A Probative Argument of Intention

Abstract

This article develops the basic argument for proving intention in criminal adjudication. The evidential proof of an accused's state of mind is a very old problem that arises from an even older moral quandry of distinguishing between unlawful killings that are accidental from those that are intentional for punitive purposes. Intentional unlawful killings typically attract much greater responsibility and punishment than killings by accident. The necessity of proving intention for an unlawful killing arises generally from an alleged killer claiming: ‘I didn’t mean to do it’. This denial can in turn be disambiguated into two cognitive (epistemic error) and volitional (muscular accident) sub-categories. Historically, pre-modern fact-finders saw themselves as being limited to relying on confessions and expert marabout to prove an alleged killer's intention in the face of these denials. The article deploys contemporary rationalist methods of logical argumentation for the proof of intention in criminal adjudication. The arguments made in the paper are pitched at a theoretical level and without necessarily reflecting a detailed exposition of the existing doctrine of one particular jurisdiction.