Since 2014, Russia’s Wagner Group has gained prominence, expanding its role from driving Russian foreign policy across many African and Middle Eastern countries into an integral part of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In this paper, we first draw on the one-sided violence (OSV) literature to show how organizational incentives explain Wagner’s violence against civilians pre-November 2021. Despite the static context of organizational incentives, Wagner’s OSV lethality increased dramatically after the initial invasion. While prior research on this topic assumes organizations to be unitary and rational, we use personnel composition as an additional explanatory factor to explain OSV. Situated within research on combat psychology and health sciences, we introduce pre-combat experience (PCE) as key to understanding how training contributes to the use of OSV. By clarifying the role of PCE on OSV, we provide novel theoretical logic and empirical evidence explaining how individual-level experience aggregates to unit-level violence.
AkcinarogluS.RadziszewskiE.. 2013. “Private Military Companies, Opportunities, and Termination of Civil Wars in Africa.” Journal of Conflict Resolution57: 795–821.
2.
AkcinarogluS.RadziszewskiE.. 2020. Private Militaries and the Security Industry in Civil Wars: Competition and Market Accountability. Oxford University Press.
3.
ArendtH.1970. On Violence. Harcourt, Brace & World.
4.
AtlamazoglouS.2022. Russia’s Reliance on Wagner Group in Ukraine Is Wearing down Putin’s Favorite Mercenary Group, the British Military Says.
5.
AvantD.NeuK. K.. 2019. “The Private Security Events Database.” Journal of Conflict Resolution63: 1986–2006.
6.
AxeD.2022. Why Are Mercenaries Driving Russia’s Best T-90 Tanks?
7.
ButlerC.GatesS.. 2009. “Asymmetry, Parity, and (Civil) War: Can International Theories of Power Help Us Understand Civil War?” International Interactions35: 330–340.
8.
BymanD.2008. “An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?” Security Studies17: 599–643.
9.
ÇelikE.ŞafakY.. 2017. Wagner, Russian Blackwater in Syria.
10.
ChraibiC.2020. Russian Wagner Mercenaries Arrested in Belarus: ‘Little Green Men’ Scenario, Fighters in Transit, or Other?
11.
CilD.FjeldeH.HultmanL.NilssonD.. 2020. “Mapping Blue Helmets: Introducing the Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research57: 360–370.
12.
Clemente-SuárezV. J.Robles-PérezJ. J.. 2013. “Psycho-Physiological Response of Soldiers in Urban Combat.” Anales de Psicología29: 598–603.
13.
CRS. 2022. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects. Technical Report. Congressional Research Service.
14.
DavenportC.1995. “Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry Into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions.” American Journal of Political Science39: 683–713.
15.
DiPippoG.2022. Strangling the Bear? The Sanctions on Russia After Four Months.
16.
DownesA. B.2007. “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy.” Civil Wars9: 420–444.
GrigoriyM.2025. Saving Billions, Cynically: A Very Special Military Operation.
19.
GrissomA. R.CharapS.CheravitchJ., et al.2022. Russia’s Growing Presence in Africa: A Geostrategic Assessment. Technical Report. RAND Corporation.
20.
HillD. W.JonesZ. M.. 2014. “An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression.” American Political Science Review108: 661–687.
21.
HopkinsV.HeitmannN.. 2023. “In Bleak Russian Cemetery, Sea of Crosses Signals War’s True Toll.” The New York Times.
22.
HoureldK.BennettD.DixonR.. 2023. “Russian Mercenaries Closely Linked With Sudan’s Warring Generals.” Washington Post.
23.
HRW. 2022. Central African Republic: Abuses by Russia-Linked Forces. Technical Report. Human Rights Watch.
24.
JaklinD. C.2024. “Sadat: Proxy Force – Informal Security Structure – Turkey’s Group Wagner?”
25.
JoynerT.2023. “When No-One Was Watching, Putin Quietly Moved His Guns for Hire into Africa. Here’s What He May Be up to.” ABC News.
26.
KalyvasS. N.2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge University Press.
27.
KomminothL.2022. “Russia’s Wagner Group Could Make Millions From Exploitation of African Rainforest.” African Business.
28.
KunkelS.2023. Double Delegation: An Investigation of the UN Use of Private Security Contractors.
29.
KunkelSkyEllisMatthew Kyle. 2026. “Replication Data For: Violence as a Condition: Structure, Composition, and the Use of Lethal Force.”
30.
KyddA. H.WalterB.. 2006. “The Strategies of Terrorism.” International Security31: 49–80.
31.
LechnerJ.EledinovS.. 2024. Is Africa Corps a Rebranded Wagner Group?
32.
LeeJ.2022. The Great Russian Oil Switch Is Gathering Momentum. Bloomberg.
33.
LockyerA.2010. “The Dynamics of Warfare in Civil War.” Civil Wars12: 91–116.
34.
LyallJ.2009. “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?: Evidence From Chechnya.” Journal of Conflict Resolution53: 331–362.
35.
MaA.2022. Ukraine Posts Image of Dog Tag it Said Belonged to a Killed Mercenary From the Wagner Group, Said to be Charged With Assassinating Zelenskyy.
36.
MacFarquharN.2022. “‘Coffins Are Already Coming’: The Toll of Russia’s Chaotic Draft.” The New York Times.
37.
MantuaJ. R.2023. Effective U.S. Military Training Increases Battlefield Confidence of Partner Forces: A Replication Study. Technical Report. Institute for Defense Analyses Central Research Program.
38.
MartenK.2019a. Into Africa: Prigozhin, Wagner, and the Russian Military.
39.
MartenK.2019b. “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group.” Post-Soviet Affairs35: 181–204.
40.
MartenK.2020. Where’s Wagner? The All-New Exploits of Russia’s “Private”. Military Company - PONARS Eurasia.
41.
MatsonL. M.AdlerAmy B.QuartanaPhillip J., et al.2022. “Management of Acute Stress Reactions in the Military: a Stepped Care Approach.” Current Psychiatry Reports24: 799–808.
42.
MayerC.2023. Quasi-Mercenary Groups Inquiry.
43.
MINUSCA Fact Sheet.
44.
MohieddeenH.2022. Inside the Wagner Group, Russia’s Mercenary Force.
45.
NedeleK. C. H.2023. The Long Arm(s) of the State: The Role of the Wagner Group in Russia’s Pivot to Africa, 2017-2022. Technical Report. World Peace Foundation.
46.
NicolaB.2025. Executive Outcomes: The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth.
47.
NiemeyerK.2023. A Captured Russian Prison Inmate-Turned-Soldier Said the Wagner Group’s Paramilitary Trained Him for 3 Weeks and Didn’t Expect Him to Survive the Ukrainian Assault.
48.
NindlB. C.BillingD. C.DrainJ. R., et al.2018. “Perspectives on Resilience for Military Readiness and Preparedness: Report of an International Military Physiology Roundtable.” Journal of Science and Medicine in Sport21: 1116–1124.
49.
ObajiP.Jr. 2022a. “Putin’s Prison Recruiting Scheme Takes a Big, Desperate Turn.” The Daily Beast.
50.
ObajiP.Jr. 2022b. “Notorious Russian Mercenaries Pull Out of Africa for Ukraine.” The Daily Beast.
51.
OlivierM.2022a. At the Heart of the Wagner System, from Douala to Bangui.
52.
OlivierM.2022b. Russia-Ukraine: From the CAR to Mali, Wagner Takes Part in Putin’s War.
53.
OppenheimB.WeintraubM.. 2017. “Doctrine and Violence: The Impact of Combatant Training on Civilian Killings.” Terrorism and Political Violence29: 1126–1148.
54.
OstrovskyS.2023. From Prison to the Frontlines: Thousands of Russian Convicts Sent to Fight in Ukraine.
55.
OwenA.2022. Putin’s Secret Army Has its Back to the Wall. News.
56.
PattaD.CarterS.. 2023. “Russia’s Wagner Group Accused of Using Rape and mass-murder to Control an African Gold Mining Town.” CBC News.
57.
PeltierE.2023. “Battle for Influence Rages in Heart of Wagner’s Operations in Africa.” The New York Times.
58.
PenelC.PetersohnU.. 2022. “Commercial Military Actors and Civilian Victimization in Africa, Middle East, Latin America, and Asia, 1980–2011.” Journal of Global Security Studies7: 1–19.
59.
PetersohnU.2017. “Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), Military Effectiveness, and Conflict Severity in Weak States, 1990–2007.” Journal of Conflict Resolution61: 1046–1072.
60.
PhamJ. P.2023. What Is Wagner’s “Value Proposition” in Africa?
61.
Plan to Compete. 2023. “Chechen Leader Eyes Wagner-Like Mercenary Unit.” Al Jazeera.
62.
PowersM.2021. Making Sense of SADAT, Turkey’s Private Military Company.
63.
Putin: Soviet Collapse a ‘Genuine Tragedy’. 2005.
64.
RaiA.2022. Nearly 3,000 of Russia’s Notorious Wagner Mercenaries Killed in the War, UK MPs Told.
65.
RaleighC.LinkeA.HegreH.KarlsenJ.. 2010. “Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset: Special Data Feature.” Journal of Peace Research47: 651–660.
66.
RanaM.2022. “Volodymyr Zelensky: Russian Mercenaries Ordered to Kill Ukraine’s President.”
67.
ReichA.2022. Don’t Want Russian Prisoners to Fight in Ukraine? Send Your Kids. Wagner.
RondeauxC.2019. Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare.
70.
Russia and Wagner’s Growing Influence in the Central African Republic. 2023.
71.
SauerP.2022. “Russia’s Private Military Contractor Wagner Comes Oout of the Shadows in Ukraine War.” The Guardian.
72.
ScahillJ.2007. Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army. Nation Books.
73.
SchellingT. C.1966. Arms and Influence. Yale University Press.
74.
SchwirtzM.2023. “The Fight Over Soledar Underscores the Divisions Between Russia’s Army and a Russian Mercenary Force.” New York Times.
75.
SerwatL.NsaibiaH.CarboneV.LayT.. 2022. Wagner Group Operations in Africa: Civilian Targeting Trends in the Central African Republic and Mali. Technical Report. ACLED.
76.
ShepelevaA.2018. UkrInform: Russia Moves 77,000 Troops to Border With Ukraine.
77.
ShoaibA.2022. Commanders in Ukraine Left Africans Fighters Recruited by Wagner Group.
78.
SmithE.2022. Russia’s Ukraine Offensive Now Relying on a Private Mercenary Group That’s Hiring Convicts, UK Says.
79.
SrivastavaS.2022. “Corporate Sovereign Awakening and the Making of Modern State Sovereignty: New Archival Evidence From the English East India Company.” International Organization76: 1–23.
80.
SvecL.2014. “Cultural Heritage Training in the US Military.” SpringerPlus3: 126.
81.
The GRU, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and Russia’s Wagner Group. 2020. Malign Russian Actors and Possible U.S. Responses.
82.
The New York Times. 2022. “How the World Is Seeking to Put Pressure on Russia.” The New York Times.
83.
TkachB.2019. “Private Military and Security Companies, Contract Structure, Market Competition, and Violence in Iraq.” Conflict Management and Peace Science36: 291–311.
84.
TkachB.2020. “Private Military and Security Companies, Corporate Structure, and Levels of Violence in Iraq.” International Interactions46: 499–525.
85.
TollefsenA. F.StrandH.BuhaugH.. 2012. “PRIO-GRID: A Unified Spatial Data Structure.” Journal of Peace Research49: 363–374.
86.
Tornero-AguileraJ. F.StergiouM.Rubio-ZarapuzA.Martín-RodríguezA.MassuçaL. M.Clemente-SuárezV. J.. 2024. “Optimising Combat Readiness: Practical Strategies for Integrating Physiological and Psychological Resilience in Soldier Training.” Healthcare12: 1160.
87.
TriebertC.KhavinD.. 2023. “Imagery Shows How a Cemetery for Russian Mercenaries Is Expanding.” The New York Times.
88.
UK intelligence. 2022. Russia’s Wagner Group Suffers Heavy Casualties in Ukraine.
89.
UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee. 2023. Guns for Gold: The Wagner Network Exposed. Technical Report. House of Commons.
90.
UN Comtrade Database. 2022. New York, NY.
91.
Victor Kovalenko [@MrKovalenko]. 2022. A Former Internal Affairs Minister of #Ukraine @AvakovArsen Shared the Intercepted Russian Military Summary for March 18: Rus. Army Troops Killed 12,814. Private Company Liga (Former Vagner) Troops Killed 4,451. Total Number Ofservicemembers Killed at War in Ukraine: 17,265. https://t.co/TuSTIyHW5n.Tweet
92.
What is Russia’s Wagner Group of mercenaries in Ukraine?2022. “What is Russia’s Wagner Group of Mercenaries in Ukraine?” BBC News.
93.
WoodR. M.2014. “Opportunities to Kill or Incentives for Restraint? Rebel Capabilities, the Origins of Support, and Civilian Victimization in Civil War.” Conflict Management and Peace Science31: 461–480.
94.
WoodR. M.KathmanJ. D.GentS. E.. 2012. “Armed Intervention and Civilian Victimization in Intrastate Conflicts.” Journal of Peace Research49 (5): 647–660.
95.
ZiemkeJ. J.2008. From Battles to Massacres. University of Wisconisin.
