Most assessments of power-sharing institutions focus on their functionality, that is, on their prospects for delivering peace, stability, and prosperity. This article focuses instead on the prior question of “adoptability,” that is, on whether particular power-sharing institutions can be accepted (agreed to) in the first place. While the adoptability question is scarcely touched on in the academic literature, it is just as important as the functionality question, as it hardly matters whether an institution is functional if it is not adoptable. The article examines the adoptability question through a close-up look at the negotiations in Cyprus. The evidence from there suggests that consociational power sharing is more likely to be adoptable than centripetal power sharing in contexts where agreement is needed.
HorowitzDL (1985) Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
6.
HorowitzDL (1990) Comparing Democratic Systems. Journal of Democracy1 (4): 73–79.
7.
HorowitzDL (1991) A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
8.
HorowitzDL (2000) Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron? In: ShapiroIMacedoS (eds) Designing Democratic Institutions. New York: New York University Press, pp.253–284.
9.
HorowitzDL (2002) Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement: The Sources of an Unlikely Constitutional Consensus. British Journal of Political Science21: 193–220.
10.
HorowitzDL (2007) The Many Uses of Federalism. Drake Law Review55: 953–966.
11.
HorowitzDL (2008) Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Process in Post-Conflict States. William and Mary Law Review49: 1213–1248.
12.
HorowitzDL (2014) Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems. Journal of Democracy25: 5–20.
LijphartA (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
16.
LijphartA (2004) Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. Journal of Democracy15 (2): 96–109.
17.
LoizidesNEskinerE (2004) The Aftermath of the Annan Plan Referendums: Cross-Voting Moderation for Cyprus. Southeast European Politics5 (2–3): 158–171.
18.
LordosAKaymakETocciN (2009) A People’s Peace in Cyprus: Testing Public Opinion on the Options for a Comprehensive Settlement. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
19.
McGarryJ (2013) Is Presidentialism Necessarily Non-Collegial?Ethnopolitics12 (1): 93–97.
20.
McGarryJLoizidesN (2015) Power-Sharing in a Re-United Cyprus: Centripetal Coalitions vs Proportional Sequential Coalitions. International Journal of Constitutional Law (I*CON)13 (4): 847–872.
21.
McGarryJO’LearyB (2007) Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation as Political Prescription. International Journal of Constitutional Law5 (4): 1–29.
22.
McGarryJO’LearyB (2015) Power-Sharing Executives: Consociational and Centripetal Formulae and the Case of Northern Ireland. Ethnopolitics. DOI: 10.1080/17449057.2015.1088231.
23.
MichaelM (2009) Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
24.
National Council (1989) Greek Cypriot Proposals. Nicosia: National Council.
PericleousC (2009) The Cyprus Referendum: A Divided Island and the Challenge of the Annan Plan. London: I.B. Tauris.
27.
PolyviouP (1975) Cyprus: The Tragedy and the Challenge. Washington, DC: The American Hellenic Institute.
28.
PolyviouP (1980) Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiations 1960–1980. London: Duckworth.
29.
ReillyB (2001) Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
30.
ReillyB (2006) Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
31.
RoederP (2005) Power-Dividing as an Alternative to Ethnic Power-Sharing. In: RoederPRothchildD (eds) Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp.51–82.
VileMJC (1982) Federation and Confederation: The Experience of the United States and the British Commonwealth. In: ReaD (ed.) Political Co-Operation in Divided Societies: A Series of Papers Relevant to the Conflict in Northern Ireland. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, pp.216–228.
38.
WimmerA (2003) Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Iraq. Survival45 (4): 111–134.
39.
WippmanD (1998) Practical and Legal Constraints on Internal Power-Sharing. In: WippmanD (ed.) International Law and Ethnic Conflict. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp.211–241.
