The Emergence of a Fiscal Cleavage: Evasori,Tartassati,and the Italian Tax State Since 1973

Abstract

Taxation is not only politics congealed in institutions, but politics is the product of fiscal relations. This is particularly evident in Italy, where tax revolts are frequent and governments collapse because of fiscal conflicts. This article argues that these conflicts originate from a fiscal cleavage, the socio-structural foundations of which were laid in the 1970s. The major tax reform of 1971–73 constituted two fiscal class positions that soon initiated a series of collective actions, including strikes, demonstrations, and shop closures. After 1994, the fiscal division line influenced the different groups’ orientation toward the party system of the Second Republic. There, election campaigns centered on tax policy ultimately hardened the fiscal cleavage in the context of European integration. This qualitative, historical-sociological analysis relies on archival material, newspaper articles, published sources, and social statistics. It aims not only to explain the contemporary dynamics of Italian politics but also to help us understand the growing salience of tax politics in other societies.