Does increasing counterinsurgent mechanization result in higher levels of unintentional civilian casualties? Existing research on unintentional civilian victimization in recent conflicts has focused on air strikes, but this question remains unexplored in research examining counterinsurgent force structure for ground units. However, a host of counterinsurgency practitioners in Iraq have cited the mechanized forces’ effectiveness in delivering precision fires that limit civilian casualties. We propose an armored restraint theory, suggesting that mechanized crews’ armored protection enhances soldiers’ decision space when making the consequential choice to employ lethal force. When this enhanced decision space is combined with units that systematically respect jus in bello principles and non-combatant immunity norms, it results in armored restraint, which may reduce government-caused civilian casualties in civil conflicts. We test this theory using micro-data from Iraq and find mechanized units are associated with significantly lower civilian casualty levels compared to dismounted units.
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