Public budget cuts often cause strong reactions from citizens. At the same time, public budgeting is complex, and budget numbers are often difficult to understand. Politicians trying to defend an unpopular budget cut can, therefore, use several strategies to explain and persuade the public about cuts. This study tests three such strategies: numerical reframing, justifications and excuses. Using a survey experiment, we show that numerical reframing is largely ineffectual when it comes to moving citizen perceptions and attitudes regarding a budget cut. Similarly, using an excuse-based strategy, transferring responsibility for the cut to other actors, is also without significant effects. In contrast, strategies based on justification, either highlighting tradeoffs or providing citizens with reference points, do lower opposition to a budget cut. These findings have implications not just for politicians trying to explain cuts; they also reveal challenges inherent in public discussions regarding public budgets.
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