Ecological and Psychosocial Uniqueness of Collectivist Practices Versus Mindsets

Abstract

Objective practices and subjective mindsets of collectivism are usually treated as inseparable twins. However, collectivist practices (e.g., living in extended families) and collectivist mindsets (e.g., preferring us over them) have distinct connections with ecological circumstances and different impacts on psychosocial functioning. This study clarifies these differences using ecological characteristics and psychosocial flourishing as criteria. Notably, our analysis of cross-sectional data from 120 countries reveals a path from increased habitat variability to decreased collectivist practices, followed by decreased collectivist mindsets, and ultimately, increased psychosocial flourishing. Additionally, national wealth reinforces the reductional impact of habitat variability on collectivist mindsets but not on collectivist practices. Finally, our country-level and multi-level analyses demonstrate that both societally shared and personally encountered experiences of psychosocial flourishing can distinguish between behavioral and mental manifestations of cultural collectivism versus individualism. These results challenge the broader notion that cultural practices and mindsets are interchangeable.

Keywords

latitudinal psychology habitat variability collectivist practices collectivist mindsets individualist practices individualist mindsets psychosocial functioning

Introduction

Perhaps the greatest achievement of psychology is the delicate distinction between mutually interrelated behavioral and mental processes. Prominent classic theories such as the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), the theory of role conflict resolution (Gross et al., 1958), and the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) explain complex relationships between objective behaviors and subjective mental states. A striking exception to this scientific advance is the societal-level conceptualization of collectivism—the opposite of individualism—as an undifferentiated whole of practices and mindsets (for overviews, see Kagitçibasi, 1997; Kitayama et al., 2022; Oyserman et al., 2002; but see Minkov & Kaasa, 2021, for the distinction between objective and subjective culture). This gestalt of collectivism has accordingly been defined and measured as a cultural syndrome (Triandis, 1993, 1996). As a current case in point, Pelham et al.’s (2022) Global Collectivism Index (GCI) is dually based on both objective practices (marriage stability, collective living, collective religiosity, collective transportation) and subjective mindsets (familism, nepotism, nationalism).

Conflating objective practices with subjective mindsets is a critical flaw recognized by both behaviorists and phenomenologists (see Englander & Morley, 2023; Kiparsky, 2001; Pribram, 1979; Wann, 1964, for comprehensive reviews of behavioristic and phenomenological psychology). Behaviorists, influenced by Watson and Skinner, would one-sidedly emphasize collectivist practices as reflections of the objectivity inherent in natural habitats and laws of nature. Phenomenologists, inspired by Husserl and Heidegger, would instead predominantly focus on collectivist mindsets as expressions of subjectivity rooted in inhabitants’ lived experiences and habitual functions. Drawing on insights from both behaviorism and phenomenology, we aim to better understand collectivism through a bifocal lens: habitat-driven adaptations of practices and inhabitant-centered processes of mindset formation, including meaningful thoughts, feelings, and behavioral motives.

As a point of departure, we conceptualize collectivist practices and collectivist mindsets as hybrid constructs, that are both similar (collectivism) and different (practices versus mindsets). This approach highlights that while the collectivist syndrome framework (Triandis, 1993, 1996) and the Global Collectivism Index (Pelham et al., 2022) emphasize similarities, there is significant value in exploring the differences between practices and mindsets from behavioristic and phenomenological perspectives. Building on the behaviorists’ emphasis on the environment as a primary influence on behavior, we propose that objective collectivist practices have stronger upstream connections to the ecological characteristics of the natural habitat (compared to subjective collectivist mindsets). By contrast, informed by the phenomenologists’ focus on consciousness and meaning, we propose that subjective collectivist mindsets have stronger downstream connections to the cognitive, affective, and conative experiences of psychosocial functioning (compared to objective collectivist practices).

The conceptual section discusses antecedents and consequents of collectivism as criteria for distinguishing between collectivist practices and mindsets in natural habitats. The upshot is a societal-level path from increased habitat variability to decreased collectivist practices, to decreased collectivist mindsets, to increased experiences of psychosocial flourishing. Relatedly, the methods section decomposes the recently created Global Collectivism Index (GCI; Pelham et al., 2022) into the complementary constructs of objective GCI practices and subjective GCI mindsets, and operationalizes macro-level contexts of habitat variability and micro-level experiences of psychosocial flourishing as distinct construct validation criteria. The empirical section reports analyses providing country-level and multi-level evidence in support of the societal-level complementarity of the overlapping collectivism constructs. The discussion section reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the study and highlights the neglected importance of distinguishing between objective cultural practices and subjective cultural mindsets.

Conceptual Background

This study does not primarily aim at specific theory testing or theory building. Instead, it seeks theoretical relevance by establishing the discriminant validity of two societal-level constructs—collectivist practices and collectivist mindsets—which are often mistakenly treated as interchangeable. As a further theoretical contribution, we integrate insights from behaviorist and phenomenological traditions (e.g., Englander & Morley, 2023; Kiparsky, 2001; Pribram, 1979; Wann, 1964), applying their complementary perspectives to the ecological antecedents and experiential consequences of collectivist practices and mindsets. In the subsections that follow, we present natural habitat variability and psychosocial flourishing as validation criteria. From a behaviorist standpoint, the link between habitat variability and collectivist practices serves as a key indicator. From a phenomenological standpoint, psychosocial flourishing offers a benchmark for assessing the uniqueness of collectivist mindsets.

Behaviorism: Habitat Variability as Criterion

Behaviorists emphasize how the environment—and, notably, the natural habitat—influences observable behaviors, including collectivist practices. Natural habitats differ in animal life, plant life, precipitation, temperature, and day length, in this order of increasing remoteness (Kummu & Varis, 2011; Van de Vliert, Joshanloo, et al., 2025). Most clearly, characteristics of humans, animals and plants depend on the characteristics of climate and sun radiation, making abiotic explanations of inhabitants’ habits more fundamental than biotic explanations. Collectivist habits have been explained by average conditions of biotic pathogen prevalence (Fincher & Thornhill, 2008, 2012), biotic rice agriculture (Talhelm, 2020; Talhelm et al., 2014), and abiotic thermal demands (Van de Vliert, 2013). Because the pathogen and rice theories focus on more immediate environmental factors, they offer less fundamental explanations than the theory centered on the demands of cold and heat, prompting us to prioritize abiotic conditions as the primary drivers of collectivist practices.

Importantly, the above-mentioned biotic and abiotic explanations of collectivism confound average natural ecologies with deviations from average natural ecologies. Decreasing pathogen prevalence, decreasing rice agriculture, and increasing thermal demands are all confounded with greater variability in daily rainfall, seasonal cold and heat, and day length over the year (Van de Vliert, Joshanloo, et al., 2025). Average-based ecological explanations are also flawed because humans are less sensitive to average precipitation, average temperature, and average day length, than to varying precipitation (drought, deluge), varying temperatures (cold, heat), and varying day length (short, long). Therefore, we concentrated on abiotic habitat variability as a criterion to discriminate between behavioristically relevant collectivist practices and behavioristically less significant—or even irrelevant—mental expressions of cultural collectivism versus individualism.

Behavioristic explanations of collectivism align with and can be embedded within systems-theoretical principles (Ashby, 1958; Baum, 2005; Giuliano & Nunn, 2021; Heylighen, 1992; Mintzberg, 1979; Von Bertalanffy, 1968), which also emphasize the role of external influences and interactions in shaping practices. The proposed mechanism explaining the relationship between habitat variability and cultural practices—rather than cultural mindsets—is the systems-theoretical principle that, in order to thrive, any system adjusts its internal flexibility to the variability of its external environment. In line with this possible explanation, evidence exists that tropical stability and persistency—which stem from fixed rainfall periods, warm winters, hot summers, and nearly constant day length—support collectivistic relational stability, durable behavioral conformity, and persistent group loyalty (Van de Vliert, Pelham, & Vandello, 2025). Conversely, abiotic habitat variability conflicts with the rigidity of collectivism, particularly in its practices, thereby reconfirming the idea that environments of all kinds often directly influence human behavior (e.g., see Bargh, 2017; Kihlstrom, 1987).

Direct and Indirect Effects as Criteria

The systemic environmental basis of human behavior (Baum, 2005; Giuliano & Nunn, 2021; Von Bertalanffy, 1968) suggests a strong connection between habitat variability as a stimulus and the adaptive response of flexible individualist practices. Accordingly, we propose that increased collectivist practices may mediate the relationship between reduced habitat variability and heightened collectivist mindsets (cf. Bandura, 1986; Baum, 2005). This consideration informed the formulation and subsequent testing of Hypothesis 1: greater habitat variability is directly associated with lower levels of collectivist practices and indirectly associated with diminished collectivist mindsets. This hypothesis refines the undifferentiated latitudinal gradient of lower cultural collectivism at higher latitudes (Van de Vliert, Pelham, & Vandello, 2025) by disentangling it into latitudinal gradients of preceding objective practices and following subjective mindsets. Hypothesis 1 can itself be refined by focusing on the varying rates at which cultural practices and mindsets evolve.

Slower and Faster Effects as Criteria

Further discriminant validity can be established by applying the systems-theoretical framework of cultural evolution, which posits that practices evolve more slowly than mindsets due to institutional and societal inertia (Gelfand, 2018; Henrich, 2016). A key application of this framework is the interactive impact of natural habitat variability and national wealth on collectivism versus individualism (Van de Vliert, Pelham, & Vandello, 2025). This interplay may unfold at different speeds—slower for collectivist practices, which are entrenched in institutional structures and societal conventions, yet faster for collectivist mindsets, which are more adaptable to ecological and economic conditions. This refined perspective sets the stage for a more detailed argument.

Greater habitat variability creates more stress, which can act as a double-edged sword depending on whether it is appraised as negatively threatening or positively challenging (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Seery, 2011; Skinner & Brewer, 2002). In poorer populations, greater habitat variability is more likely to be perceived as threatening, leading to the adoption of a more collectivist mindset (Van de Vliert, 2011. 2013), with collectivist practices evolving more slowly in response (Gelfand, 2018; Henrich, 2016). In contrast, richer populations tend to interpret greater habitat variability as a challenge, fostering a less collectivist mindset, with a corresponding shift in collectivist practices occurring at a delayed pace. This reasoning led to Hypothesis 2: greater habitat variability is associated with increases in collectivist mindsets in poorer populations but is associated with decreases in collectivist mindsets in richer populations. No parallel hypothesis was formulated for collectivist practices, as their evolution may lag behind for decades or even centuries.

Phenomenology: Psychosocial Flourishing as Criterion

Phenomenologists delve into subjective experiences, emphasizing individual perceptions, authentic meaning, intentionality, autonomy, and well-being to uncover deeper insights into human flourishing (Englander & Morley, 2023). Similarly, self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000, 2017) explores psychosocial thriving through the fulfillment of basic psychological needs—autonomy, competence, and relatedness—each of which fosters well-being most effectively when experienced in a genuinely self-directed manner. Together, these conceptual frameworks suggest that the cognitive, affective, and conative dimensions of cultural mindsets provide more nuanced and richer explanations of psychosocial flourishing compared to the observable behavioral aspects of cultural practices. More specifically, self-determination theory suggests that collectivist mindsets, rather than collectivist practices, may undermine autonomy by increasing identity conflict and regulatory burden, thus diminishing positive self-assessments of psychosocial functioning.

Employing the phenomenological perspective as a supplementary construct validation criterion extends the conceptual pathway from increases in habitat variability to decreases in collectivist practices, to decreases in collectivist mindsets, and ultimately to increases in psychosocial flourishing. While larger increases in individualism may lead to loneliness due to greater social isolation (Heu et al., 2021), decreases in subjective collectivist mindsets are more often associated with increases in experiences of affective autonomy, mutual trust, interpersonal equality, social support, and subjective well-being (Hofstede, 2001; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Triandis, 1995; Welzel, 2013). With all this in mind, we tested Hypothesis 3: compared with collectivist practices, collectivist mindsets exhibit a stronger negative association with experiences of psychosocial flourishing.

Methods

Collectivist Practices and Mindsets

Splitting up practices and mindsets is admittedly difficult because pure behaviors and pure mental states are rare. Nevertheless, Pelham et al.’s (2022) 10-item Global Collectivism Index (GCI) can be subdivided into items that emphasize imprints of concrete collectivist activities (e.g., marriage to divorce ratios) and items that emphasize imprints of cognitive and affective differentiation between familiars and strangers (e.g., attitudes about relatives versus immigrants). Although objective practices and subjective mindsets [r₍₁₁₈₎ = 0.56; p < .001; CI = 0.43 to 0.67] have collectivism in common, they are sufficiently different and deserving to be treated separately.

Objective Practices

Seven GCI items were used to create a cross-national measure of collectivist practices. Marriage stability was represented by marriage to divorce ratios for 137 countries, and collective living by total fertility rates for 198 countries. Collective living was additionally estimated as percentages of multi-generational households for 124 countries, household sizes for 180 countries, and percentages of solo-person households in 57 countries (reverse coded). Collective religiosity was measured as percentages of people in 143 countries who view religion as an important part of their daily life. Finally, collective transportation was represented by the number of motor vehicles per capita for 186 countries (reversed). The 120-country combination of these imprints of concrete collectivist activities, reproduced in Supplemental Table S1, is internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = .82), and approximates normality (M = −0.15, SD = 0.78; skewness = 0.22, SE = 0.22; kurtosis = −0.87, SE = 0.44). As an indication of convergent validity, this composite measure of objective GCI practices is significantly related to Conway et al.’s (2017) index of objective legal discrimination between we-groups and they-groups [r₍₁₁₈₎ = 0.71, p < .001; CI = 0.61 to 0.79].

Subjective Mindsets

The GCI also contains representations of three collectivist mindsets retrieved from a cross-national index of ingroup favoritism: familism, nepotism, and compatriotism (Van de Vliert, 2011). Familism—preferring to treat one’s closest relatives (father, mother, son, daughter, sibling) more advantageously—was available for 57 countries. Nepotism—preferring to give relatives organizational positions because of their relationship rather than on their merits—was available for 116 countries. Compatriotism—preferring to give fellow nationals easier access to scarce jobs than immigrants—was available for 73 countries. The 120-country combination of these imprints of cognitive and affective differentiation between us and them, reproduced in Supplemental Table S1, is internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = .89), and approximates normality (M = 0.13, SD = 0.86; skewness = −0.55, SE = 0.22; kurtosis = 0.29, SE = 0.44). As an indication of convergent validity, this composite measure of subjective GCI mindsets is significantly related to Hofstede’s (2001) latent value dimension of vertical collectivism versus horizontal individualism [r₍₁₁₈₎ = 0.83, p < .001; CI = 0.72 to 0.90].

Predictors of Collectivism

Habitat Variability

Natural habitats differ primarily in annual day length variation, with seasonal temperature variability and daily precipitation variability in their wake. To increase measurement reliability, we averaged the three variabilities into a single index (Van de Vliert, Joshanloo, et al., 2025; Van de Vliert, Pelham, & Vandello, 2025), which is reproduced in Supplemental Table S1.

Day length variability is the absolute difference between the country’s day length hours on 21 June and 21 December (Hut et al., 2013). It leads to seasonal temperature variability measured as the standard deviation of the lowest and highest temperatures in the coldest and hottest months (Parker, 1997). More variable day length also leads to dry and rainy days characteristic of temperate climates rather than dry and rainy months characteristic of tropical climates. Daily precipitation variability—greater to the extent that the monthly minimum is higher and the monthly maximum is lower—is therefore proxied by the minimal monthly precipitation divided by the maximal monthly precipitation (Van de Vliert et al., 2018). The resulting measure is unifactorial (eigenvalue λ = 2.15, R² = .72), internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = .80), and a valid indicator of the well-known greater habitat variability at higher latitudes [r₍₁₁₈₎ = 0.92; p < .001; CI = 0.89 to 0.95; latitude coordinates sourced from Google (2012)].

National Wealth

The average log-transformed income per head in 2000, 2002, and 2004 (measured with a time lag to allow causality to take hold, and retrieved from Van de Vliert & Van Lange, 2019), is reproduced in Supplemental Table S1.

Predictors of Psychosocial Flourishing

As part of annual Gallup World Polls from 2005 to 2018, 1.347,639 native inhabitants of 119 out of the 120 sampled countries answered the following questions about their own functioning: “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your freedom to choose what you do with your life?” “Did you learn or do something interesting yesterday?” “Can people in this country get ahead by working hard, or not?” “(In the past month) have you helped a stranger or someone you didn’t know who needed help?” “(In the past month) have you volunteered your time to an organization?” “If you were in trouble, do you have relatives or friends you can count on to help you whenever you need them, or not?” “Were you treated with respect all day yesterday?” Joshanloo (2018) demonstrated that the seven yes-no responses can be integrated into valid measures of psychosocial flourishing at both the country and individual levels (see Supplemental Table S1 for country scores). The nesting of the individual-level measure within the country-level measure enabled a dual test of Hypothesis 3: compared with collectivist practices, collectivist mindsets exhibit a stronger negative association with both societally shared and personally encountered experiences of psychosocial flourishing.

Country-level Predictors

The country-level test of Hypothesis 3 regressed the societally shared experiences of psychosocial flourishing on the country-level factors of habitat variability, collectivist practices, and collectivist mindsets.

Individual-level Predictors

The subsequent multi-level test of Hypothesis 3 regressed the personally encountered experiences of psychosocial flourishing on both the aforementioned country-level factors and relevant individual characteristics available from the Gallup World Polls. Gender and age were included because women and younger individuals tend to experience lower levels of psychosocial thriving compared to men and older individuals (Joshanloo, 2018). Secondary education, college education, and income adequacy were added to control for economic development at the personal level. Finally, habitat satisfaction (“Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the city or area where you live?”) was examined to account for the place-boundedness of livability and its potential impact on psychosocial functioning.

Dichotomous predictors were female gender, secondary education, college education, and habitat satisfaction. A 4-point ordinal scale assessed the adequacy of each respondent’s household income: “Which phrase comes closest to your own feelings about your household’s income these days? (1) Living comfortably on present income; (2) Getting by on present income; (3) Finding it difficult on present income; (4) Finding it very difficult on present income” (reverse coded). Age was measured continuously in years.

Statistical Analyses

SPSS 25 served as the inferential statistics in all country-level tests of the construct validity of collectivist practices and mindsets. Durbin-Watson coefficients, ranging between 1.88 and 2.37, confirmed that spatial autocorrelation did not affect the country-level results, meeting the midpoint criterion of 2 on the 0-4 scale. In addition, Bayesian multi-level modeling was conducted using Mplus version 8.9 to test Hypothesis 3. The added value of the multi-level analysis is information about the societal-level complementarity of the collectivism constructs with psychosocial flourishing at the individual level as a construct validation criterion.

In the Bayesian analysis, two Markov Monte Carlo chains were run using the Gibbs sampling algorithm for 10,000 iterations. The first 50% of iterations were discarded as burn-in. A thinning factor of 20 was applied to mitigate autocorrelation, which refers to the dependence between successive samples in the chains. High autocorrelation can slow the exploration of parameter space and reduce the efficiency of the sampling process. A maximal potential scale reduction factor of 1,000 across all parameters showed excellent convergence (Gelman & Rubin, 1992). Additionally, the posterior parameter trace plot and autocorrelation plot revealed consistently satisfactory results across all parameter estimates. The posterior predictive p-value for our model was .466, indicating a good model fit (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2010). We used the default non-informative priors of Mplus. In Bayesian statistics, uninformative priors are expansive and diffuse probability distributions that are designed to give the observed data significant influence in shaping the posterior distribution. This approach minimizes the influence of the researcher's prior beliefs, ensuring a more data-driven and objective inference process (Muthén et al., 2017).

Results

Habitat Variability as Criterion

Direct and Indirect Effects

Using mediation analysis (Hayes, 2018, model 4), this first route of discriminant validation revealed no direct path from habitat variability to collectivist mindsets [B₍₁₁₇₎ = −0.07, p = .52; CI = −0.29 to 0.15], but a completely mediated path from greater habitat variability through lower levels of collectivist practices to less collectivist mindsets [B₍₁₁₇₎ = −0.35; Boot CI = −0.53 to −0.19] (Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.88). These distinct paths from greater habitat variability to less collectivist practices and mindsets support Hypothesis 1.

Slower and Faster Effects

Does the interplay of habitat variability and national wealth influence collectivist practices more gradually, while impacting collectivist mindsets more rapidly? Adding national wealth as an environmental modifier of the indirect effect of habitat variability on collectivist mindsets (Hayes, 2018, model 8; total R² = .53) revealed that higher national wealth has no interaction effect on the relationship between greater habitat variability and less collectivist practices [∆R² = .00; B₍₁₁₅₎ = 0.07, p = .14; CI = −0.02 to 0.16], but does change the initially insignificant effect of habitat variability on collectivist mindsets [∆R² = .15; B₍₁₁₄₎ = −0.44, p < .001; CI = −0.58 to −0.29] (Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.90). In line with Hypothesis 2, this interaction effect indicates that greater habitat variability is associated with increases in collectivist mindsets in poorer populations but is associated with decreases in collectivist mindsets in richer populations (see Figure 1). These validation results again emphasize that collectivist practices and collectivist mindsets should not be thoughtlessly lumped together.

Figure 1.

Joint effects of habitat variability and national wealth on subjective collectivist mindsets while controlling for objective collectivist practices. Habitat variability increases collectivist mindsets in poorer populations [B₍₁₁₇₎ = 0.51, p < .001; CI = 0.25 to 0.77] but decreases collectivist mindsets in richer populations [B₍₁₁₇₎ = −0.35, p < .001; CI = −0.50 to −0.19].

Psychosocial Flourishing as Criterion

Country-level Test

In support of Hypothesis 3, Table 1 shows that, unlike collectivist practices [r₍₁₁₇₎ = −0.02, p = .79], collectivist mindsets reduce societally shared experiences of psychosocial flourishing [r₍₁₁₇₎ = −0.45, p < .001]. Moreover, this reduction effect by collectivist mindsets suppresses a background effect by habitat variability [r₍₁₁₅₎ = −0.35, p < .001]. Serial mediation analysis (Hayes, 2018, model 6) further revealed a direct path from greater habitat variability to worse psychosocial functioning [B₍₁₁₅₎ = −0.03, p < .001; CI = −0.05 to −0.02] and an indirect path from greater habitat variability to better psychosocial functioning [B₍₁₁₅₎ = 0.02; Boot CI = 0.01 to 0.03] (total R² = .36). The indirect path leads from increases in habitat variability to decreases in objective collectivist practices, to decreases in subjective collectivist mindsets, to increases in societally shared experiences of psychosocial flourishing (Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.37).

Table 1.

Predictions of Societally Shared Experiences of Psychosocial Flourishing.

Predictor	r ₍₁₁₇₎	Control factors	r ₍₁₁₅₎	CI
Habitat variability	−0.16	Collectivist practices Collectivist mindsets	−0.35^***	−0.49 to −0.20
Collectivist practices	−0.02	Habitat variability Collectivist mindsets	0.00	−0.21 to 0.24
Collectivist mindsets	−0.45^***	Habitat variability Collectivist practices	−0.56^***	−0.68 to −0.42

Note. N = 119 countries.

***

p < .001.

The shorter paths from habitat variability through collectivist practices to psychosocial flourishing [B₍₁₁₅₎ = 0.00; Boot CI = −0.01 to 0.01], and from habitat variability through collectivist mindsets to psychosocial flourishing [B₍₁₁₅₎ = 0.00; Boot CI = −0.01 to 0.01], were not viable. We did identify a shorter path from habitat variability through the undifferentiated Global Collectivism Index (GCI) to psychosocial flourishing [B₍₁₁₆₎ = 0.03; Boot CI = 0.02 to 0.04]. However, this shorter indirect path reduced the total effect size from .36 to .15, obscuring the crucial suggestion that objective collectivist practices uniquely influence psychosocial flourishing through subjective collectivist mindsets.

Multi-level Test

Table 2 shows, first, that personally encountered experiences of psychosocial flourishing increase most notably with college education, income adequacy, and habitat satisfaction. Nevertheless, experiences of psychosocial functioning are collective phenomena (R² ≈ .39) rather than individual ones (R² ≈ .09). Collectivist practices at the societal level do not play a part (effect = 0.01, p = .198; CI = −0.01 to 0.03). Instead, individual flourishing seems to be primarily reduced by collectivist mindsets at the societal level (effect = −0.05, p < .001; CI = −0.07 to −0.04), and secondarily by habitat variability (effect = −0.03, p < .001; CI = −0.05 to −0.02). Again, in agreement with Hypothesis 3, there is a path from increases in habitat variability to decreases in objective collectivist practices, to decreases in subjective collectivist mindsets, to increases in personally encountered experiences of psychosocial flourishing. Again, shorter paths from habitat variability through collectivist practices [effect = 0.00, p = .20; CI = −0.02 to 0.01], or through collectivist mindsets [effect = 0.00; p = .26; CI = −0.01 to 0.01], were not viable.

Table 2.

Individual Effects (R² ≈ .09) and Country Effects (R² ≈ .39) on Individually Experienced Psychosocial Flourishing (IEPF).

Level^a	Predictor^b	Unstandardized estimate	95% Credible interval		Posteriors.d.	p ^c	Standardized estimate
Level^a	Predictor^b	Unstandardized estimate	Lower	Upper	Posteriors.d.	p ^c	Standardized estimate
1	Female	−0.006	−0.007	−0.006	0.000	<.001	−0.016
1	Age	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	0.000	<.001	−0.070
1	Secondary education	0.021	0.020	0.022	0.000	<.001	0.053
1	College education	0.058	0.057	0.059	0.001	<.001	0.106
1	Income adequacy	0.043	0.042	0.043	0.000	<.001	0.186
1	Habitat satisfaction	0.075	0.074	0.076	0.000	<.001	0.154
2	Habitat variability (HV)	−0.035	−0.051	−0.019	0.008	<.001	−0.457
2	Collectivist practices (CP)	0.008	−0.011	0.027	0.010	.198	0.096
2	Collectivist mindsets (CM)	−0.052	−0.066	−0.038	0.007	<.001	−0.646
2^d	HV → CP → IEPF	−0.005	−0.018	0.007	0.007	.198
2^d	HV → CM → IEPF	0.004	−0.007	0.015	0.006	.255
2^e	HV → CP → CM → IEPF	0.017	0.009	0.029	0.005	<.001

Level 1 is the individual level (N = 1.347,639), and level 2 is the country level (N = 119).

Predictors refer to six individual effects, three country effects, and three country-level mediation effects (last three rows). The effects are unstandardized and standardized posterior median point estimates.

The p-value is the proportion of the posterior distribution below zero for a positive regression coefficient and above zero for a negative regression coefficient.

HV is significantly associated with CP (−0.676; p < 0.001; CI = −0.792 to −0.565), but not with CM (−0.070; p = 0.255; CI = −0.281 to 0.144).

CP is significantly associated with CM (0.503; p < .001; CI = 0.267 to 0.732).

Conclusion

All in all, the validation criteria of societally shared and personally encountered experiences of psychosocial flourishing can consistently distinguish between the behavioral and mental manifestations of cultural collectivism. Practices and mindsets indeed stand out as complementary conceptualizations of collectivism versus individualism at the societal level.

Discussion

Contributions to Psychology

Previous research showed that north-south clines in collectivism versus individualism are omnipresent. In the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, collectivism slopes downward in opposite poleward directions, and has done so since pre-industrial times (Van de Vliert, 2020). Within Africa, collectivism likewise slopes in opposite poleward directions above and below the equator (Van de Vliert, Pelham, & Vandello, 2025). On even finer spatial scales within the Northern Hemisphere, collectivism slopes downward in northward direction across the 50 United States and across the 85 regions of the Russian Federation (Van de Vliert, Pelham, & Vandello, 2025). This omnipresence of undifferentiated decreases in collectivism at higher latitudes attaches crucial importance to distinguishing between collectivist practices and mindsets. Through an integrated lens of behaviorism and phenomenology, discriminant validity of the collectivist constructs of objective practices and subjective mindsets has been established here on the basis of their different relationships with natural habitats, socio-economic environments, and experiences of everyday life.

Ecologically, less collectivist practices appear to act as linking pins between greater habitat variability and less collectivist mindsets. In addition, whereas the relationship between greater habitat variability and less collectivist practices is unaffected by national wealth as such, greater habitat variability is associated with more collectivist mindsets among poorer populations but with less collectivist mindsets among richer populations (see Figures 1 and 2). Psychosocially, less collectivist mindsets appear to act as linking pins between less collectivist practices in more variable habitats and more experiences of psychosocial flourishing at both societal and individual levels. Evidently, rather than as mirror images of each other (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Minkov & Kaasa, 2021), collectivist practices and collectivist mindsets deserve to be treated as potentially different theoretical concepts and practical manifestations of cultural collectivism.

Figure 2.

Empirical associations illustrating the uniqueness of collectivist practices and mindsets through an integrated lens of behaviorism and phenomenology. The left side of the figure depicts behaviorist accounts of psychosocial functioning via three boxes and three directional arrows, while the right side presents phenomenological interpretations using two boxes and a single arrow.

This pattern of findings demonstrates the merit of zooming out to latitudinal gradients in collectivism and then fine-tuning in on the differences between practices and mindsets. A major implication flowing from this research strategy is that psychosocial theory building around collectivism versus individualism is suboptimal unless it specifies the target domain as being practices or mindsets. The studied collectivist practices appear to have relatively little to say about cognitive, affective and conative aspects of psychosocial functioning, whereas the studied collectivist mindsets appear to have relatively little to say about the inhabitants’ adaptations of their natural habits to their natural habitats. This is a critical theoretical issue because almost all knowledge about collectivism versus individualism is built on measures of subjective mindsets (e.g., Akaliyski et al., 2025; Gelfand et al., 2004; Hofstede, 2001; Kitayama et al., 2022; Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis, 1996; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; Van de Vliert, 2011; but see Kashima & Kashima, 1998, 2003; Vandello & Cohen, 1999). It means that much of cross-cultural psychology, and psychology more generally, has unknowingly neglected the latitude-related impact of ecological influences on habitual psychosocial behavior.

In striking contrast to cross-cultural differences in collectivism versus individualism, latitudinal gradients of more creativity and less aggression toward the North and South Poles are built on measures of objective cultural practices (Van de Vliert & Van Lange, 2019). The psychological assumption behind these metric choices is that habitual cultural practices are valid representations of habitual cultural mindsets (cf. Minkov & Kaasa, 2021). The present validation study calls this implicit assumption into question by demonstrating that core dimensions of psychosocial practices and psychosocial mindsets cannot be parsimoniously lumped together without losing accuracy and generalizability. Compared with north-south clines in creative and aggressive practices, north-south clines in creative and aggressive mindsets might have less to say about inhabitants’ adaptations of their creative and aggressive habits to their natural habitats; and might have more to say about cognitive, affective and conative aspects of creative and aggressive functioning. This is clearly a promising avenue for further research.

That psychology as a discipline focuses on individuals should not discourage investigators and interventionists to zoom across micro-, meso-, and macro-contexts. On the contrary, combining zooming-in and zooming-out approaches may enrich psychology conceptually and methodologically (Minkov et al., 2024; Smith & Bond, 2019; Van de Vliert, Joshanloo, et al., 2025; Van de Vliert, Pelham, & Vandello, 2025). The statistical paths reported here illustrate how zooming out enriches psychology by placing increasing emphasis on behavioral adaptations to distal ecological contexts, whereas zooming in enriches psychology by placing increasing emphasis on mental habits of psychosocial functioning in immediate proximal situations. What has been highlighted as a fundamental divide between behaviorists and phenomenologists (e.g., Kiparsky, 2001; Pribram, 1979; Wann, 1964), may in fact be the result of conscious choices between zooming out from or zooming in on the targeted individuals. Zooming out to individuals’ latitude-related behaviors in socio-economic environments and natural habitats is as legitimate and insightful as zooming in on their thoughts, feelings, and motives in micro-situations.

Strengths and Weaknesses

This theoretically informative validation study presents both advantages and limitations. The strength of zooming out to the individuals’ natural habitats comes with the weakness of addressing only very general types of collectivist practices (marriage stability, collective living, collective religiosity, collective transportation) and collectivist mindsets (familism, nepotism, nationalism). Missing are, for example, many specific elements of Triandis’s definition of collectivism as “a social pattern consisting of closely linked individuals who see themselves as parts of one or more collectives (family, co-workers, tribe, nation); are primarily motivated by the norms of, and duties imposed by, those collectives; are willing to give priority to the goals of these collectives over their own personal goals; and emphasize their connectedness to members of these collectives” (Triandis, 1995, p. 2). This deficiency is due to the challenge of finding appropriate worldwide indicators of cultural practices and mindsets from representative samples.

The strength of using measures of habitat variability, collectivist practices, collectivist mindsets, and experiences of psychosocial flourishing from fundamentally different sources is balanced by the weakness of analyzing them sequentially despite their co-occurring nature. The statistical paths identified are not necessarily causal. Although this does not significantly impact the chosen routes of construct validation, caution is needed to avoid overinterpreting the results in a theory-building direction. For instance, the finding that objective collectivist practices precede subjective collectivist mindsets (see Figure 2) should not be interpreted as excluding the possibility that these practices and mindsets influence each other.

The strength of including predictable variabilities in day length, temperature, and daily precipitation over the course of the year is accompanied by the weakness of not accounting for unpredictable earthquakes and other natural disasters as ecological precursors of collectivism (Oishi & Komiya, 2017). While the cultural consequences of predictable versus unpredictable environments are receiving increasing attention (e.g., Munakata et al., 2023), the cultural consequences of the predictability of habitat variability remain largely untrodden scientific territory (but see Van Lange et al., 2017). A final weakness, at least from a zooming-in perspective, is the broad yet arbitrary selection of questions to assess people’s psychosocial functioning. However, from the alternative zooming-out perspective, this weakness can also be seen as a strength because of the better conceptual match between the syndrome of collectivism versus individualism (Triandis, 1993, 1995, 1996) and the gestalt of psychosocial flourishing or eudaimonic well-being (Joshanloo, 2018).

Beyond Business as Usual

This article is unusual in its emphasis on parsimony, accuracy, and generality as basic scientific principles (for details, see Weick, 1979). Parsimonious description peaks in the habitat-based geography of collectivism. Students can be easily taught that—due to habitat variability—collectivist practices and mindsets increase from the North Pole toward the equator, decrease from the equator toward the South Pole, and vary negligibly from East to West (Van de Vliert, Pelham, & Vandello, 2025). To strengthen their case, teachers can add that the parsimonious subjective mindset of vertical collectivism versus horizontal individualism (Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998)—less tellingly also known as tight-loose culture (Gelfand et al., 2011; Uz, 2015)—likewise increases from the North Pole toward the equator, decreases from the equator toward the South Pole, and varies negligibly from East to West (Van de Vliert, 2020).

Accurate description peaks in the statistical paths from increases in habitat variability to decreases in objective collectivist practices, to decreases in subjective collectivist mindsets, to increases in societally shared and personally encountered experiences of psychosocial flourishing. That these potentially causal paths are deliberately reduced to factual statistical paths, does not make them less accurate. On the contrary, the observed series of empirical conditions prompts a set of precise speculations about the adaptations of habitual cultural practices and habitual cultural mindsets to the contextual layers of the more distal natural habitat and the less distal socio-economic environment.

Generic description peaks in the broad coverage of the ultimate outcome variable of psychosocial functioning. More so than objective collectivist practices, subjective collectivist mindsets reduce societal and individual experiences of life satisfaction (“Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your freedom to choose what you do with your life?”), personal growth (“Did you learn or do something interesting yesterday?”), career opportunities (“Can people in this country get ahead by working hard, or not?”), selfless altruism (“Have you helped a stranger or someone you didn’t know who needed help?”), volunteer work (“Have you volunteered your time to an organization?”), social support (“If you were in trouble, do you have relatives or friends you can count on to help you whenever you need them, or not?”), and procedural justice (“Were you treated with respect all day yesterday?”).

In various ways, this article has illustrated how parsimonious, accurate, and generic descriptions of objective cultural practices and subjective cultural mindsets can help explain human habits across widely diverse natural habitats around the Earth.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-jcc-10.1177_00220221251406561 – Supplemental material for Ecological and Psychosocial Uniqueness of Collectivist Practices Versus Mindsets

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-jcc-10.1177_00220221251406561 for Ecological and Psychosocial Uniqueness of Collectivist Practices Versus Mindsets by Evert Van de Vliert, Mohsen Joshanloo, Brett Pelham and Joseph A. Vandello in Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was partially supported by a grant from the Well-being for Planet Earth Foundation awarded to Mohsen Joshanloo in 2021.

ORCID iDs

Evert Van de Vliert

Mohsen Joshanloo

Brett Pelham

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

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