Abstract
Although it is theoretically relevant, the effect of pre-electoral coalitions on vote choice remains a largely unexplored area in the field of party strategy. The article addresses this gap by focusing on the Italian regional elections, where the electoral rules allow parties to run alone and, at the same time, to present pre-electoral coalitions on the ballot paper. This setting allows us to investigate under what conditions citizens vote for their preferred party and the coalition that this party indicated to coalesce with. The results suggest that ideological congruence and the size of the parties entering a pre-electoral agreement are decisive factors. Findings also reveal that the time elapsed since the establishment of a coalition has no effect on vote choice.
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