The results of the study show the robustness of two utility-based negotiation theories—group decision theory and Nash's bargaining solution—in accurately predicting outcomes of a marketing channel laboratory simulation in which power and information conditions were varied. Both theories significantly outperformed the predictions of a random model. Nash's theory performed better than group decision theory.
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