International institutions play a key role in sanctions success. However, little is known about when senders mobilize institutional sanctions and how they induce international institutions to support their sanctioning efforts. Senders may need institutional support when they expect third-party states to engage in sanctions-busting. I suggest that senders anticipate sanctions-busting when they face third-party rivals which also have an alliance tie with targets. The presence of such potential sanctions busters may lead senders to seek institutional support. Also, senders should possess substantial material power to induce member states of international institutions to approve the sanctioning efforts. I assess the theoretical claim of this research by analyzing 1,038 sanctions episodes over the period 1951–2005. The findings support my argument that senders pursue institutional support when they face potential sanctions busters, and the success of their efforts partly depend on their material power.
AbbottKennethSnidalDuncan. 1998. “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution42 (1): 3-32.
2.
AlesinaAlbertoDollarDavid. 2000. “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of Economic Growth5 (1): 33-63.
3.
AlexanderDanRooneyBryan. 2019. “Vote-Buying by the United States in the United Nations.” International Studies Quarterly63: 168-176.
4.
BapatNavinMorganT. Clifton. 2009. “Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data.” International Studies Quarterly53 (4): 1075-1094.
5.
BarbieriKatherineKeshkOmar M. G.PollinsBrian. 2009. “TRADING DATA: Evaluating Our Assumptions and Coding Rules.” Conflict Management and Peace Science26 (5): 471-491.
6.
CarterDavidSignorinoCurtis. 2010. “Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data.” Political Analysis18 (3): 271-92.
7.
CarterDavidStoneRandall. 2015. “Democracy and Multilateralism: the Case of Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly.” International Organization69 (1): 1-33.
8.
CasettiEmilio. 2003. “Power Shifts and Economic Development: When will China Overtake the USA?” Journal of Peace Research40 (6): 661-675.
9.
ChapmanTerrence L. 2007. “International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy.” Journal of Conflict Resolution51 (1): 134-166.
10.
ChapmanTerrence L. 2009. “Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy.” International Organization63 (4): 733-764.
11.
DiehlPaulGoertzGary. 2000. War and Peace in International Rivalry. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
12.
DizajiSajjadvan BergeijkPeter. 2013. “Potential Early Phase Success and Ultimate Failure of Economic Sanctions: A VAR Approach with an Application to Iran.” Journal of Peace Research50 (6): 721-736.
13.
DomberGregory. 2008. Supporting the Revolution: America, Democracy and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981–1989. PhD Dissertation, George Washington University, Washington DC.
14.
DreherAxelSturmJan-EgbertVreelandJames. 2009a. “Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?” Journal of Development Economics88: 1-18.
15.
DreherAxelSturmJan-EgbertVreelandJames. 2009b. “Global Horse Trading: IMF Loans for Votes in the United Nations Security Council.” European Economic Review53 (7): 742-757.
16.
DreznerDaniel. 1999. The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
17.
DreznerDaniel. 2000. “Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?” International Organization54 (1): 73-102.
DruryA. CooperPatrickJamesPeksenDursun. 2014. “Neo-Kantianism and Coercive Diplomacy: The Complex Case of Economic Sanctions.” International Interactions40 (1): 25-51.
20.
EarlyBryan. 2009. “Sleeping With Your Friends’ Enemies: An Explanation of Sanctions-Busting Trade.” International Studies Quarterly53 (1): 49-71.
21.
EarlyBryan. 2012. “Alliances and Trade with Sanctioned States: A Study of US Economic Sanctions, 1950–2000.” Journal of Conflict Resolution56 (3): 547-572.
EarlyBryanSpiceRobert. 2015. “Economic Sanctions, International Institutions, and Sanctions Busters: When Does Institutionalized Cooperation Help Sanctioning Efforts?” Foreign Policy Analysis11 (3): 339-360.
24.
EarlyBryanPeksenDursun. 2019. “Searching in the Shadows: The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Informal Economies.” Political Research Quarterly72 (4): 821-834.
25.
FangSongying. 2008. “The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics.” American Journal of Political Science52 (2): 304-21.
26.
FinnemoreMarthaSikkinkKathryn. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization52 (4): 887-917.
27.
FarrellHenryNewmanAbraham L.. 2019. “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion.” International Security44 (1): 42-79.
28.
FarrellHenryAdrienneHéritier,. 2003. “Interorganizational Negotiation and Intraorganizational Power in Shared Decision Making: Early Agreements Under Codecision and Their Impact on the European Parliament and Council.” Comparative Political Studies37 (10): 1184-1212.
29.
GartzkeErik. 1998. “Kant We All Just Get along?: Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace.” American Journal of Political Science42 (1): 1-27.
30.
GiblerDouglas. 2008. “The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation.” Journal of Conflict Resolution52 (3): 426-454.
31.
GiblerDouglas. 2009. International Military Alliances, 1648-2008. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
32.
GleditschKristian. 2002. “Expanded Trade and GDP Data.” Journal of Conflict Resolution46: 712-724.
33.
GoertzGaryDiehlPaul. 1993. “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns.” International Studies Quarterly37: 147-171.
34.
GonzalezEdward. 1968. “Castro’s Revolution, Cuban Communist Appeals, and the Soviet Response.” World Politics21 (1): 39-68.
35.
GriecoJoseph M.GelpiChristopherReiflerJasonFeaverPeter D.. 2011. “Let’s Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War.” International Studies Quarterly55 (2): 563-583.
36.
GruberLloyd. 2000. Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
37.
Hafner-BurtonEmilieMontgomeryAlexander. 2008. “The Hegemon’s Purse: No Economic Peace between Democracies.” Journal of Peace Research45 (1): 111-120.
38.
HastingsJustin V.WangYaohui. 2018. “Informal Trade along the China–North Korea Border.” Journal of East Asian Studies18 (2): 181-203.
39.
HeckmanJames. 1979. “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error.” Econometrica47 (1): 153-161.
40.
HufbauerGarySchottJeffreyElliottKimberly A.OeggBarbara. 2007. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 3rd ed.Washington, DC: Patterson Institute for International Economics.
41.
HurdIan. 2007. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
42.
HuthPaul. 1998. “Major Power Intervention in International Crises, 1918-1988.” Journal of Conflict Resolution42 (6): 744-770.
43.
JoyceKyleGhosnFatenBayerReşat. 2014. “When and Whom to Join: The Expansion of Ongoing Violent Interstate Conflicts.” British Journal of Political Science44 (1): 205-238.
44.
KaempferWilliamLowenbergAnton. 1999. “Unilateral versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective.” International Studies Quarterly43 (1): 37-58.
45.
KrasnerStephen. 1991. “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier.” World Politics43: 336-366.
46.
KuziemkoIlyanaWerkerEric. 2006. “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations.” Journal of Political Economy114 (5): 905-930.
47.
LaiBrianReiterDan. 2000. “Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816-1992.” Journal of Conflict Resolution44 (2): 203-27.
48.
LeedsAshley. 2003. “Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties.” International Organization57 (4):801-827.
49.
LeedsAshleyLongAndrewMitchellSara. 2000. “ReEvaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises.” Journal of Conflict Resolution44 (5): 686-699.
50.
LektzianDavidSprecherChristopher. 2007. “Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict.” American Journal of Political Science51 (2): 415-431.
51.
LebovicJamesVoetenErik. 2006. “The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR.” International Studies Quarterly50: 861-888.
52.
LudlowPiers. 2021. “Solidarity, Sanctions and Misunderstanding: The European Dimension of the Falklands Crisis.” International History Review43 (3): 508-524.
53.
ManulakMichael. 2017. “Leading by Design: Informal Influence and International Secretariats.” Review of International Organizations12 (4): 497-522.
54.
MaozZeevTerrisLesley G.KupermanRanan D.TalmudIlan. 2007. “What Is the Enemy of My Enemy? Causes and Consequences of Imbalanced International Relations, 1816–2001.” Journal of Politics69 (1): 100-115.
55.
MarinovNikolay. 2003. Deter, Bargain, Destabilize: Explaining the Initiation, Duration and Success of Economic Sanctions. PhD Dissertation, Stanford University, Stanford CA.
McKeownTimothy. 2009. “How U.S. Decision-Makers Assessed Their Control of Multilateral Organizations, 1957–1982.” Review of International Organizations4: 269-291.
59.
McLeanElenaWhangTaehee. 2014. “Designing Foreign Policy: Voters, Special Interest Groups, and Economic Sanctions.” Journal of Peace Research51 (5): 589-602.
60.
MelinMollyKochMichael. 2010. “Jumping Into the Fray: Alliances, Power, Institutions, and the Timing of Conflict Expansion.” International Interactions36 (1): 1-27.
61.
MorleyMorris. 1987. Imperial State and Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
62.
MorganT. CliftonBapatNavinKobayashiYoshiharu. 2014. “Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset.” Conflict Management and Peace Science31 (5): 541-558.
63.
MurdieAmandaPeksenDursun. 2013. “The Impact of Human Rights INGO Activities on Economic Sanctions.” Review of International Organizations8 (1): 33-53.
64.
NielsonDanielTierneyMichael. 2003. “Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform.” International Organization57 (2): 241-276.
65.
NovosadPaulWerkerEric. 2019. “Who Runs the International System? Nationality and Leadership in the United Nations Secretariat.” Review of International Organizations14 (1): 1-33.
66.
OnealJohnRussettBruce. 1999. “Is the Liberal Peace Just an Artifact of Cold War Interests? Assessing Recent Critiques.” International Interactions25 (3): 213-41.
67.
ParizekMichalStephenMatthew. 2021. “The Increasing Representativeness of International Organizations’ Secretariats: Evidence from the United Nations System, 1997–2015.” International Studies Quarterly65 (1): 197-209.
68.
PeksenDursunPetersonTimothy. 2016. “Sanctions and Alternate Markets How Trade and Alliances Affect the Onset of Economic Coercion.” Political Research Quarterly69 (1): 4-16.
69.
PetersonTimothyDruryA. Cooper. 2011. “Sanctioning Violence: The Effect of Third-Party Economic Coercion on Militarized Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution55 (4):580-605.
70.
PevehouseJonNordstromTimothyMcManusRoseanneJamisonAnne Spencer. 2020. “Tracking Organizations in the World: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 datasets.” Journal of Peace Research57 (3): 492-503.
71.
PrattTyler. 2021. “Angling for Influence: Institutional Proliferation in Development Banking.” International Studies Quarterly65 (1): 95-108.
72.
RecchiaStefanoChuJonathan. 2021. “Validating Threat: IO Approval and Public Support for Joining Military Counterterrorism Coalitions.” International Studies Quarterly65 (4): 919-928.
73.
SampleSusan. 2018. “Power, Wealth, and Satisfaction: When Do Power Transitions Lead to Conflict?” Journal of Conflict Resolution62 (9): 1905-1931.
74.
SpanielWilliamSmithBradley. 2015. “Sanctions, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure.” International Studies Quarterly59 (4): 735-749.
75.
SteinbergRichard. 2002. “In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO.” International Organization56 (2): 339-374.
76.
StoneRandall. 2011. Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
77.
StoneRandall. 2013. “Informal Governance in International Organizations: Introduction to the Special Issue.” Review of International Organizations8: 121-136.
78.
ThompsonAlexander. 2006. “Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission.” International Organization60 (1): 1-34.
79.
ThompsonWilliam. 2001. “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics.” International Studies Quarterly45 (4): 557-586.
UrpelainenJohannes. 2012. “Unilateral Influence on International Bureaucrats: An International Delegation Problem.” Journal of Conflict Resolution56 (4): 704-735.
82.
VoetenErik. 2000. “Clashes in the Assembly.” International Organization54 (2): 185-215.
83.
VoetenErik. 2005. “The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force.” International Organization59 (3): 527-557.
84.
VreelandJamesDreherAxel. 2014. The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
85.
WangTe-Yu. 1999. “US Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of Important Issues.” International Studies Quarterly43 (1): 199-210.
86.
WeberPatrickSchneiderGerald. 2020. “How Many Hands to Make Sanctions Work? Comparing EU and US Sanctioning Efforts.” European Economic Review130: 1-23.
WesterwinterOliverAbbottKennethBierstekerThomas. 2021. “Informal Governance in World Politics.” Review of International Organizations16: 1-27.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
