Revisiting the Politics of Growth Models: Germany and the European Economic and Monetary Union

Abstract

This article advances the debate on the agency of political actors in Comparative Political Economy (CPE) theories, focusing on Growth Model Theory (GMT). GMT expects stable coalitions around dominant economic sectors, which support growth strategies through lobbying and ideological influence. Despite the explicit goal to account for the domestic politics of growth models, GMT has not developed a politics model that captures agency, uncertainty, and conflict. It thus retains the core problems of the structuralist approaches common in CPE: the reification of policy processes as “blocs” or “coalitions,” a presentism that infers preferences from outcomes, and a narrow focus on economic interests. We propose an alternative politics model based on cultural schemas nondeterministically guiding actors through uncertainty. This model can incorporate conflicting motives, interpretive frameworks, and cognitive limitations in the formation of growth strategies, while also accounting for these strategies’ potential persistence. We illustrate our criticism through a case study of Germany's political debate on the European Economic and Monetary Union. Historical evidence reveals deep divisions among policymakers, shaped by uncertainty, geopolitics, national-identity concerns, and short-term opportunism in response to intraparty and electoral threats.