political force in the political arena. In order to overcome its crisis of membership decline and recover its ‘past glory’, Protestantism, allied with secular conservative groups, has been involving itself in important political events and issues such as elections, legislation and the relationships between South and North Korea and between South Korea and the USA. Many Korean liberals now regard the Protestant Churches as a leading anti-reform polity, while the majority of Korean conservatives see Protestantism as the last bastion of real Korean-ness, from which a rearguard action must be fought to save their country from the pro-North Korea forces and reverse the laissez-faire flow of South Korean social and political development.