Quotas Unhinged? How the Change to Preferential Voting Impacts Women’s Representation in Two German Länder

Abstract

Proportional electoral systems, especially when coupled with voluntary party or legislative gender quotas, have been considered beneficial for advancing women’s representation. Extant research on preferential voting in proportional systems, however, yields conflicting evidence. We focus on recent electoral reforms in two German Länder, Hamburg and Bremen, that converted their proportional system from closed to open party lists with preferential voting. Through calculating a counterfactual, we assess the gendered outcomes differentiated between elections, parliaments and parties, to show that party culture plays a pivotal role in shaping the effects of voluntary party quotas within the context of electoral system changes. Our findings underscore the nuanced interaction between electoral system reform and a party’s commitment to gender parity, highlighting the significance of pre-reform party positions and their dedication to prioritizing gender quotas.

Keywords

preferential voting electoral system change Germany party politics voluntary party quotas

Introduction

Electoral system design is central to enhancing women’s representation, with proportional systems perceived to be particularly advantageous (Caul Kittilson and Schwindt Bayer, 2012; Davidson-Schmich, 2016; Krook, 2017; Matland, 2006; Studlar and McAllister, 2002), as they enable party leaderships to shape party lists, thus allowing gender quotas to be implemented more effectively than majoritarian systems (Thames, 2017). However, variations within proportional systems, impact how well voluntary party quotas (VPQs) ‘sit’ within the respective electoral architecture (Ahrens et al., 2020; Caul Kittilson, 2006; Dahlerup, 2006). Closed party lists that include strong quota rules, with strict zippers and stiff penalties for non-compliance, advance gender parity goals more successfully than systems with open lists in which voters have some degree of influence (Matland, 2006; Schmidt, 2009). The intention to give individual voters more choice over successful candidates often drives current initiatives for electoral reform globally and increases the push for more preferential voting.

Research on how preferential voting affects women’s representation (Caul Kittilson, 2006; Matland and Lilliefeldt, 2014; Schmidt, 2009) is inconclusive, reflecting how contextual factors, including gendered party cultures, significantly influence outcomes (Gendźwiłł and Górecki, 2023; Górecki and Pierzgalski, 2022). By default, we expect centre-left and left-wing parties with strong gender parity orientation and effective quotas to further enhance gender balance through preferential voting. Similarly, parties with historical patriarchal legacies and weak or absent quotas, are anticipated to continue to promote men even if voter preferences may elevate some women (Schmidt, 2009).

In cases with striking women’s underrepresentation, some suggest that preferential votes can potentially lift more women into winnable positions (Caul Kittilson, 2006; Gray, 2017; Paxton and Hughes, 2015), while others found that preference votes primarily go to men (Gendźwiłł and Górecki, 2023; Jenny, 2018; Millard, 2014; Thames, 2017; Thames and Williams, 2010). Building on Matland’s and Lilliefeldt’s (2014) model, we demonstrate that isolating the preference vote from its respective context renders the current research inconclusive (cf. Schmidt, 2009) and corroborate their finding that ‘the rest of the system in which electoral institutions are embedded’ (Matland and Lilliefeldt, 2014: 80) better explains the gendered effect of preferential voting. We submit that party culture regarding gender equality and gender quotas has greater salience for understanding when, if and how preferential voting advances parity goals or re-stabilizes male-dominated parliamentary composition. Prior research examining the interactions between gender quotas and preferential voting have predominantly concentrated on legislated candidate quotas within open-list proportional representation (OLPR) systems (Górecki and Pierzgalski, 2022). We shift the focus to the impact of preferential voting where only voluntary party quotas are present. In such contexts, the question of aligning electoral system factors and voter preferences for individual candidates with a party’s quota stipulation falls within the purview of party commitment and regulation. We focus on two German Länder (Hamburg and Bremen) that transitioned from proportional representation with closed party lists (PR) to preferential list proportional representation (PLPR) in the early 2000s. The two similar city states, known as trailblazers for gender equality in politics and public administration, provide relevant case studies which suggested a rich seam of valuable data to mine.

We examined whether the transition had benefits for, or unhinged, women’s parliamentary representation and, more specifically, how it affected parties’ VPQ implementation, by comparing the impact on women’s representation overall and for quota parties¹ by generating counterfactual scenarios. We calculated the outcome if the shift towards PLPR had not occurred, leaving VPQs unaffected by preference votes, and found no significant overall effect. (see also Jakobeit et al., 2011; Probst and Gattig, 2012). However, major differences were apparent at the party level, where preferential voting undercut hard quotas of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and negatively impacted women’s representation. This is historically significant because, with few exceptions in the post war period, the SPD has been the principal governing party in both Länder and contributed significantly to high women’s representation in parliament.

Our findings indicate the pertinence of interactive gendered effects of party culture and gender parity goals in explaining the effects of voluntary party quotas within the context of electoral system changes. For example, parties with a strong top-down and bottom-up pro-parity culture such as the Bündnis’90/Grüne (Greens) and Die Linke (the Left), exhibit a resilience to the potential for preferential voting to undermine quotas. In contrast, the SPD, who have an equally strong formal parity commitment but more diverse intraparty culture, experience a negative impact on women’s representation. In electoral races where parties (such as the CDU) with weak or no parity claims have the most seats and few women representatives, preferential voting appears to have little or no positive effects. Thus, preferential voting systems do not disadvantage women per se, but the way parties engage with PLPR and practice new ‘rules-in-use’ (Ostrom, 1999) does affect the probability of women being elected. Put simply, while PLPR does not produce rules about gender, how parties address the ‘fit’ between preferential voting and their parity commitment can generate gendered effects (Gains and Lowndes, 2022).

Our findings contribute to understanding the effect of preferential voting by emphasizing the importance of party culture in aligning VPQs with electoral system changes. While preferential voting does not inherently favour male candidates, its ability to disrupt quota systems underscores the significance of contextual factors in shaping electoral outcomes. We proceed by reviewing the literature on gendered effects of preferential voting systems, before presenting our data, methods and the cases of Hamburg and Bremen. We then examine how gender quotas intersect with preferential voting in the electoral systems in both legislatures. Constructing counterfactual scenarios to PRPL voting, we identify: (1) a small overall gendered representation gap caused by the new electoral laws; and (2) a more substantive gap, particularly the effectiveness of the Social Democrats’ to preserve their VPQs. We conclude by summarizing the results and discussing our findings in light of wider theoretical debates.

The Gendered Effects of Electoral Systems and Preferential Voting

Electoral systems are a crucial ingredient for achieving gender parity in politics (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993; Tremblay, 2012). Research suggests that proportional systems favour women’s entry into politics, while majoritarian systems tend to pose more challenges (Caul Kittilson and Schwindt Bayer, 2012; Matland, 2006; Skorge, 2023; but see Christensen and Bardall, 2016). Recent research, focused on tailoring gender quotas to specific electoral systems (Dahlerup et al., 2014; Lang et al., 2023; Lépinard and Rubio-Marin, 2018), have highlighted how electoral rules influence party behaviour in candidate selection (Meier, 2012). For example, proportional systems and multi-member constituencies encourage parties to strategically diversify candidate profiles, such as by sex or ethnicity (Celis et al., 2014). Moreover, parties can broaden their candidate pool with higher district magnitude and using more winnable seats to appeal to different voter subgroups (Matland, 2006). For preferential list systems, most studies focus on voter preferences as the main driver of gendered outcomes, arguing either that women in PLPR can profit by voting for women, or that male bias informs negative outcomes for women. A smaller strand of literature focuses on the interactive effects of institutional design and party culture on women’s representation.

As Passarelli (2020: 32) has noted, making standard definitions of the ‘preferential voting’ system is notoriously difficult because the ‘category brings together countries that have very different characteristics and generate just as many different outcomes’′. Indeed, preferential voting can be found in majoritarian and proportional systems (Górecki and Pierzgalski, 2022), the latter usually operating with open or flexible party lists and labelled preferential list proportional representation (Passarelli, 2020; Schmidt, 2009). Unlike closed party lists with candidates elected in list order, flexible or open lists² allow voters to alter party lists by voting low-ranked candidates up to electable positions.

In PLPRs, changes to intraparty list through preference votes may affect efforts to ensure parity through party quotas and zippered lists (Schmidt, 2009), but the results are inconclusive. Some argue that advantages for women can be discerned under PLPR as voters concerned about gender parity can be mobilized to vote for women (John et al., 2018; Lamendola and Terrell, 2020; Schmidt and Saunders, 2004), with conservative milieux being notable sites for improving the chances of the few women listed (Dean, 2021; Golder et al., 2017). Others regard PLPR as a disadvantage likely to perpetuate gender biases (Chmilewski and Sauer, 2022; Thames and Williams, 2010). Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and North Macedonia compared showed (all aspects of electoral systems equal) that OLPR induced massive women’s underrepresentation despite a 40% legislated candidate quota – but only in BiH (Gavrić and Vojvodić, 2024). In Poland, another conservative context, contradictory results followed quota adoption: in 2011, women advanced through preferential voting (Kunovitch, 2012) but made up only one in four candidates who benefitted (Millard, 2014). Gendźwiłł and Górecki (2023) explain this ‘paradox of gender quotas’ through context: when women’s share on electoral lists increases abruptly through quotas, vote shares may remain the same due to discriminatory gender-based voting, thereby effectively limiting women’s electoral chances (cf. Matland, 1993 on similar effects in Norway until the 1960s).

Ambivalent study results on gendered voting preferences and voter bias compound the mixed evidence of gendered effects PLPR. Whether or not women support specific parties with an outspoken parity orientation, a woman leader and/or substantive number of women representatives is context dependent. In a study of 55 elections in 14 countries, Ferland (2022) discredited the notion that a stronger presence of women among party representatives leads to increased same-gender voting – unless the leader is a woman. While there is no data to test for gendered voter preferences in our cases, the broader electoral landscape reveals no systematic preference for male candidates in Germany (Fujiwara et al., 2023; Kaiser and Hennl, 2008), and further that women are more likely than men to vote for left-leaning parties (including the SPD) that nominate high numbers of women (Hudde, 2023; Marcinkiewicz and Jankowski, 2014).

A final strand of research identifies the prime drivers of gendered outcomes as a combination of electoral system design and party culture. In Belgium, preferential voting and strong legislative quotas intersect to the detriment of women (Erzeel and Caluwaerts, 2015; Marien et al., 2017). In 2003, 49% of candidates were women, but only received 39% of preferential votes. This was less voter bias (Wauters et al., 2010: 472) and more systemic factors, such as underrepresentation in important list positions, weaker financial support and less media coverage.

Däubler et al. (2024) found that although public attitudes towards gender equality are important, internal party dynamics and institutional factors like electoral systems, are more significant in shaping candidate selection processes and shaping electoral success. For our cases, we expect that variation in party culture and nominations offer a plausible explanation for gendered patterns in electoral success, rather than generalized assumptions about gendered voter bias. Norway provides a particularly intriguing comparable case. Examining effects of district and party magnitude alongside mobilization around women’s representation, Matland (1993) demonstrates gradual changes over time. Progressing from ‘women tokens’ to party parity commitments, women’s representation increased to 35% by the mid-1980s. Once women politicians were firmly entrenched, that is, crossing 30%, district and party magnitude ceased as factors for gaining preference votes (Matland, 1993). As we explain in the next section, our cases are comparable to Norway and exhibit comparably strong Land-driven gender equality commitments and high women’s representation since the mid-1980s. We would thus expect no negative impact of the new PLPR on women’s representation.

In sum, studies challenge assumptions that voter bias accounts for gendered outcomes in electoral success, particularly in gender-equal contexts such as Finland and Norway with no significant gendered voting behaviour, regardless of party affiliation (Lefkofridi et al., 2019; Matland, 1993). In Lithuania, for instance, a gender gap in preference votes only exists for the Social Democrats, pointing out party-contingency (Ragauskas, 2021). Like Belgium, we expect party-specific factors and institutional design to be the main drivers of potential gendered votes (Erzeel and Caluwaerts, 2015). Put in broader terms, we submit that the embeddedness of a preference vote in specific party cultures, and its interaction with VPQs, better explains gendered outcomes under PLPR, and not voter choice (see also Rudolph et al., 2022). In this respect, parties are powerful gatekeepers for electoral success; their nomination strategies shaped by internal party cultures are thus decisive in determining electoral outcomes for women and men (Davidson-Schmich, 2006; Fujiwara et al., 2023). We engage with this argument by examining if, and to what degree, women’s election results for VPQ parties are affected by switching from PR to PLPR.

We draw on Matland and Lilliefeldt’s (2014) theoretical model that predicted the impact of preferential voting on women’s representation according to a party’s commitment to gender equality. It assumes divergences between party leadership(s) and voters regarding the goal of parity. In cases where a party is strongly committed to gender equality, preferential votes for women would have less impact because voters who are sceptical towards gender equality would vote men up (or women down). Conversely, in parties where leadership is sceptical towards stronger women’s representation, and thus not taken measures to advance women, the effects of preferential voting could be more positive overall, if voters prefer to advance at least a few more women.

We build on their model and adapt it to the German case by focusing on VPQs as high-impact expressions of this general commitment (see Table 1). We assume that voter preference itself is shaped by party culture, and a programmatic focus on women is only a part of it. Gender-sensitive party culture manifests programmatically (situating gender centrally in programmes), organizationally (addressing gendered factors in day-to-day internal practices, e.g. offering childcare; curbing late meetings), and with regard to power dynamics and positionality (employing (im)material resources and formal mechanisms to advance women in inner-party office and leadership) (Ahrens and Meier, 2024; Ruf, 2021). A gender-sensitive party culture is thus an element of intraparty culture and acts to simultaneously shape the public perception of a party’s gender equality commitment.³

Table 1.

Predicted Impact of Preferential Voting on Women’s Representation.

Voters	Parties
Voters	Party strongly committed to gender equality, has adopted positive action policies and strongly promotes women	Party not hostile to women, yet has not adopted strong positive action policies not aggressively promotes women	Party is sceptical to women, seen as outsiders and inferior candidates, women are impeded by the party
Party voters strongly committed to gender equality; consciously vote for women	LIMITED	POSITIVE	STRONG POSITIVE
Party voters not hostile to women, yet not actively concerned about representation	NEGATIVE	LIMITED	POSITIVE
Party voters sceptical to women, seen as inferior representatives	STRONG NEGATIVE	NEGATIVE	LIMITED

Source: Adapted from Matland and Lilliefeldt (2014: 82).

In Germany, the most salient gender-sensitive party culture is arguably found in the Greens, where it is rooted in their feminist history and parity commitment Women are formally entitled to the party lists top-spot, and the party frequently utilizes parity leadership duos. Sexist power dynamics are addressed up front without fear of inner-party retribution (Ahrens et al., 2020). The Left is similarly obligated to parity in candidacy and leadership and promotes a gender-sensitive party culture. Despite its historical association as a promoter of gender equality and programmatically embracing parity, the SPD shows weaker organizational and power-based follow-through. The CDU exhibits the lowest formal commitment to gender equality in both its organization and power dynamics (Ahrens et al., 2020).

Gendered voter preferences, while not wholly determined by gender-sensitive party culture, are shaped by it. Research on gendered voter preferences evolved from identifying overtly sexist voter choice, to the establishment of complex sets of conditions that impact women candidates and their electability differently than men (Davidson-Schmich, 2016). Voters in preferential voting systems combine a mix of candidate-centred, strategic and underlying preference voting (Bowler et al., 2018). Gender-sensitive party culture shapes voter choices though: how well candidates are known; and whether parties strategically place them in visible and winnable list positions. Consequently, the underlying masculinist bias of voters is best addressed by parties promoting women and publicly standing against discrimination.

Lühiste (2015) argues that women fare better in closed list than open ordered systems because party gatekeepers in the latter place women in less favourable positions, and thus reduce their chance for preferential votes. We agree that party calculations, as part of intraparty cultures, impact women candidates and the gendered electorate in preferential voting systems. We expect that the strongest gendered impact of preference votes occurs in cases: (1) where a party (here the SPD) formally committed to gender equality omits adequate support for women, ultimately advancing more men via preference votes; (2) where a party traditionally sceptical to women’s representation (here the CDU) maintains an outwardly masculinist culture, leading voters to advance, or at least not to comparatively disadvantage, more women. By contrast, in cases where a party (here the Greens and the Left) strongly commits to gender equality and signals the importance of gender equality through changed internal party culture, the preference vote alters the party’s parity intention only partially.

Voluntary Party Quotas and Preferential Voting Systems in German Länder

Women continue to be underrepresented in German Länder parliaments. In 2024, their share ranged from 25.1% in Bavaria to the two leaders, Bremen (37.9%) and Hamburg (43.9%).⁴ In the absence of legislative quotas or a parity law, the main institutional arena for adopting and implementing quotas are parties (Ahrens and Lang, 2023; Davidson-Schmich, 2006). Since the 1980s, four parties have adopted VPQs; the Greens, followed by the SPD, the Left and, utilizing an aspirational ‘quorum’, the CDU (Lang, 2018). The quota regulations for the period we analyse are in descending order of scope and effectiveness: Greens – 50% quota with uneven seats reserved for women, even seats open to everyone; the Left – 50% and zippered list; SPD – 40% and zippered list; CDU⁵ – 33% list quorum (Ahrens et al., 2020).

Germany is a strongly federalized party democracy impacting VPQ implementation (Davidson-Schmich, 2006, 2016), and 14 of 16 Länder employ some form of proportional voting system. Only Hamburg and Bremen changed their electoral system in the early 2000s from PR closed party lists to preferential voting (Bowler et al., 2018). Both city states are left leaning and have long been dominated by the SPD and considered pioneers in promoting women’s participation in their Bürgerschaft (Citizen Assembly). Both crossed the ‘critical mass’ of 30% (Dahlerup, 2006) by the end of the 1980s, and 40% by the turn of the millennium (Currle, 1996, see Figures 1 and 5), putting them on a similar path to Norway (Matland, 1993). In the light of the electoral system change, we ask: how does the switch to preferential voting affect women’s representation in parliament and VPQ parties? More specifically, does the preference vote produce differently gendered outcomes for specific quota parties, and do zippers become unhinged in the process?

Figure 1.

Women’s Representation Hamburg 1987–2020: Election Results and Counterfactual.

Evidently, women’s parliamentary representation remained strong even after changing to preferential voting (42.3% in Hamburg in 2020; 43.7% in Bremen in 2023), and at first glance, the results seem unsurprising given the gender equality legacies. However, we show that under the previous closed-party-list PR, the chances of reaching gender parity in Hamburg and Bremen would have been higher. If the previous electoral system would have applied, women would have gained more parliamentary seats in almost every election compared to their de-facto representation after the electoral system change, for both parliament and party selection.

Hamburg

The city state of Hamburg is the wealthiest German Land (GDP per capita), densely populated with 1.8 million inhabitants, and with the SPD occupying the mayoral office for most election cycles since 1946, a long-standing stronghold for the party. Hamburg founded the first women’s Land-level equality office in 1979, signalling the SPD’s commitment to gender parity as a Land-sponsored goal. The Hamburg Bürgerschaft, elected every 5 years, comprises 121 mandates, 71 of which are distributed via personal votes in 17 multi-member districts with three to five mandates each. The remaining 50 are allocated on Land level through a ‘protected open list/personalized OLPR’ (Passarelli, 2020: 39).

Until 2004, Hamburg operated with PR (one vote; closed party lists) for both districts and land level; parties determined the candidate order and ultimately who was elected (David, 2010). In 2004, a referendum initiated by the association ‘Mehr Demokratie’ (‘More Democracy’), resulted in the adoption of a preferential voting system with open party lists and 10 votes per voter. Before the reform took effect, the governing CDU altered it to five votes for district-level open lists and one for a closed Land list (six votes in total), arguing that such change kept it simple and ensured the ability of party’s to secure mandates for top candidates through the Land list (David, 2010; Trefs, 2008). The new electoral law was applied for the 2008 elections, but it was changed once again in 2009, by a further referendum initiated by the same association, to flexible Land-level lists following an all-party compromise (David, 2010). Since then, voters have ten votes: five for district-level candidates using OLPR and five for a ‘personalized OLPR’ on Land level (David, 2010; Passarelli, 2020).

Voters can simultaneously split (‘panaschieren’) and cumulate (‘kumulieren’) votes across several candidates and parties, or – for the Land list – simply vote for one party list. In districts, candidates with the most personal votes win. District mandates are deducted from the party’s proportional share at the Land level. If all a party’s seats are filled this way, no Land list candidates enter the Bürgerschaft. (HamWahlG, 2018: §3). The 50 Land-level seats are allocated proportionally, based on the share of personal versus list votes each party receives,⁶ that is, more personal votes mean more personal mandates. Mandates are assigned first to candidates elected by list votes (in original order) and then to candidates elected by personal votes.

The electoral system change resulted in parties losing influence over the composition of their parliamentary group. The first assessments of the impact on women’s representation, concluded that the new voting system had not negatively impacted women when comparing their share among candidates and those elected (Jakobeit et al., 2011). Contrary to this assessment, we demonstrate that (1) the impact differed substantially across parties; (2) that compared to the former proportional representation system, all VPQ parties but the Greens lost women representatives and, therefore, (3) the new electoral system was of greater benefit to men than women.

Bremen

The city state of Bremen is Germany’s smallest Land with 680,000 inhabitants and ranks second for GDP per capita. Like Hamburg, Bremen invested early in women friendly policies with the SPD as the primary driving force. It comprises two electoral areas subject to the same electoral rules (‘Wahlbereiche’) that elect 69 seats (Bremen) and 15 seats (Bremerhaven) to the Bürgerschaft (BremWahlG, 2018: §5).⁷

Until 2007, Bremen used a proportional system with closed party lists and a 5% threshold in both electoral areas. A referendum in 2006 by the same association as in Hamburg resulted in the adoption of a preferential proportional system combining open – and closed – list PR with a total of five votes. Since the 2011 elections, voters can split or cumulate votes: for one party list only; for different candidates on a party list; for different party lists; for candidates from different party lists. The total vote share⁸ (personal and party votes) determines party mandates in each electoral area. As in Hamburg, the share of personal vs list votes regulates whether a party’s seats go to individual or list candidates. Because there is no minimum threshold for preference votes to count and candidates can be elected based solely on personal votes (Passarelli, 2020: 43), the new electoral system limited parties’ control over candidate selection. In 2011 and 2015, respectively, list mandates were assigned first, then personal mandates, which was a specific request of the referendum association (Probst and Gattig, 2012). In 2018, the Bürgerschaft reversed the sequence of assigning mandates: since 2019, seats go first to candidates with the most personal votes, then to list candidates.

This change was significant. Prior to 2019, prominent candidates often entered via the list, while only locally known candidates could get elected with a relatively small margin of personal votes. The reform benefitted candidates with the highest personal vote share (mainly party list top candidates), provided transparency about personal vote winners and reinforced party power in determining list winners (Weser-Kurier, 2018). Although a high personal vote share can still upend the party list, ‘More Democracy’ criticized the change for decreasing the chances of low-ranked candidates. Evaluations of the 2011 election revealed that the preference vote resulted in considerably fewer women being elected for the SPD (Probst and Gattig, 2012: 74). While other parties compensated for the effect, ensuring that the overall share for women stayed the same, it signalled an evident tension between preference votes and quota stipulations.

After presenting our data and methods, we consider the extent to which quota parties (Greens, SPD, Left, CDU) fulfilled their VPQs for electoral lists and how far the preferential voting system altered the gender composition of parliaments and factions. Our findings show that the change from proportional to preference voting in both Länder impacted parties’ ability to fulfil their VPQ commitment.

Data and Methods

To assess the effect of the electoral system changes on women’s representation, we used official data available online, or upon mail request, from the Land-level electoral offices in Hamburg and Bremen. We collated gender-disaggregated electoral data on all candidates elected for all parties that were represented in both legislatures between 2003 and 2023.⁹ For calculating changes to women’s representation in each party, we executed three analytical steps. First, we examined whether parties correctly applied their VPQs, for example, 50% women on uneven seats for Greens, 33% women for CDU for each ten seats. Second, we calculated the number of women and men elected in total and for each party. Third, working on the assumption that the election result – number of seats per party – would be the same pre- and post-preference vote, we calculated the number of women and men list candidates that would have been elected under the old proportional system. This step produces a counterfactual exhibiting women’s share in parliament and parties if no change to the electoral system had occurred, based on the actual number of candidates elected.

Contra Probst and Gattig (2012), who calculated women’s share for the 2011 Bremen elections based on the total share of women and men candidates on party lists and total of women and men elected and detected no gendered effect, we found that SPD and CDU¹⁰ often applied VPQs only to the upper (previously winnable) party list part while bottom list places were dominated by men. Only analysing if the share on lists matches the elected share (Probst and Gattig, 2012), can distort the actual gendered impact of electoral system change, as our results below demonstrate.

We differentiated the last step of our analysis (counterfactual calculation) following Land level regulations and changes over time. For Hamburg, we calculated the data separately for the Land list and for each of the 17 district lists. We compared the composition of those elected with the original composition on the party lists, separating list and personal mandates to assess the impact of each, that is, who received enough preference votes to unhinge the zippered electoral list (or other VPQs). For the district level, the party list composition was checked against those elected to measure potential replacements of top seats by lower placed candidates. Total district mandates were then aggregated and combined with the Land list results to reveal the overall changes in gender representation.¹¹

For Bremen, each electoral area was first calculated separately and in total to determine if the electoral area makes a difference. We then investigated how many women and men were elected via the list and via personal votes to approximate their differential success in preference votes.¹² This revealed how the last electoral system change – personal mandates before list mandates – impacted women’s and men’s electoral chances.

Unhinged Quotas in Hamburg and Bremen

Both cities introduced preferential voting as a strategy to enhance democracy, enabling voters to have a greater say in the electoral outcomes. Likewise, gender equality is perceived by most parties and public administration in these two Länder as a high-valued public and democratic good. Our analysis scrutinizes whether the electoral outcomes were consistent with this long-term commitment. According to Matland and Lilliefeldt’s (2014) model on the effects of preferential voting on gender quotas, we expect the largest gendered effect on women to be for: (1) parties with a strong commitment to gender equality but with an internal party culture that lacks adequate support for women (here the SPD); (2) parties who uphold a masculinist party culture, yet voters comparatively advance, or at least do not disadvantage, more women (here the CDU). We also expect that preference votes alter outcomes only partially for parties strongly committed to gender equality and a changed internal party culture (here Greens and the Left).

Hamburg

In three of four election cycles under the new system (2008, 2011, 2020), men benefitted when compared to their candidacies and original list placements in Hamburg (see Figure 1; see Table 1A, online Supplemental Material, for details). All parties composed electoral lists following their VPQ in every election year, and both the CDU and SPD had almost no double candidacies, that is, candidates running simultaneously on district and Land level. Double candidacies provide a safety net by ensuring that – if not successful on district level – candidates can still be elected through the Land list; if successful, however, additional Land list candidates benefit. Greens and the Left used this strategy more often, and both women and men benefitted equally from candidates elected on district-level freeing places on the Land list.

In 2008, the share of women dropped by 2.5 percentage points (three mandates), 3.3 percentage points in 2011 (four mandates) and even 5.7 percentage points in 2020 (seven mandates). In 2015, women gained 2.4 percentage points (three mandates). For the election in 2011, Jakobeit et al. (2011) concluded preferential votes had no impact on the relative election success of women, since women compared to men lost in total only four mandates via party lists. However, we would suggest that 3.3 percentage points is certainly not marginal, particularly in the context of an exchange of four seats in a parliament of only 121.

Since 1987, women’s representation had steadily increased, before suffering a setback in 2001, when for the first time since 1945, the CDU won the elections (36.5%) and the right-wing populist Schill Party for a Rule of Law Offensive extemporaneously won almost 20%. Both parliamentary groups were male dominated (CDU 82.1%; Schill Party: 89.7%), and SPD and Greens lost massively. By 2004, the women’s share continued the earlier trend, reaching more than 40%, before the 2008 elections with the new electoral system reduced women’s share to figures even below the 1991 results 17 years earlier. Notably, women’s share was high in 2020 with 42.3% of all seats, yet the Hamburg Bürgerschaft would have had almost reached parity under the old electoral system with 48% of potentially successful list places occupied by women candidates (Figure 1).

When examining the electoral paths of women via the district level vs Land list, Figure 2 shows that except for 2015, fewer women than expected were elected on the district level. For the Land list, women received fewer seats than expected in 2011 and 2020, but more in 2015; there was no difference in 2008 (see Table 2A, online Supplemental Material, for details).

Figure 2.

Elected Women and Counterfactual Hamburg 2008–2020, District Level and Land List.

It is important to note that – different to the Land list – women had an almost similar share as men on the district level (with considerably lower district magnitude). This shows that, overall, women are as likely as men to be put forward as candidates on the more competitive district level.

The picture changes when the different parties are examined for total gendered gains and losses, for candidacies and those elected on district versus Land level. Our data identifies three different outcomes: (1) the projected number of elected women is lower than expected (CDU in 2008 and 2011; SPD in all elections except 2015), (2) the projected number of elected men is lower than expected (SPD, Greens in 2015; Left in 2015 and 2020), (3) the projected number of women and men matches for candidacies and those elected. Since we are interested in changes, we further explored the first and second outcomes. Figure 3 illustrates the results for CDU, SPD, Greens and Left for all election cycles.

Figure 3.

Comparison Projected and Elected MPs by Party and Gender, Hamburg 2008–2020.

Women’s representation in the CDU remained on a very low level with no sign that the new electoral system positively impacted women. Importantly, the CDU’s overall seat share decreased considerably from 56 seats in 2008, to 28 in 2011, 20 in 2015 and 15 in 2020; in 2020 not a single CDU candidate was elected via the Land list. Men dominated the first two places on district-level lists with women often placed third; in district 13, where the CDU got three MPs elected in 2008, the fourth-positioned man, however, replaced the third-placed woman. Thus, if the CDU continues to rely mainly on district-level mandates, women’s representation is unlikely to change even with new quota regulations.

Despite a generally higher seat share for women, the results for the SPD demonstrate the potentially negative impact of the preference vote for women. With the exception of 2015, where one woman greater than projected was elected via the Land list after the man placed directly above her got elected via the district level, women lost seats in comparison to their original party list placement (see Figure 4; see Table 3A, online Supplemental Material, for details).

Figure 4.

Women’s Representation SPD Hamburg 1987–2020: Election Results and Counterfactual.

Notwithstanding the party fulfilling their quota zipper obligation, the new electoral law had negative effects for SPD women candidates in every election except 2015, where they gained one seat (+1.7% points). In 2008 and 2011, the effect was below 5 percentage points (or two and three less seats), but in 2020, women lost 13 percentage points (seven seats). Generally, the new preferential voting system appears to increasingly disadvantage SPD women, particularly when compared to earlier trajectories). Thus, women’s representation for the SPD steadily increased since 1987 and dropped significantly after electoral system change, with their share in the 2008 and 2020 elections even below the 1991 results (Figure 4).

Comparable to many other studies (Meier, 2012; Schmidt, 2009; Wauters et al., 2010), list top positions explain the district outcomes. First, the 17 potential first positions were clearly male dominated: 14 in 2008; 11 in 2011; and 13 in 2020. Only in 2015, were the positions close to being equal – nine for men and eight for women; notably, 2015 resulted in the highest share of SPD women elected on district level (42.9%). In addition, women listed in second place were overtaken by men listed on lower places: two in 2008, four in 2011 and 2020. In 2011, two men were overtaken by lower-listed women, thereby reducing the factual seat loss for women to two; in 2015, the numbers were equal, with one woman and one man overtaken on their second list place. Placing women second failed to secure their seats, thus breaking the SPD quota zipper.

The electoral results for the Greens and the Left are juxtaposed, with women benefitting from preferential voting in several elections: Greens in 2011 and 2015 and the Left in 2015 and 2020. There is no clear indication whether the land or district lists drive change, in some years it is the former, in some the latter, however, double candidacies can play an important role. For instance, in 2020, Green men benefitted because Green women were successful on district level and freed a place for men on the Land list. Women candidates from list places 1, 3, 5, 9 and 11 (and the man on list place 2) all won their district lead candidacy and were succeeded by men on the Land list. Nevertheless, this did still not result in parity, and Green women received almost 60% of the seats. Hence, the double candidacies with the strict zipper securing Green women lead positions in winnable districts resulted in advancing women.

Overall, the four Hamburg elections results under PLPR only partially align with our assumptions based on Matland and Lilliefeldt (2014). For the SPD, the preference votes substantially overturns the party’s quota zipper and thus supports the assessment of limited to strongly negative effects on women. For the Left and the Greens, however, this effect is almost zero over time, implying different cultures in both these parties. For the CDU, the expected outcome of limited to strongly positive preference votes for women candidates of parties sceptical towards gender parity could not be confirmed. Over the past four election cycles, the preference vote did not increase CDU women’s representation, indicating potentially a still negative party voter attitude towards women candidates.

Bremen

In every Bremen election since the electoral system change, fewer women were elected relative to their candidacy and original list placements (see Figure 5; see Table 4A, online Supplemental Material for details). In 2011, men received three more seats than under the old electoral system (amounting to 3.6 percentage points). In 2015, the impact was even stronger, with women securing seven fewer seats (8.5 percentage points). In 2019 and 2023, men received one more seat than expected, thereby gaining 1.2 (2019) and 1.1 (2023) percentage points. Like Hamburg, receiving one or three more seats does not sound that much, but it has considerable impact in a small parliament. With the old electoral system, Bremen always had the highest women’s representation among all German Länder. Put into historical perspective, the immediate impact of the new electoral system is clearly visible (Figure 5). Under the new system, women’s share stopped its decade-long upwards trend, and the 33.7% in 2015 was even below the 1991 share of 34.0%. Women’s share increased again from 2019, but Figure 5 illustrates what would have happened without electoral system change.

Figure 5.

Women’s Representation Bremen 1987-2023: Election Results and Counterfactual.

The general decrease of women’s representation under the Bremen preferential voting system cannot be primarily attributed to an overall move of the electorate to the right, as evidenced by the Bremen CDU. It adhered fully to its quorum in 2015 and 2019, and it even ran a zippered list in 2011 for the top 14 list places (starting with a woman) and in 2023 for the whole list (starting with a man). More importantly, their gender composition hardly changed through the elections and the women’s share ranged between 33.3% in 2019 and 50% in 2023 – shares the CDU never reached in federal elections (Ahrens and Lang, 2023). This supports Matland and Lilliefeldt’s (2014) hypothesis of an overall moderately positive effect of the preference vote for women-sceptical parties. Likewise, the Left and Greens solidly reached parity or a higher share of women (except Greens in 2015, see Figure 6). In Figure 6, we excluded the Left because they only had one seat change in 2011, and the CDU because their gender composition of candidacies and those elected stayed the same.

Figure 6.

Comparison Projected and Elected MPs, SPD and Greens, Bremen 2011–2023.

For the Greens, the different outcomes in 2015, 2019 and 2023 result from one woman candidate (one man candidate in 2015) moving up to top place after being elected through personal votes, that is, gaining substantial numbers of preference votes and overtaking a higher placed candidate of a different sex.¹³

Like Hamburg, it is the SPD that exhibits the strongest negative effects of preference votes (see Figure 7; separate results for Bremen and Bremerhaven are reported in Table 5A, online Supplemental Material). In each election since the electoral system change, women’s share dropped considerably when comparing candidacies and those elected. In 2011, SPD’s women’s share dropped 8.4 percentage points (four mandates), skyrocketing to 20 percentage points in 2015 (six mandates), to 8.7% percentage points in 2019 (two mandates) and 7.4% percentage points (two mandates) in the 2023 election.

Figure 7.

Women’s Representation SPD Bremen 1987–2023: Election Results and Counterfactual.

Without the electoral system change to preference votes, the SPD would have reached the parity zone of 45%–55% women among their MPs in the last three elections (Figure 7). For example, their zippered party list was revealed to be completely unhinged, evident in how the first ten seats were allocated under preference voting in 2011: from originally M-W-M-W-M-M-W-M-W-M (six men, four women) to a list of M-M-W-M-M-M-M-M-M-W (eight men, two women). Women were thus downgraded to unwinnable positions through preference voting (see Probst and Gattig, 2012: 60f.). A similar pattern occurred in 2015. Compared to the historical trajectory, women’s representation deteriorated immensely, the results marking an all-time low since 1987, and with no election reaching results previously achieved between 1991 and system changes (Figure 7).

Although the changes in 2019 – assigning seats to candidates with the highest preference votes first – served to buffer the gendered effect, men still benefitted and women lost ground compared to the old electoral system with closed party lists. For the SPD, it substantially mattered which mandates (personal or list mandates) were assigned first. Until the 2015 election, with list mandates assigned first, the most prominent candidates were elected through the list (predominantly men), whereas even more unknown candidates were elected personally by relatively few additional personal votes (also predominantly men). From 2019 onwards, the opposite procedure was applied, which induced transparency in allocated personal votes and strengthened the parties’ powers in determining the candidates with higher chances of being elected from the list.

Taken together, the results for the four Bremen elections under preference voting only partially align with our assumptions originating from Matland and Lilliefeldt (2014). Again, SPD women were the primary losers and preference voting substantially unhinged the party’s quota zipper. In this respect, the new electoral system resulted in limited to strongly negative effects, which might potentially be explained by sceptical voters. While the preferential voting effect for the Left and the Greens in Bremen is almost zero over time, the zippered Land list endorsed by CDU leadership was equally unaltered by preference votes. This may elicit the rather astonishing observation that CDU voters are potentially less sceptical towards women candidates than SPD voters.

Discussion and Conclusion

Electoral systems play a crucial role in advancing women’s representation, with proportional systems being particularly advantageous. Nonetheless, parties’ effectiveness in promoting gender parity is equally shaped by electoral system design, the composition of party lists, the implementation of VPQs and the individual choices expressed by voters through preference votes.

In Hamburg and Bremen, city states with strong gender equality legacies, the empirical analysis demonstrated that preferential voting is neither intrinsically ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for parity, and its effects are not solely dependent on official party positions regarding gender equality. We find that the new preferential voting systems unhinged zippered party lists in both Bürgerschaften with the most pronounced negative effects for the SPD. This matches Gendźwiłł and Górecki’s (2023) assumption that even small differences in preference votes can generate crucial disparities for large district magnitudes and for larger parties. Preference voting in Hamburg and Bremen thus does not always favour male candidates, but its capability to upend VPQs and zippered lists spins the electoral outcomes towards men in specific party culture contexts.

The counterfactual calculations highlight that electoral reforms in both Länder worked against parity, because voters can overturn party leaderships’ commitment to quotas and zippered lists. In cases where the party leadership and the electorate strongly commit to gender equality (Greens and Left), preference votes do not upend parity commitments, and in cases where party leadership is sceptical to women’s equal representation (CDU Hamburg), the electorate sometimes advance women beyond the VPQ. Voters, however, did not alter the strong Bremen CDU leadership parity commitment of zippered lists.

Party culture and how leadership commitment to gender equality ‘sits’ with the electorate thus plays a central role. Consistent with Matland and Lilliefeldt (2014), we found the strongest negative effect of preferential voting for the SPD, which similar to Lithuania (Ragauskas, 2021), could indicate latent gender bias among certain voter segments. In both German Länder, preferential voting diminished the chances of SPD women candidates when compared to the previous electoral system. This is significant because the SPD had been the most constant contributor to gender parity over many decades in both city states. Conversely, Matland and Lilliefeldt (2014) stipulated that the strongest positive parity effect of the preference vote occurs for parties that are traditionally parity-averse, but have a substantial pro-parity constituency. In our case, this would resemble the German CDU, where we found no clear correlation. Instead, our data suggests party culture is the pertinent intervening factor, with the Bremen CDU in particular, revealing no negative effects from the preference vote.

Considering this, we suggest a degree of caution when making generalized assumptions about gendered voter bias. Instead, future studies should address the interactions between (informal) party culture on nominations and preferential voting systems in greater depth, considering how these produce gendered effects (Gains and Lowndes, 2022). In this respect, we suggest potential alternative explanations for our findings¹⁴ and offer prescriptive pathways for how parties can counter negative effects of preferential voting systems on gender parity.

In the first instance, our findings for the 17 electoral districts in Hamburg conform to the typical strong top list position effect (Lühiste, 2015; Meier, 2012; Schmidt, 2009; Wauters et al., 2010) for the SPD: in 2015, the only year where the first positions were close to equal, women received 42.9% of mandates. Arguably, the SPD could safeguard its VPQ by putting women equally as often as men at the top of the list, although this might still not be sufficient if the following contextual factors come to bear.

Additional nomination and campaigning strategies – even if adhering to VPQs – may produce gendered personal vote outcomes. Kamlage (2012), for example, analysed how the change to the electoral system impacted candidate campaigning strategies in Bremen. One core finding was that, despite only one state-wide party list, most parties informally ordered candidates to focus on their local city districts rather than the entire city area (Kamlage, 2012: 16–36). Jankowski (2016) found the same ‘friends and neighbours’ logic for Hamburg, where voters tended to favour candidates from their own area, using locality as a key decision-making cue irrespective of the candidate’s ballot position. If both the SPD and CDU combined this locality aspect with their German-wide gendered practice of systematically nominating women candidates in districts where their party is less popular, or the candidate is unknown (Davidson-Schmich, 2006; Fujiwara et al., 2023), this could result in fewer personal votes for women.

The focus on specific districts also benefitted local politicians who already served on advisory councils or in leadership positions (Kamlage, 2012) – for the CDU and SPD these are more likely men (Ahrens et al., 2020; Davidson-Schmich, 2016, 2018). Strong deviations from the original list, and successful candidates from low list places particularly for the SPD, indicate such effects but the unavailability of data (Bowler et al., 2018; Kamlage, 2012) means this cannot be rigorously tested. In addition, voter turnout in Bremen varies significantly by electoral district and correlates with socioeconomic status (high income = high turnout) (Probst and Gattig, 2012: 51–52). Candidates in low-turnout areas likely receive fewer personal votes whereas those in high-turnout areas have an advantage. This might be gendered, for instance, if women candidates run predominantly in low-turn-out areas without parties securing their electability through top list positions.

In consideration of the new electoral system, other candidates targeted specific voter groups for instance, migrant or young voters (Kamlage 2012: 34). This could explain why in 2011 low-listed SPD migrant men outperformed women in winning seats through personal votes in Bremen (Probst and Gattig, 2012: 75). Moreover, new campaigning necessities require financial (e.g. personal campaign flyers) and time commitment (e.g. support from family and friends) (Kamlage, 2012: 26–28). For example, in both Belgium and Germany, research has shown that parties spent less money on women’s personal election campaigning and women received less media coverage. Arguably, this impedes their chances to sufficiently mobilize for personal votes and lowers their electoral chances despite candidacy parity (Ahrens et al., 2020; Davidson-Schmich, 2016, 2018; Wauters et al., 2010: 472).

In sum, our findings indicate the importance of intraparty culture in assessing the effects of preferential voting on women. In particular, we assert that how parties organize and represent gender equality, constitutes a central intervening factor. On a practical level, quota parties might need to craft more nuanced ways to counter lingering masculinist sentiments by, for example, nominating women in winnable districts and ensuring they are furnished with additional resources to launch strong preferential voting campaigns.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-psx-10.1177_00323217251410745 – Supplemental material for Quotas Unhinged? How the Change to Preferential Voting Impacts Women’s Representation in Two German Länder

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-psx-10.1177_00323217251410745 for Quotas Unhinged? How the Change to Preferential Voting Impacts Women’s Representation in Two German Länder by Petra Ahrens and Sabine Lang in Political Studies

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Lauritz Wandhoff and Judith Friede for their most valuable support in collecting data and literature. We wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the article.

Author Contributions

Petra Ahrens: Conceptualization, Investigation, Methodology, Formal analysis, Writing – Original draft preparation, Writing – Reviewing and Editing. Sabine Lang: Conceptualization, Investigation, Methodology, Writing – Original draft preparation, Writing- Reviewing and Editing.

Consent to participate

Not applicable.

Consent for publication

Not applicable.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Petra Ahrens’ work was supported by the Academy of Finland, grant number 338556.

Ethical considerations

There are no human participants in this article, and informed consent is not required.

ORCID iD

Petra Ahrens

Sabine Lang

Supplemental material

Additional Supplementary Information may be found with the online version of this article.

Contents

Table 1A: Elected and Counterfactual Hamburg 2008–2020.

Table 2A: Elected and Counterfactual Hamburg 2008–2020, District Level and Land List.

Table 3A: Elected and Counterfactual Hamburg 2008–2020, SPD District and Land Level.

Table 4A: Elected and Counterfactual Bremen 2011–2023.

Table 5A: Elected and Counterfactual 2008–2020, SPD Bremen, Bremerhaven and Bremen Total.

Notes

Author Biographies

Petra Ahrens is Academy of Finland Research Fellow at Tampere University, Finland. Her research focuses on gender policies and politics in the European Union and its institutions, gender equality in Germany, gender-sensitive parliaments, and transnational civil society. Alongside articles, she is the author of Actors, Institutions, and the Making of EU Gender Equality Programs (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), co-editor, with Lise Rolandsen Agustín, of Gendering the European Parliament. Structures, Policies, and Practices (Rowman & Littlefield / ECPR Press, 2019), and co-editor, with Anna Elomäki and Johanna Kantola, of European Parliament’s Political Groups in Turbulent Times (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).

Sabine Lang is Professor of International and European Politics at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies of the University of Washington. From 2016 to 2024, she directed the UW Center for European Studies, a Jean Monnet Center of Excellence, from 2016 to 2024, and held a Jean Monnet Chair from 2021 to 2024. Her research focuses on gender in comparative perspective with an emphasis on political representation and civil society. Her latest publications include a co-edited volume with Petra Meier and Birgit Sauer on Party Politics and the Implementation of Gender Quotas: Resisting Institutions. Palgrave Macmillan 2023.

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