Military academies tend to be strongly linked to the professionalization of the armed forces. This explains why many countries in the world have created such institutions. The following article studies a potential negative externality stemming from military schools: increased coup risk. We argue that military academies may create, inculcate, and strengthen cohesive views that could conflict with incumbent policies, and that these schools establish networks among military officers that may facilitate coordination necessary for plotting a putsch. We also contend and empirically demonstrate that these negative side effects of military academies are in particular pronounced in nondemocracies, that is, military academies have diverse effects across regime types. This work has significant implications for our understanding civil–military relations. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on military education and professionalization, as we suggest that military academies are important vehicles through which coups can emerge predominantly in authoritarian states.
AlbrechtHolgerEiblFerdinand. 2018. “How to Keep Officers in the Barracks: Causes, Agents, and Types of Military Coups.” International Studies Quarterly62 (2): 315–28.
2.
ArbatliCemalArbatliEkim. 2016. “External Threats and Political Survival: Can Dispute Involvement Deter Coup Attempts?” Conflict Management and Peace Science33 (2): 115–52.
3.
BaranyZoltan. 1991. “Civil-military Relations in Communist Systems: Western Models Revisited.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology19 (1): 75–99.
4.
BarnettCorrelli. 1967. “The Education of Military Elites.” Journal of Contemporary History2 (3): 15–35.
5.
Bar-OrA.ShayH.. 2005. “Military Education of Israel’s Junior Officers. From ‘a Platoon Commander-general’ to a Professional Officer.” Military Spectator3 (1): 109–15.
6.
BelkinAaronSchoferEvan. 2003. “Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk.” Journal of Conflict Resolution47 (5): 594–620.
7.
BellCurtisSudduthJun Koga. 2017. “The Causes and Outcomes of Coup during Civil War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution61 (7): 1432–55.
8.
BellinEva. 2004. “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Politics36 (2): 139–57.
9.
BellinEva. 2012. “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring.” Comparative Politics44 (2): 127–49.
10.
Ben-ShalomUzi. 2014. “Trends in Military Education in the IDF: A Case Study of the Tactical Command College.” Political and Military Sociology42 (1): 51–73.
11.
BiddleStephenMcDonaldJuliaBakerRyan. 2018. “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance.” Journal of Strategic Studies41 (1-2): 89–142.
12.
BöhmeltTobiasPilsterUlrich. 2016. “The Impact of Institutional Coup-proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes.” International Interactions41 (1): 158–82.
13.
BöhmeltTobiasPilsterUlrichTagoAtsushi. 2017. “Naval Forces and Civil–Military Relations.” Journal of Global Security Studies2 (4): 346–63.
14.
CarterDavidSignorinoCurtis. 2010. “Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data.” Political Analysis18 (3): 271–92.
15.
ChandraSiddharthKammenDouglas Anton. 2002. “Generating Reforms and Reforming Generations: Military Politics in Indonesia’s Democratic Transition and Consolidation.” World Politics55 (1): 96–136.
16.
CohenStuart. 1995. “The Israel Defense Forces (IDF): From a “People’s Army” To a “Professional Military”—Causes and Implications.” Armed Forces & Society21 (2): 237–54.
17.
CollierPaulHoefflerAnke. 2007. Military Expenditure and the Risks of Coups d’État. Oxford: Oxford University.
18.
DeBruinErica. 2017. “Preventing Coups d’état: How Counterbalancing Works.” Journal of Conflict Resolution.
19.
DornbuschSanford. 1955. “The Military Academy as an Assimilating Institution.” Social Forces33 (4): 316–21.
20.
FeaverPeter. 1999. “Civil-military Relations.” Annual Review of Political Science2 (1): 211–41.
21.
FinerSamuel. 1962. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.
22.
GaletovicAlexanderSanhuezaRicardo. 2000. “Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters: A Model and New Evidence on Coups d’État.” Economics & Politics12 (2): 183–204.
23.
GeddesBarbara. 1999. “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?” Annual Review of Political Science2 (1): 115–44.
24.
GeddesBarbara. 2003. Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
25.
GouldRoger. 1971. “Multiple Networks and Mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871.” American Sociological Review56 (6): 716–29.
HeymanCharles., ed. 2002. Jane’s World Armies. Southampton, UK: Hobbs.
28.
HorowitzDonald. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.
29.
HuntingtonSamuel. 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University.
30.
JanowitzMorris. 1960. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
31.
JanowitzMorris. 1977. Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
32.
JowellMarco. 2014. “Cohesion through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).” Journal of Eastern African Studies8 (2): 278–93.
33.
KeeganJohn., ed. 1983. World Armies. 2nd ed. Detroit, MI: Gale Research.
34.
KoehlerKevinOhlDorothyAlbretchHolger. 2016. “From Disaffection to Desertion: How Networks Facilitate Military Insubordination in Civil Conflict.” Comparative Politics48 (4): 439–57.
35.
LeonGabriel. 2014. “Loyalty for Sale? Military Spending and Coups d’état.” Public Choice159 (3-4): 363–83.
36.
LondreganJohnPooleKeith. 1990. “Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power.” World Politics42 (2): 151–83.
37.
LuttwakEdward. 2016. Coup d’État. A Practical Handbook. Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
38.
MarshallMontyJaggersKeith. 2004. POLITY IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2004. Dataset User’s Manual. College Park: University of Maryland.
39.
McMahonBlakeSlantchevBranislav. 2015. “The Guardianship Dilemma: Regime Security through and from the Armed Forces.” American Political Science Review109 (2): 297–313.
40.
MoussaNayla. 2016, February3. “Loyalties and group formation in the Lebanese Officer Corps.” Carnegie Middle East Center, Regional Insight. Accessed625, 2018. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ACMR_Moussa.pdf.
41.
NordlingerEric. 1977. Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
42.
NunnFrederick. 1972. “Military Professionalism and Professional Militarism in Brazil, 1870-1970: Historical Perspectives and Political Implications.” Journal of Latin American Studies4 (1): 29–54.
43.
NunnFrederick. 1975. “Effects of European Military Training in Latin America: The Origins and Nature of Professional Militarism in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, 1890-1940.” Military Affairs39 (1): 1–7.
44.
ParkinsonSarah. 2013. “Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking High-risk Mobilization and Social Networks in War.” American Political Science Review107 (3): 418–32.
45.
PathmanandUkrist. 2008. “A Different Coup d’État?” Journal of Contemporary Asia38 (1): 124–42.
46.
PerlmutterAmosLeoGrandeWilliam. 1982. “The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-military Relations in Communist Political Systems.” American Political Science Review76 (4): 778–89.
47.
PetersenRoger. 2001. Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
48.
PilsterUlrichBöhmeltTobias. 2011. “Coup-proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967-99.” Conflict Management and Peace Science28 (4): 331–50.
49.
PilsterUlrichBöhmeltTobias. 2012. “Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-military Relations.” Foreign Policy Analysis8 (4): 355–72.
50.
Pion-BerlinDavidEsparzaDiegoGrishamKevin. 2014. “Staying Quartered: Civilian Uprisings and Military Disobedience in the Twenty-first Century.” Comparative Political Studies47 (2): 230–59.
51.
PiplaniVarunTalmadgeCaitlin. 2016. “When War Helps Civil-military Relations: Prolonged Interstate Conflict and the Reduced Risk of Coups.” Journal of Conflict Resolution60 (8): 1368–94.
52.
PowellJonathan. 2012. “Determinants of Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’état.” Journal of Conflict Resolution56 (6): 1017–40.
53.
PowellJonathanThyneClayton. 2011. “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research48 (2): 249–59.
54.
QuinlivanJames. 1999. “Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East.” International Security24 (2): 131–65.
55.
RoesslerPhilip. 2011. “The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa.” World Politics63 (2): 300–346.
56.
RouquiéAlainSuffernStephen. 1998. “The Military in Latin American Politics since 1930.” In Latin America: Politics and Society since 1930, edited by BethellLeslie, 145–216. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
57.
RubyTomislavGiblerDouglas. 2010. “US Professional Military Education and Democratization Abroad.” European Journal of International Relations16 (3): 339–64.
58.
SavageJesseCaverleyJonathan. 2017. “When Human Capital Threatens the Capitol: Foreign Aid in the Form of Military Training and Coups.” Journal of Peace Research54 (4): 542–57.
59.
SieboldGuy. 2007. “The Essence of Military Group Cohesion.” Armed Forces & Society33 (2): 286–95.
60.
SiegelDavid. 2009. “Social Networks and Collective Action.” American Journal of Political Science53 (1): 122–38.
61.
SinghNaunihal. 2014. Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
62.
SnowDavidZurcherLouisEkland-OlsonSheldon. 1980. “Social Networks and Social Movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment.” American Sociological Review45 (5): 787–801.
63.
StanilandPaul. 2014. Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
64.
StepanAlfred. 1971. The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
65.
StepanAlfred. 1973. “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion.” In Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, edited by StepanAlfred, 47–65. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
66.
StepanAlfred. 1988. Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
67.
SudduthJun Koga. 2017. “Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships.” Comparative Political Studies50 (13): 1768–801.
68.
SutterDaniel. 2000. “A Game-theoretic Model of the Coup d’état.” Economics & Politics12 (2): 205–23.
69.
SvolikMilan. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. New York: Cambridge University Press.
70.
ThompsonWilliam. 1973. Grievances of Military Coup-Makers. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
71.
ThompsonWilliam. 1976. “Organizational Cohesion and Military Coup Outcomes.” Comparative Political Studies34 (8): 255–76.
72.
ThyneClayton. 2010. “Supporter of Stability or Agent of Agitation? The Effect of US Foreign Policy on Coups in Latin America, 1960-99.” Journal of Peace Research47 (4): 449–61.
73.
TorontoNathan. 2007. “Why War Is Not Enough: Military Defeat, the Division of Labor, and Military Professionalization.” PhD diss., Ohio State University.
74.
TorontoNathan. 2017. “Why Professionalize? Economic Modernization and Military Professionalism.” Foreign Policy Analysis13 (4): 854–75.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
