Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

Transgender people face high rates of discrimination and health problems yet supportive policy measures are often opposed, especially by religious organisations adhering to cis-normative theologies. Scholars exploring the links between religion and transgender issues have examined a number of themes, but the way religious actors discursively frame transgender issues remains under-researched. This article contributes to work in this area by using the concept of political opportunity structures to examine the discourse of religious groups on the 2022 Scottish Gender Recognition Reform Bill. The study shows that arguments were typically framed in secular terms, drawing on the epistemic authority of science and a language of individual rights. Supporting groups used arguments designed to highlight the difficulties that transgender people face. Oppositional groups used themes based on biological essentialism, concern for the well-being of trans people, the risks to cisgendered women and warnings about the negative impact on society and religious freedoms.

Keywords

transgender religious groups discourse political opportunity structures Gender Recognition Reform Bill

Introduction: Religion and Transgender Issues

Transgender people endure significant discrimination and experience substantially higher rates of mental health problems compared with their cisgender counterparts (Campbell et al., 2019; Hatch et al., 2022). Research conducted by the National Center for Transgender Equality shows that 30% of trans people in the United States experienced mistreatment at work as a result of their gender identity, 39% reported instances of serious psychological distress (compared with 5% of the general population) and 40% had attempted suicide at some point during their lifetime (James et al., 2016). Despite this, public policy measures aimed at improving the lives of trans people are frequently resisted on the grounds that they pose a threat to social norms. These views are often promoted by right-wing figures in politics and the media, making transgender issues a key fault line in the ongoing ‘culture wars’ taking place in many Western societies (Castle, 2019; McLean, 2021).

Some of the strongest opposition to the extension of transgender rights comes from religious organisations that adhere to cis-normative theologies (Sumerau et al., 2019). Research into the links between religion and transgender issues has covered a variety of topics. These include theological perspectives on transgender debates (e.g. Bayer, 2024; Block, 2021; Wilcox, 2021), the interplay between religious freedom and transgender rights (Endsjø, 2020; Kazyak et al., 2018; Parkinson, 2023) and the influence of religious beliefs and values on attitudes towards transgender individuals. This latter field of research contains a range of approaches. Some studies have focused on religious support for transgender rights, emphasising efforts to make religious spaces, beliefs and practices more inclusive (e.g. Andersson et al., 2013; Paige, 2023; Yip and Nynäs, 2012). Others have highlighted attitudinal differences between religious groups. For example, some research indicates that members of the Jewish faith tend to be more tolerant of transgender people than members of other religions (see Campbell et al., 2019; Golriz, 2021). Most studies in this area have highlighted negative correlations, noting that increased religiosity (typically measured as frequency of attendance at a place of worship) is generally associated with greater transphobia, prejudice and intolerance towards transgender individuals (Campbell et al., 2019; Elischberger et al., 2018; Hatch et al., 2022; Kanamori et al., 2019; Lewis et al., 2022; Tee and Hegarty, 2006; Westwood, 2022).

Researchers have also examined the relationships between religion, trans issues and health. Several studies have highlighted the protective benefits of religiosity for transgender people who find acceptance in their faith communities. Conversely, others have pointed to the harmful effects of belonging to a religious group, with membership often leading to psychological conflict, rejection and social exclusion (Kay et al., 2022; Lekwauwa et al., 2023; Rabasco and Andover, 2023; Sumerau et al., 2019; Wolford-Clevenger et al., 2018). Relatedly, numerous studies have explored the internal religious lives of transgender individuals, examining the strategies they employ to reconcile their gender identity with the tenets of their faith. This research has found that many trans people choose to leave their religion (almost 60% according to survey data examined by Kay et al., 2022) or adopt private spiritual identities and practices that emphasise their personal connection to God (Anderson and McGuire, 2021; Etengoff and Rodriguez, 2022; Exline et al., 2021; Heidari et al., 2021; Scott et al., 2022; Sumerau et al., 2016).

While existing research has significantly advanced our understanding of the relationships between religion and transgender issues, one area that has been under-researched is the way in which religious actors discursively frame transgender themes. This is an important topic to address because debates surrounding trans issues, and the manner in which they are conducted, can have considerable effects on wider social behaviour, producing real-world consequences for transgender people (Clifford et al., 2015; Jones and Brewer, 2020). Research in this area remains comparatively small and has typically focused on a limited range of themes. Most of this work has tended to focus on transgender rights in the United States (e.g. Mathers et al., 2018; Stone, 2017; Sumerau et al., 2016) or has examined religious opposition (typically campaigns from high-profile national groups) as part of a broader offensive by conservative organisations against LGBTQ advocacy (e.g. Hunt, 2010, 2011; Nash and Browne, 2020). One of the principal findings here has been the existence of a substantial overlap between the discourse used by religious organisations and the language of wider transgender debates. Studies on this topic, focusing particularly on the rhetoric deployed in legislative arenas and forms of media representation, have identified a number of recurring themes. Advocates for transgender equality often use human rights arguments underpinned by scientific understandings about the naturalness of sexual orientation, focusing on individual freedoms and fairness to highlight the difficulties that many trans people face in their daily lives (e.g. Bailey and Jones, 2023; Barnett et al., 2018; Divan et al., 2016; Jones et al., 2017; Powell et al., 2016; Vipond, 2017). In contrast, opponents of trans rights use various strategies to delegitimise transgender identities. These include the use of degrading and offensive terms (such as ‘tranny’ or ‘she-male’), invoking notions of ‘science’ and ‘common sense’ to argue for the binary nature of biological sex, warnings that a ‘transgender ideology’ is endangering free speech and social norms, employing ‘trickster’ tropes designed to portray trans people as deceptively hiding their ‘true’ gender and framing trans women as sexual predators intent on harming cisgendered women and children (for examples, see Billard, 2016, 2023; Hines, 2020; Jakubowska and Mickiewicz, 2024; Martin and Rahilly, 2023; Montiel-McCann, 2023; Pape, 2022; Rodriguez and Ciszek, 2020; Zottola, 2021).

This article builds on research in this area in two key ways. First, it explores the discourses used by religious groups operating at a variety of levels: national, regional and local. Second, it shows how these discourses were manifest in an institutional, policy-making setting in the United Kingdom. To do this, it analyses written and oral submissions made to public consultations on the 2022 Scottish Gender Recognition Reform Bill, deploying the concept of political opportunity structures to outline the broader strategic context in which religious groups were operating. Here, a number of core themes can be identified. Both supportive and oppositional groups used arguments that were primarily secular in nature and sought to ground their arguments in the epistemic authority of science and official sources of expertise. Supporting groups highlighted themes of individual rights, while oppositional groups (by far and away the majority) made four central propositions: (1) that sex and gender were immutable and biologically fixed; (2) that the proposed reforms would have an adverse impact on trans people, especially children and young adults; (3) that they would pose risks for cisgendered women and (4) would produce negative effects on society and undermine religious freedoms.

The rest of the article proceeds as follows. First, it sets out the theoretical and methodological framework used for the study, deploying the concept of political opportunity structures to assess the strategic context in which religious groups are operating. Second, it examines the respective public arguments that were used by religious groups making representations on the Bill. The article concludes by discussing the implications of these findings and makes some suggestions for future research.

The Strategic Context

Religious groups engaging in UK policy debates must navigate a complex and multi-layered political environment to achieve their organisational aims. One way to examine this process is by using the concept of political opportunity structures. This idea, which derives from social movement theory, refers to the range of factors in the broader political environment that can affect a group’s ability to mobilise and promote policy change. Key variables include the nature of political institutions, the dynamics of the party system, the stability of political alignments, the contours of public opinion and processes for political and civic participation (e.g. Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2009).

In the case of transgender debates, the political opportunity structure for religious organisations is shaped by a number of intersecting elements. The principal factors here are: (1) the role of religion within a predominantly secular environment; (2) the progressive secularisation of British society and its political institutions; (3) the prevailing laws and social/political attitudes towards sexual minority rights and (4) the growing liberalisation of many mainstream denominations in respect of LGBTQ issues. Taken together, these factors provide a range of constraints, but also opportunities for religious organisations.

The role of religion in Western, liberal democratic states is shaped by its relationship with secular forces. As Habermas (2011) makes clear, the construction of ‘the political’ as a distinct and separate realm for rational-critical deliberation on public affairs is only made possible by a historic shift in the nature of religious authority. The gradual decline of religious power, combined with growing pressures for democratisation, led to the establishment of nation-states legitimised with notions of popular will, cleaving social life into functionally discrete ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ spheres. However, as many scholars have noted, these spheres are not rigid, objective realities but discursively constructed processes of social life (e.g. Dubuisson, 2007; Mahmood, 2009). The idea that religion should be confined to the private sphere is rooted in a distinctly Western Protestant understanding of religion as a set of propositional beliefs about the supernatural, rather than any fundamental or universal characteristics of ‘religion’ itself (Kitching, 2024). As a consequence, the boundaries between the secular and the religious spheres are fluid and contested, requiring ongoing effort to maintain and reproduce. This has significant implications for religious communities since the meaning and content of ‘religion’ are transformed through their engagement with secular forces, rendering it a concept that is ‘perpetually under construction’ (Lynch, 2017: 289).

In this context, the very definition of what constitutes ‘religion’ is subject to ongoing negotiation and change. As religious authority has been supplanted by market forces in many areas of social life, religious communities have increasingly focused on family relations and sexual morality as one of the few remaining areas where religious authority can still be exercised (Butler, 2019). These trends have been further intensified by the pressures of secularisation, as the proportion of adults belonging to, or identifying with a religion, declines. This is particularly apposite in the case of the United Kingdom, where religious identification has been contracting for several decades and where more than half the population now profess to have no religion at all (Booth and Goodier, 2023).

The strategic context for religious organisations has also been shaped by the changing nature of law and social/political attitudes relating to sexual minority rights. In recent decades, these issues have increasingly been framed in terms of individual rights following the liberalisation of public opinion, mirroring trends in the United States and other Western countries (e.g. George, 2018, 2019). Campaign groups promoting LGBTQ rights have largely pursued an assimilationist strategy, focusing on achieving legal equality and inclusion within existing institutions, using frames based on the epistemic status of science and developments in genetics showing the innate nature of sexual orientation. The pragmatic nature of this strategy proved to be a success, and non-heterosexual rights and protections were significantly expanded by the New Labour governments from 1997. These advancements included the lifting of a ban on gay people serving in the armed forces in 2000, the Adoption and Children Act of 2002, the Civil Partnership Act of 2004, anti-discrimination measures enshrined in the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations of 2007, as well as the Equality Act of 2010, culminating in the legalisation of same-sex marriage, which was introduced by the Conservatives in 2013.

At the same time, the assimilationist approach had a number of unintended consequences. The focus on conformity and inclusion within heteronormative institutions often reaffirmed binary and essentialist views of gender, one consequence of which was to marginalise calls for greater transgender rights. This created an opportunity for religious conservative groups, who sought to exploit this marginalisation by portraying transgender people – many of whom do not meet assimilationist norms – as morally deviant and a threat to the social fabric (see Kollman and Waites, 2011; Stocks, 2015; Wuest, 2021). Conservative groups were also motivated by liberalising attitudes within mainstream religious communities. Here, the discursive separation between the religious and secular spheres allowed religious individuals to hold dichotomous views on LGBTQ issues, accepting scientific arguments supporting the extension of civil rights while opposing full inclusion within their own religious communities (Andersson et al., 2013). This, along with the national decline of religious influence, drove conservative groups to become more involved with public debates on issues of sexual morality, and to do so using a secular language of rights, often based on scientific understandings of sexuality, rather than theological claims (see Hunt, 2010, 2011); This approach, which has been described by Engelke (2009) as a form of ‘strategic secularism’, involves advancing religious agendas with the use of secular frames and marks a significant shift from historical practice in the United Kingdom. Throughout the twentieth century, Christian leaders often engaged in public debates on moral issues by invoking theological language and themes (e.g. Machin, 1998). In the twenty-first century, religious claims have been increasingly sidelined in favour of arguments that are more likely to appeal to an increasingly secular public audience (e.g. Kettell, 2019).

The Gender Recognition Reform Bill

The contours of this political opportunity structure shaped the response of religious groups to the Gender Recognition Reform Bill. This was a piece of legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament to make it easier for trans people to legally change their gender. Under the existing Gender Recognition Act, passed by the UK Parliament in 2004, a person could legally change their gender providing that certain criteria were met, namely: that they were over the age of 18 years, had medical approval with a diagnosis of gender dysphoria and had lived in their acquired gender for at least 2 years. The 2019 Conservative government initially planned to reform this Act, but subsequently dropped the plans. In March 2022 the Scottish Parliament, which possesses devolved powers over family and civil law, and which was then controlled by a left-of-centre Scottish National Party underpinned by an inclusive form of civic nationalism, introduced a new bill with significant changes. These proposed removing the need for a medical diagnosis of gender dysphoria, reducing the required time for living in an acquired gender to 6 months and lowering the minimum age that a person could legally change gender from 18 to 16. The Bill was passed in December 2022 (by 86 votes to 39) but was ultimately blocked by the Westminster government under Section 35 of the Scotland Act, citing concerns about its impact on equality across the United Kingdom.

To examine the response to this Bill, the study conducted a qualitative content analysis of materials submitted by religious organisations in the Scottish Parliament’s consultation process. The official report into the first public consultation, which ran from December 2019 to March 2020, identified written submissions from 34 religious groups (Scottish Government, 2021). Of these, 25 submissions were available in the official record of responses.¹ A second public consultation, held from March to May 2022, received written submissions from 13 religious organisations.² Three organisations (the Church of Scotland, the Evangelical Alliance and the Catholic Parliamentary Office of the Bishop’s Conference of Scotland) also provided oral evidence at a session in June.

The qualitative analysis consisted of two components. The first set out to ascertain the core themes of the discourses used by these groups in their submissions. The coding process sought to identify common claims and arguments through an inductive reading of the texts, informed by the existing literature on the discourses used in transgender debates. The second component examined the character of these arguments, considering the extent to which they were grounded in religious or secular frames. Assessing the use of religious language is not a straightforward task since it is not always clear what constitutes a ‘religious’ assertion (Audi, 2012). Theological narratives can be used for secular ends (e.g. religious parables providing a general call to help people) and not all religious language is immediately obvious. Some scholars have noted a form of discourse described as ‘God talk’ in which religious themes are coded to be recognisable to believers but hidden from a general audience (e.g. Calfano and Djupe, 2008). In the materials examined for this study, however, these methodological problems did not arise. Where religious themes were present the theological content was clear, and the groups did not appear to be using coded metaphors.

The written responses to the public consultations, coupled with the oral evidence, produced a combined dataset of 41 submissions from 36 religious organisations. All of these organisations were Christian and almost all were evangelical and/or conservative in nature. The geographical character of the groups was varied. A total of 10 groups operated UK-wide or were subsidiaries of groups working at a national level (such as the Evangelical Alliance in Scotland), 13 groups were regional (e.g. the Free Church of Scotland) and 13 groups were classified as local (e.g. Stornoway Reformed Presbyterian Church). To assess the character of the discourses used by these organisations, the coding system followed the approach taken by Kettell (2019) and classified submissions as belonging to one of three types:

Theological: Where religious/theological language and/or reasons were the sole or prominent feature of the argument being presented.

Minor religious: Where religious/theological language and/or reasons were a relatively minor or a subordinate feature of the argument being presented.

Secular: Where religious/theological language and/or reasons were not used in the argument being presented.

The analysis found that the majority of submissions used arguments that were wholly or mostly secular in character. A total of 10 responses (24% of the dataset) were coded as ‘theological’ and a further 12 (29%) were classed as ‘minor religious’ – typically presenting their case in secular terms, with limited instances of religious rhetoric. An example of this was the submission from the campaign organisation, Christian Action, Research, and Education (CARE), which made no theological claims beyond an initial, non-specific reference to the fact that their view was ‘drawn from both science and Biblical teaching’. A total of 19 responses (46%) made no theological references at all and were coded as ‘secular’. The use of secular discourse also had a geographical pattern, being most concentrated in national-level organisations, which are more likely to take a lead on campaigns and be involved in public policy debates. A total of 70% of the submissions from national groups were categorised as secular, compared with 54% of submissions from local groups and 28% of those from regional organisations. These groups, along with their geographical classification and the coding of the discourse used in their written submissions to the two public consultations (C1 and C2) and oral evidence, are set out in Table 1.

Table 1.

The Transgender Discourse of Religious Groups.

Group	Geo	C1	C2	Oral
African Caribbean Christian Fellowship, Aberdeen Branch	Local	Secular	–	–
Anscombe Bioethics Centre	National	–	Secular	–
Apostolic Church in Scotland	Regional	–	Secular	–
Archdiocesan Secondary Head Teacher Association	Local	Minor	–	–
Board of Reformed Christian Education Scotland	Regional	Theo	–	–
CARE	National	–	Minor	–
Catholic Head Teachers of the Diocese of Motherwell	Local	Minor	–	–
Catholic Parliamentary Office of the Bishop’s Conference of Scotland	Regional	Theo	Theo	Minor
Catholic Truth	National	Secular	–	–
Central Evangelical Church	Local	Secular	–	–
Christian Concern	National	–	Secular	–
Christian Institute	National	–	Secular	–
Christian Medical Fellowship	National	–	Secular	–
Church of Scotland	Regional	–	Minor	Secular
Covenant Fellowship Scotland	Regional	Theo	–	–
East Dunbartonshire Catholic Schools Group	Local	Secular	–	–
Evangelical Alliance	National	Theo	Secular	Minor
Free Church of Scotland	Regional	Theo	Minor	–
Free Church of Scotland (Continuing)	Regional	Secular	–	–
General Assembly of Unitarian and Free Christian Churches	National	–	Secular	–
Glasgow Archdiocesan Primary Head Teacher Association	Local	Minor	–	–
Logos Scotland	Regional	–	Minor	–
Maryburgh Free Church	Local	Secular	–	–
North Edinburgh Reformed Presbyterian Church	Local	Theo	–	–
Reformed Baptist Church Anniesland	Local	Secular	–	–
Reformed Presbyterian Church of Scotland	Regional	Theo	–	–
Scottish Catholic Education Service	Regional	Secular	–	–
Scottish Catholic Education Service’s National Parent Group	Regional	Minor	–	–
Scottish Catholics for Labour	Regional	Minor	–	–
Springburn Assemblies of God Church, Glasgow	Local	Secular	–	–
Stornoway Free Church Kirk Session	Local	Secular	–	–
Stornoway Reformed Presbyterian Church	Local	Theo	–	–
United Free Church of Scotland	Regional	Secular	Theo	–
Western Isles Presbytery of the Free Church of Scotland	Local	Minor	–	–

The large majority of these groups were opposed to the proposals contained in the Bill. Just two – the Church of Scotland and the General Assembly of Unitarian and Free Christian Churches – expressed support for the measures. The supporting and oppositional discourses used by these groups are examined in the sections below.

Supporting Groups

The religious groups in favour of the Bill framed their arguments in secular language and focused on two distinct themes. The first drew on claims grounded in notions of equality and individual rights. The second utilised scientific understandings of the varied nature of sexual orientation. The written submission from the General Assembly of Unitarian and Free Christian Churches (GAUFCC) was based primarily on a language of rights. This stated that ‘a person’s own understanding and statement of their gender identity is a matter of conscience’ and: ‘We believe that trans right are human rights’ (consultation 2 (hereafter ‘C2’)).

The written and oral submissions from the Church of Scotland focused on aligning with liberalising international trends and drew on the epistemic authority of science and medical expertise, emphasising their pastoral responsibilities for the well-being of transgender individuals. Citing the approach taken by the World Health Organisation, the Church argued that ‘transgender or diverse gender identity is not a mental or behavioural disorder’ (C2), adding, in their oral evidence, that ‘this is not a medical issue . . . the people that are transgender that are experiencing their lives through different diverse gender ways need to be listened to’ (Henry, 2022). On this basis, the Church criticised some of the language used in the Bill around the notion of acquiring a gender identity. As they put it: ‘A trans person does not ‘acquire’ a different identity, it is inherent in who they are . . . The use of the term acquire suggests it is a choice or something new to the person’ (C2). The Church also drew on sources of expertise to reject claims that trans people posed a risk to cisgendered women. Arguing that the Church was motivated by ‘concerns of speaking for the marginalised and the prejudiced’, Rev Karen Henry (2022) told the Scottish Parliament’s Equalities, Human Rights and Civil Justice Committee that trans people were being ‘victimised’, stating: ‘We have figures from various research that suggests that trans women are twice as likely to experience sexual assault than cis women’. Both organisations also supported shortening the time period for making an application, with the GAUFCC stating that ‘there should not be undue barriers or delays to official recognition of that identity’. On the question of lowering the minimum age, however, the two groups were divided. While the GAUFCC stated that it did not have an official view on this issue, the Church of Scotland expressed concerns that allowing applications from people under 18 would raise potential welfare issues given that under-18s were classified as children by the United Nations (C2).

Oppositional Groups

Religious groups opposed to the Bill raised a variety of issues in their submissions to the public consultations, but the overwhelming majority of their arguments centred on four core themes: (1) the immutability of sex and gender; (2) a claim that the Bill would be detrimental to trans people, especially children and young adults; (3) claims that a process of gender self-identification created risks for cisgendered women and (4) warnings that the proposals would have negative social outcomes and undermine religious freedoms. All of these arguments, with the partial exception of the first, were presented using secular language.

The Immutability of Sex and Gender

The central feature of this theme was one of biological essentialism – the assertion that sex and gender are binary, fixed at birth and cannot be chosen or changed by individuals. It presented the idea of sexual dimorphism as a natural, common-sense assertion and dismissed the notion that sex and gender are socially constructed as having no basis in reality. These assertions were found in 23 (60%) of the oppositional responses contained in the dataset. Of all the core arguments marshalled against the proposals for reform this was also the one most likely to be presented in theological terms. The United Free Church of Scotland, for example, stated that: ‘The Christian Scriptures clearly teaches [sic] we are all made in God’s image, male and female. Therefore, we believe that sex cannot be reduced to a mere social construct but is a core part of our humanity’ (C2). The Christian think tank, Logos Scotland, claimed that ‘our identity is rooted in our creation as children of God, and as such we are born male and female’ (C2). The Reformed Presbyterian Church of Scotland attacked gender recognition certificates as being ‘contrary to the law of God’, claiming that: ‘From the very first book, the Bible makes it clear that humans are created as either male or female (Genesis 1:27)’ (C2). The Catholic Parliamentary Office of the Bishop’s Conference of Scotland (hereafter ‘Catholic Parliamentary Office’) stated that ‘human beings are created in the image and likeness of God, body and soul, male and female’ and that ‘human life, from the moment of conception, has its sexual state fixed genetically, anatomically and physiologically, as a constitutive part of our personal identity’ (C2).

While theological frames were prominent, half the claims made about the immutability of sex and gender (12 responses compared with 11) were presented in secular terms. In contrast to theological frames, which pointed to scriptural sources of authority, the secular framing on this issue was grounded in claims about the scientific nature of these concepts. The Apostolic Church in Scotland, for example, referred to the ‘unalterable biological facts of gender’, claiming that: ‘A reasonable person knows that a man cannot be trapped in a woman’s body and vice versa’ (C2). CARE claimed that it was impossible to ‘alter someone’s biological reality’ and said that the Scottish Bill would reinforce ‘an objectively false narrative that to be “male” or “female” are entirely matters of personal choice’ (C2). The Christian Medical Fellowship wrote that the social constructivist view of gender had ‘no evidence-base in science’ and attacked the proposed reforms as ‘an ideological imperative that ignores objective biological facts and makes identity rest on subjective feelings’ (C2). In the same vein, Catholic Truth maintained that: ‘There is absolutely no scientific or medical evidence to support the belief that a man can become a woman and a woman can become a man. It’s nonsense’ (consultation 1 (hereafter ‘C1’)).

Detrimental to Trans Well-Being

The second core theme used by oppositional groups was a claim that the Bill would be detrimental to the well-being of trans people. Unlike the first theme, this argument was constructed in entirely secular terms. It was based on three inter-related claims. The first – featuring in 22 oppositional responses (58% of the total) – was that adopting a self-declared, de-medicalised system of gender recognition without the need for a diagnosis of gender dysphoria would cause vulnerable people to lose contact with medical experts and therefore miss out on vital healthcare. The Anscombe Bioethics Centre (an institution engaged with moral issues on biomedical research following the teachings of the Catholic Church) claimed that removing the requirement for an assessment of gender dysphoria ‘would deprive a vulnerable group disproportionately affected by suicidality and co-morbid conditions of what may be much-needed contact with mental health professionals’ (C2). The Free Church of Scotland expressed concerns that the Bill would ‘result in less support being given to those who are wrestling with their identity’ (C2). The Scottish Catholic Education Service claimed that de-medicalisation would mean that ‘society may fail to provide the necessary support for those affected by gender dysphoria in the form of contact with health professionals’ (C1). The Christian Medical Fellowship warned that a process of self-declaration would deprive people of contact with medical experts ‘at the very time when their assessment and advice could be crucial’ (C2).

The second and third claims connected to this theme centred on proposals to reduce the amount of time that an individual needed to have been living in their acquired gender before they could legally change it, and to lower the age at which someone could apply for a gender recognition certificate. These proposals, which also drew on the United Nation’s definition of children, were criticised on the grounds that they would lead people to make life-altering decisions in a dangerously short period of time and at an age when they were too young to arrive at a fully informed choice. These claims, which featured in 37 oppositional responses, often drew on transphobic tropes around the numbers of people wanting to de-transition and sought to delegitimise the lived experiences of trans people by claiming that their identity was premised on a sense of what Cloud (2018) describes as ‘flawed agency’ – the notion that their acquired gender wasn’t ‘real’ and that they were merely acting from a state of ‘gender confusion’. Here, for example, the Anscombe Bioethics Centre warned that the changes ‘may encourage earlier social or medical transition, increasing the possibility of people making choices they later regret’ (C2). The Catholic Parliamentary Office claimed that the waiting period (the initial proposal at the consultation stage was to lower this to 3 months) was ‘remarkably short for a decision of such magnitude’ and that lowering the age limit ‘raises the question of whether a child can give informed consent, especially in the formative phase of their social development’ (C2). The Christian Institute – a non-denominational charity promoting ‘the furtherance and promotion of the Christian religion’ (https://www.christian.org.uk/who-we-are/) – described the proposed waiting period as ‘totally inadequate’, warning of ‘serious and long-lasting consequences for those who may misdiagnose themselves and then follow the path of making irreversible alterations to their bodies’ (C2). The Christian Medical Fellowship claimed that ‘the proposed changes would positively harm those wrestling with gender confusion’ and warned that: ‘Anecdotal stories of re-assignment regret, with or without requests to de-transition, are beginning to pile up’ (C2). The Board of Reformed Christian Education expressed concerns that a reduction in the time period would ‘make it easier for young people to be pressured into making hasty decisions that they will later regret’ (C1).

These assertions were frequently linked to claims based on the epistemic authority of scientific and scholarly expertise. Anthony Horan (2022), the representative of the Catholic Parliamentary Office, for instance, claimed that up to 85% of young people with gender dysphoria would eventually become settled in their biological sex, adding:

there are good reasons to protect children from making permanent legal declarations regarding their gender and also good reasons to question opening up a pathway to . . . potentially irreversible treatments . . . the long term effects of a lot of that remains unclear . . . our concern is that the science isn’t necessarily settled.

Such claims were often combined with references to the scientific understanding of cognitive development. The key assertion here was that young adults did not reach maturity until their mid-twenties, so ought not to be permitted to make far-reaching decisions about their gender earlier in life. The Christian Medical Fellowship pointed to research showing that young adults were ‘less risk-averse, more open to novel experiences and more motivated by potential rewards than more mature adults’ and warned that the proposed shortening of the time period ‘fails to take into account the growing body of evidence about the nature of neurodevelopment’ (C2). Similarly, the Catholic Head Teachers of the Diocese of Motherwell maintained that ‘full brain development is not achieved until around the age of 25, yet this proposal would allow such a decision to be taken well in advance of this’ (C1). The Christian Institute, underlining the point, wrote that: ‘To expect 16- to 17-year olds to have the capacity to make life-shaping decisions with potentially irreversible consequences is not supported by the growing body of knowledge about neurodevelopment’ (C2).

The Risks to Cisgender Women

The third main theme in the oppositional submissions was a claim that the Bill would be dangerous for cisgendered women, putting them at a heightened risk of sexual assault and violence. This theme, described by Cloud (2018) as one of ‘nefarious agency’ (in contrast to the ‘flawed agency’ of the previous theme) attacked the goals and motives of transgender people, recycling tropes that predators identify as transgender (overwhelmingly transgender women) to pursue sinister objectives. Thus, the core assertion centred on the notion that allowing a process of gender self-identification would open the gates to people intent on abusing the law in order to gain access to women’s safe spaces and create complications in other gender-designated areas, such as women’s sport.

This theme was present in 25 (66%) of the oppositional responses. The Christian Institute raised the spectre of ‘sex-change declarations by people with malicious intent’ (C2). The Evangelical Alliance spoke of ‘bad-faith actors’ abusing the system in order to gain entry to women’s spaces (Ringland, 2022). The Apostolic Church in Scotland claimed that if the Bill were to become law then ‘biological men’ would be able to ‘take over women’s safe spaces such as public toilets and shelters, as well as women’s sports and women’s opportunities in workplaces’ (C2). The Board of Reformed Christian Education warned that ‘[g]irls would not be able to defend their privacy because the law would be on the side of the ‘transgender’ pupil with his certificate’ (C2) and the Catholic Head Teachers of the Diocese of Motherwell expressed concerns about ‘the safety and protection of women and girls both in schools and in wider society’, warning that the proposals would be ‘open to abuse’ (C2). In a similar way, the Reformed Presbyterian Church of Scotland claimed that: ‘The proposed Bill makes it easier for women to be abused, particularly as it denies women the right to single-sex facilities by distorting the natural category of what a woman is’ (C1). Scottish Catholics for Labour warned of the threat to ‘the safety and well-being of female schoolchildren if natal males are to be allowed to occupy female only changing facilities and toilets in schools and sports centres’ (C1).

Other groups repeating this theme highlighted opposition from women’s rights organisations and drew attention to the impact that the proposals would have on service provision. Logos Scotland said that ‘many women’s groups are concerned about the impact that this is having on their rights to safe spaces and their identity’ (C2). CARE maintained that a process of self-identification had ‘troubling, and arguably unresolvable, practical implications . . . in areas such as single sex spaces or activities’ (C2). The Evangelical Alliance stated that: ‘Women need to have access to single-sex spaces in certain circumstances, for example rape crisis centres or women’s refuges’, adding that: ‘Separating biological sex and gender identity to the extent that the Bill infers would complicate these essential services and provisions for both transgender people and women’ (C2).

Negative Social Consequences

The fourth core theme to be used by opposition groups – featuring in 14 (37%) of their submissions – was that the proposals would have a detrimental social impact. This theme was predominantly framed in secular terms (notwithstanding a small number of theological arguments relating to the nature of humanity and the true meaning of life) and the negative impact of the proposals was often vague and unspecified. For instance, the Christian Institute claimed, without elaboration, that the proposals would have ‘major long-term implications for our society’ (C2). The Apostolic Church in Scotland warned that the Bill ‘undermines the integrity of our society through the creation of a legal fiction that men can be women and vice versa’ (C2). The United Free Church of Scotland said that ‘proposals to allow changes to sex or gender [would] have a major impact on what it means to be human’, adding that: ‘A change to these definitions will have huge and irreversible implications across society’ (C2). In a similar way, the Evangelical Alliance maintained that the proposals ‘would have significant wider societal implications in how women and men relate to each other when biological sex is separated from gender identity’ (C2).

While many of these claims lacked specificity, assertions about the negative effects of the proposals were often linked to claims that trans rights were eroding religious freedoms. This claim mirrored the freedom of speech arguments that are often deployed in wider debates around transgender rights. Here, for instance, the Board of Reformed Christian Education claimed that pupils were ‘surrounded by LGBT propaganda in school’ and that the Scottish government was doing nothing ‘to uphold the God-given right of Christians to freely speak the truth’ (C1). The Evangelical Alliance spoke of a ‘conflict of rights’ between trans individuals and religious bodies, noting that many religious people no longer felt able to speak freely on this issue (Ringland, 2022). Anthony Horan (2022), from the Catholic Parliamentary Office, called on the Scottish parliament ‘to ensure that those who express the view that sex and gender are immutable, and thus reject the idea of gender as fluid and separable from biological sex are free to do so’, adding that: ‘Freedom of thought, conscience and religion, free speech, freedom of expression and association, all of these fundamental freedoms constitute a precious inheritance that must be preserved, and passed on intact to future generations’.

In the same vein, the Archdiocesan Secondary Head Teacher Association warned that Catholic schools would soon be ‘under attack’ from an increasing wave of transgender rights and regulations based on ‘incorrect perceptions of our faith values’ (C1). The Scottish Catholic Education Service’s National Parent Group insisted that: ‘The rights of conscience and freedom of religion must be protected for those who do not subscribe to the idea that gender is fluid’ (C1) and the Reformed Presbyterian Church of Scotland complained that ‘Christians are increasingly being accused of being transphobic’, before calling on the Scottish Government to ‘uphold the Biblical right of Christian ministers to preach the Word of God fully and faithfully, including speaking against transgenderism’ (C1). Even more stridently, Catholic Truth warned that the Bill would usher in a phase of ‘social and moral deterioration’, adding that: ‘The whole “trans” movement is an attack on our very humanity’ (C1).

Conclusion

This study builds on a small body of work examining the way that religious groups discursively frame transgender themes. In this, it makes two principal contributions. First, it analyses the discourses used by groups operating at national, regional and local levels. Second, it uses the concept of political opportunity structures to show how these discourses were manifest in an institutional policy-making setting in the United Kingdom. The study shows that religious groups – particularly those operating at the national level – framed their arguments in predominantly secular terms, drawing on the epistemic authority of science and using frames grounded in ideas of human rights. This denotes a strategic adaptation to a complex and increasingly secular environment in which religious authority has declined, where theological arguments are no longer widely persuasive and where the rights of sexual minorities have become increasingly well established. The progressive secularisation of British society and its political institutions, coupled with the liberalisation of mainstream public and religious opinion, have posed a serious challenge for (typically conservative) religious groups engaging in public debates on LGBTQ issues. Yet these developments also create a strategic opportunity. The pursuit of an assimilationist strategy by LGBTQ advocacy groups left question marks over the status of transgender individuals, enabling religious groups to use this as a wedge issue for reasserting their moral authority in the domain of sexual affairs. The adoption of secular arguments has enabled religious organisations to reposition themselves in the public sphere and has made it harder for critics to dismiss their concerns as being derived from a theological basis. Supporters of the Bill used frames based on the global advancement of transgender rights coupled with arguments based on scientific and medical expertise. In contrast, the vast majority of religious groups who were opposed to the Bill used arguments mirroring wider anti-trans discourses. These centred on the immutable and binary nature of sex and gender, claims that the proposals would be detrimental to the well-being of transgender individuals (particularly children and young adults), warnings about the potential risks to cisgender women and concerns regarding threats to social stability and religious freedoms.

Engaging in public policy debates on transgender issues can be a source of renewed relevance for religious groups but is not without its risks. With societal attitudes having become increasingly liberalised during the last two decades, despite recent setbacks due to the political weaponisation of trans debates (Smith, 2022), opposing the expansion of transgender rights may alienate the general public and further erode the social and political influence of religion. Furthermore, basing public arguments against trans rights on scientific grounds exposes religious groups to potential changes in the evidence base (Thomas, 2014). If a growing body of research demonstrates that de-medicalisation and the ability to legally change gender have positive effects on the health and well-being of trans people without causing societal harm, opposition to measures like the Gender Recognition Reform Bill may lose credibility. Similarly, opposing transgender rights using tropes of ‘regret’ and claims about the increasing numbers of people seeking to de-transition becomes more challenging if the numbers involved remain low or decrease. At the present time there are no official figures on detransitioning in the United Kingdom, but a recent US Transgender Survey found that 94% of respondents who had transitioned to a gender different from their assigned sex at birth reported feeling ‘a little’ or ‘a lot more satisfied’ with their life (James et al., 2024). In these respects, the issue of gender recognition may mirror the legalisation of same-sex marriage, where warnings by religious groups about adverse social consequences and negative effects on children did not materialise and where religious opposition is now far more subdued.

These findings highlight the importance of understanding the broader political and cultural context in which religious groups operate and the dynamic interplay between religion, politics and transgender rights. The study demonstrates how the discourses used by religious organisations have been shaped by the political opportunity structure of the British state and provides supporting evidence for a shift towards the use of secular, rather than theological frames. Future research on this subject could develop our understanding in various ways. Comparative research into the discourses used by religious groups in different countries could provide more details about the way in which these discourses are shaped by political opportunity structures. Similarly, longitudinal studies could track changes in religious discourse over time, examining the ways that groups adjust their strategies in response to changes in the broader strategic context. Scholars working in this area could also fruitfully explore the impact of religious discourse on public opinion and policy outcomes, in order to improve our knowledge of the effectiveness of alternative discursive frames.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author thanks the anonymous reviewers of this journal for their insightful comments and suggestions on revising an earlier version of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Steven Kettell

Notes

Author Biography

Steven Kettell is a Reader in Politics and International Studies, at the University of Warwick. His research interests are centred on the politics of secularism, non-religion and the role of religion in the public sphere. He is a co-creator and executive editor of the journal, British Politics.

References

Anderson

McGuire

(2021) ‘I Feel Like God Doesn’t Like Me’: Faith and Ambiguous Loss among Transgender Youth’. Family Relations 70 (2): 390–401.

Andersson

Vanderbeck

Sadgrove

, et al. (2013) Same Sex Marriage, Civil Rights Rhetoric, and the Ambivalent Politics of Christian Evangelicalism in New York City. Sexualities 16 (3–4): 245–260.

Audi

(2012) Religious Commitment and Secular Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bailey

Jones

(2023) ‘Fairness Versus Inclusion’ Representations of Transgender Athletes in British Newspaper Reports. In: File

Schnurr

(eds) The Language of Inclusion and Exclusion in Sports. Boston, MA: De Gruyter, pp.193–214.

Barnett

Nesbit

Sorrentino

(2018) The Transgender Bathroom Debate at the Intersection of Politics, Law, Ethics, and Science. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 46 (2): 232–241.

Bayer

(2024) Trans* in the Roman Catholic Church, Its Theology and Denominational Religious Education: A Change of Perspective Is Needed. British Journal of Religious Education. Epub ahead of print 11 April. DOI: 10.1080/01416200.2024.2338818.

Billard

(2016) Writing in the Margins: Mainstream News Media Representations of Transgenderism. International Journal of Communication 10: 4193–4218.

Billard

(2023) ‘Gender-Critical’ Discourse as Disinformation: Unpacking TERF Strategies of Political Communication. Women’s Studies in Communication 46 (2): 235–243.

Block

(2021) Christian Moral Freedom and the Transgender Person. Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 41 (2): 331–347.

10.

Booth

Goodier

(2023) Census Data Suggests UK Faces ‘non-Religious Future’, Say Campaigners. The Guardian, 30 January. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/jan/30/census-data-england-wales-uk-non-religious-future-campaigners

11.

Butler

(2019) Anti-Gender Ideology and Mahmood’s Critique of the Secular Age. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 87 (4): 955–967.

12.

Calfano

Djupe

(2008) God Talk: Religious Cues and Electoral Support. Political Research Quarterly 62 (2): 329–339.

13.

Campbell

Hinton

JDX

Anderson

(2019) A Systematic Review of the Relationship between Religion and Attitudes toward Transgender and Gender-Variant People. International Journal of Transgenderism 20 (1): 21–38.

14.

Castle

(2019) New Fronts in the Culture Wars? Religion, Partisanship, and Polarization on Religious Liberty and Transgender Rights in the United States. American Politics Research 47 (3): 650–679.

15.

Clifford

Jerit

Rainey

, et al. (2015) Moral Concerns and Policy Attitudes: Investigating the Influence of Elite Rhetoric. Political Communication 32: 229–248.

16.

Cloud

(2018) Toward a Richer Rhetoric of Agency: Shaping the Identity Category Transgender in Public Discourse. Argumentation and Advocacy 54 (3): 161–178.

17.

Divan

Cortez

Smelyanskaya

, et al. (2016) Transgender Social Inclusion and Equality: A Pivotal Path to Development. Journal of the International AIDS Society 19 (3): 20803.

18.

Dubuisson

(2007) Exporting the Local: Recent Perspectives on ‘Religion’ as a Cultural Category. Religion Compass 1 (6): 787–800.

19.

Elischberger

Glazier

Hill

, et al. (2018) Attitudes toward and Beliefs about Transgender Youth: A Cross-Cultural Comparison between the United States and India. Sex Roles 78 (1–2): 142–160.

20.

Endsjø

DØ

(2020) The Other Way Around? How Freedom of Religion May Protect LGBT Rights. International Journal of Human Rights 24 (10): 1681–1700.

21.

Engelke

(2009) Strategic Secularism. Social Analysis 53 (1): 39–54.

22.

Etengoff

Rodriguez

(2022) ‘At Its Core, Islam Is about Standing with the Oppressed’: Exploring Transgender Muslims’ Religious Resilience. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 14 (4): 480–492.

23.

Exline

Przeworski

Peterson

, et al. (2021) Religious and Spiritual Struggles Among Transgender and Gender-Nonconforming Adults. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 13 (3): 276–286.

24.

George

(2018) The LGBT Disconnect: Politics and the Perils of Legal Movement Formation. Wisconsin Law Review 3: 504–591.

25.

George

(2019) Framing Trans Rights. Northwestern University Law Review 114 (3): 555–632.

26.

Gleditsch

Ruggeri

(2010) Political Opportunity Structures, Democracy, and Civil War. Journal of Peace Research 47 (3): 299–310.

27.

Golriz

(2021) Does Religion Prevent LGBTQ Acceptance? A Case Study with Queer and Trans Muslims in Toronto, Canada. Journal of Homosexuality 68 (14): 2451–2475.

28.

Habermas

(2011) ‘The Political’ the Rational Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology. In: Eduardo

Jonathan

(eds) The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere. New York: Columbia University Press, pp.15–33.

29.

Hatch

Warner

Broussard

, et al. (2022) Predictors of Transgender Prejudice: A Meta-Analysis. Sex Roles 87: 583–602.

30.

Heidari

Abdullahzadeh

Naji

(2021) Lived Religious and Spiritual Experiences of Transgender People: A Qualitative Research in Iran. Sexuality & Culture 25: 417–429.

31.

Henry

(2022) Oral Evidence to the Equalities, Human Rights and Civil Justice Committee on Behalf of the Church of Scotland, 7 June. Available at: https://www.scottishparliament.tv/meeting/equalities-human-rights-and-civil-justice-committee-june-7-2022 (accessed on 11 May 2024).

32.

Hines

(2020) Sex Wars and (Trans) Gender Panics: Identity and Body Politics in Contemporary UK Feminism. The Sociological Review Monographs 68 (4): 699–717.

33.

Horan

(2022) Oral Evidence to the Equalities, Human Rights and Civil Justice Committee on Behalf of the Catholic Parliamentary Office of the Bishop’s Conference of Scotland, 7 June. Available at: https://www.scottishparliament.tv/meeting/equalities-human-rights-and-civil-justice-committee-june-7-2022 (accessed on 11 May 2024).

34.

Hunt

(2010) The Rhetoric of Rights in the UK Christian Churches Regarding Non-heterosexual Citizenship. Politics and Religion Journal 4 (2): 183–200.

35.

Hunt

(2011) A Turn to the Rights: UK Conservative Christian Lobby Groups and the ‘Gay Debate’. Religion and Human Rights 6: 291–313.

36.

Jakubowska

Mickiewicz

(2024) Who Counts as a Woman? A Critical Discourse Analysis of Petitions against the Participation of Transgender Athletes in Women’s Sport. International Review for the Sociology of Sport 59: 203–221.

37.

James

Herman

Durso

, et al. (2024) Early Insights: A Report of the 2022 U.S. Transgender Study. Available at: https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/2022%20USTS%20Early%20Insights%20Report_FINAL.pdf (accessed 11 June 2024).

38.

James

Herman

Rankin

, et al. (2016) The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey. Washington, DC: National Center for Transgender Equality.

39.

Jones

Arcelus

Bouman

, et al. (2017) Sport and Transgender People: A Systematic Review of the Literature Relating to Sport Participation and Competitive Sport Policies. Sports Medicine 47 (4): 701–716.

40.

Jones

Brewer

(2020) Elite Cues and Public Polarization on Transgender Rights. Politics, Groups, and Identities 8 (1): 71–85.

41.

Kanamori

Pegors

Hall

, et al. (2019) Christian Religiosity and Attitudes toward the Human Value of Transgender Individuals. Psychology of Sexual Orientation and Gender Diversity 6 (1): 42–53.

42.

Kay

Wolff

Himes

, et al. (2022) A Retrospective Qualitative Analysis of Christianity and Its Influence on Gender Identity Development among Transgender Adults Who Were Assigned Female at Birth. Journal of Gay & Lesbian Mental Health 26 (3): 307–328.

43.

Kazyak

Burke

Stange

(2018) Logics of Freedom: Debating Religious Freedom Laws and Gay and Lesbian Rights. Socius 4: 1–18.

44.

Kettell

(2019) How, When, and Why Do Religious Actors Use Public Reason? The Case of Assisted Dying in Britain. Politics and Religion 12 (2): 385–408.

45.

Kitching

(2024) Contemporary, Racialised Conflicts Over LGBT-Inclusive Education: More Strategic Secularisms Than Secular/religious Oppositions? Educational Review 76 (3): 506–525.

46.

Kollman

Waites

(2011) United Kingdom: Changing Political Opportunity Structures, Policy Success and Continuing Challenges for Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Movements. In: Tremblay

Patternotte

Johnson

(eds) The Lesbian and Gay Movement and the State: Comparative Insights into a Transformed Relationship. London: Routledge, pp.181–196.

47.

Lekwauwa

Funaro

Doolittle

(2023) Systematic Review: The Relationship between Religion, Spirituality and Mental Health in Adolescents Who Identify as Transgender. Journal of Gay & Lesbian Mental Health 27: 421–438.

48.

Lewis

Flores

Haider-Markel

, et al. (2022) Transitioning Opinion? Assessing the Dynamics of Public Attitudes Towards Transgender Rights. Public Opinion Quarterly 86 (2): 343–368.

49.

Lynch

(2017) Social Construction and Social Critique: Haslanger, Race and the Study of Religion. Critical Research on Religion 5 (3): 284–301.

50.

Machin

GIT

(1998) Churches and Social Issues in Twentieth-Century Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

51.

Mahmood

(2009) Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide? Critical Inquiry 35 (4): 836–862.

52.

Martin

Rahilly

(2023) Value Frames in Discourse Supporting Transgender Athlete Bans. Discourse & Society 34 (6): 732–751.

53.

Mathers

ABL

Sumerau

Cragun

(2018) The Limits of Homonormativity: Constructions of Bisexual and Transgender People in the Post-Gay Era. Sociological Perspectives 61 (6): 934–952.

54.

McLean

(2021) The Growth of the Anti-transgender Movement in the United Kingdom: The Silent Radicalization of the British Electorate. International Journal of Sociology 51 (6): 473–482.

55.

Montiel-McCann

(2023) ‘It’s Like We Are Not Human’: Discourses of Humanisation and Otherness in the Representation of Trans Identity in British Broadsheet Newspapers. Feminist Media Studies 23 (6): 2962–2978.

56.

Nash

Browne

(2020) Heteroactivism: Resisting Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans Rights and Equalities. London: Zed Books.

57.

Paige

(2023) Theological Librarians and the Cultivation of Belonging. Theological Librarianship 16 (2): 1–6.

58.

Pape

(2022) Feminism, Trans Justice, and Speech Rights: A Comparative Perspective. Law and Contemporary Problems 85: 215–240.

59.

Parkinson

(2023) Gender Identity Discrimination and Religious Freedom. Journal of Law and Religion 38 (1): 10–37.

60.

Powell

Shapiro

Stein

(2016) Transgender Rights as Human Rights. AMA Journal of Ethics 18 (11): 1126–1131.

61.

Rabasco

Andover

(2023) The Relationship between Religious Practices and Beliefs and Suicidal Thoughts and Behaviors among Transgender and Gender Diverse Adults. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 15 (1): 25–31.

62.

Ringland

(2022) Oral Evidence to the Equalities, Human Rights and Civil Justice Committee on Behalf of the Evangelical Alliance, 7 June. Available at: https://www.scottishparliament.tv/meeting/equalities-human-rights-and-civil-justice-committee-june-7-2022 (accessed 11 May 2024).

63.

Rodriguez

Ciszek

(2020) Articulating Transgender Subjectivity: How Discursive Formations Perpetuate Regimes of Power. International Journal of Communication 14: 5199–5217.

64.

Scott

DeChants

AtteberryAsh

, et al. (2022) Identity Matters: Religious Experiences of US Based Transgender Young People. Journal of Religion and Health 63: 2443–2465.

65.

Scottish Government (2021) Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill: Analysis of Responses to the Public Consultation Exercise, 2 September. Available at: https://www.gov.scot/publications/gender-recognition-reform-scotland-bill-analysis-responses-public-consultation-exercise/ (accessed 9 January 2024).

66.

Smith

(2022) Where Does the British Public Stand on Transgender Rights in 2022? Yougov, 20 July. Available at: https://yougov.co.uk/society/articles/43194-where-does-british-public-stand-transgender-rights-1 (accessed 11 June 2024).

67.

Stocks

(2015) To What Extent Have the Rights of Transgender People Been Underrealized in Comparison to the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Queer/questioning People in the United Kingdom? International Journal of Transgenderism 16 (1): 1–35.

68.

Stone

(2017) Gender Panics about Transgender Children in Religious Right Discourse. Journal of LGBT Youth 15 (1): 1–15.

69.

Sumerau

Cragun

Mathers

LAB

(2016) Contemporary Religion and the Cisgendering of Reality. Social Currents 3 (3): 293–311.

70.

Sumerau

Mathers

LAB

Lampe

(2019) Learning from the Religious Experiences of Bi+ Trans People. Symbolic Interaction 42 (2): 179–201.

71.

Tee

Hegarty

(2006) Predicting Opposition to the Civil Rights of Trans Persons in the United Kingdom. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 16: 70–80.

72.

Thomas

(2014) Outsourcing Moral Authority: The Internal Secularization of Evangelicals’ Anti-pornography Narratives. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 52 (3): 457–475.

73.

Van Stekelenburg

Klandermans

(2009) Social Movement Theory Past, Present and Prospects. In: Ellis

Van Kessel

(eds) Movers and Shakers: Social Movements in Africa. Leiden: Brill, pp.17–44.

74.

Vipond

(2017) Producing Trans Economicus: Deploying Market Logic in the Fight for Trans Rights. Canadian Review of Social Policy 77: 17–43.

75.

Westwood

(2022) Religious-Based Negative Attitudes Towards LGBTQ People among Healthcare, Social Care and Social Work Students and Professionals: A Review of the International Literature. Health and Social Care in the Community 30: e1449–e1470.

76.

Wilcox

(2021) Queer Religiosities: An Introduction to Queer and Transgender Studies in Religion. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

77.

Wolford-Clevenger

Frantell

Smith

PNY

, et al. (2018) Correlates of Suicide Ideation and Behaviors among Transgender People: A Systematic Review Guided by Ideation-To Theory. Clinical Psychology Review 63: 93–105.

78.

Wuest

(2021) From Pathology to ‘born Perfect’: Science, Law, and Citizenship in American LGBTQ+ Advocacy. Perspectives on Politics 19 (3): 838–853.

79.

Yip

Nynäs

(2012) Re-Framing the Intersection Between Religion, Gender and Sexuality in Everyday Life. In: Nynäs

(ed.) Religion, Gender and Sexuality in Everyday Life. London: Routledge, pp.1–16.

80.

Zottola

(2021) Transgender Identities in the Press: A Corpus-Based Discourse Analysis. London: Bloomsbury.

Navigating the Secular Landscape: Religious Discourse on Transgender Rights in the United Kingdom

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction: Religion and Transgender Issues

The Strategic Context

The Gender Recognition Reform Bill

Supporting Groups

Oppositional Groups

The Immutability of Sex and Gender

Detrimental to Trans Well-Being

The Risks to Cisgender Women

Negative Social Consequences

Conclusion

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

ORCID iD

Notes

Author Biography

References