The authors report an experimental investigation of the ability of Nash's theory of cooperative games to predict the outcomes of buyer-seller negotiations, using the purchase of media time as an example. Previous theoretical work has identified conflict, power, and influence as central elements of buyer-seller negotiations. Nash's theory provides a framework for understanding conflict resolution. A role-playing experiment tests Nash's theory, while controlling for the potential effects of situational power and negotiator influence. Results support Nash's theory.
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