Donors are more likely to send aid to leaders facing elevated risks of losing power, but targets’ ability to benefit from this assistance is conditioned by regime type and political processes. The institutionalization of winning coalitions’ loyalty across regime type follows opposite patterns, supporting opposite temporal dynamics across regime types. Democratic leaders’ coalitions are firmest immediately after taking office, and aid is of most assistance to them at that time. As competition and dissatisfaction grow, aid becomes a political liability. In small winning coalition systems, however, coalitions become more solid over time, facilitating increasing benefits from aid. Without a firm coalition, however, external resources are destabilizing to autocratic leaders. Analysis of 4,692 leader years from 1960 to 2001 using a censored probit model supports these expectations.
Altman, David.2000. The politics of coalition formation and survival in multiparty presidential democracies. Party Politics63:259-83.
2.
Baldwin, David A.1971. The power of positive sanctions. World Politics241:19-38.
3.
Baldwin, David A.1985. Economic statecraft. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.
4.
Geddes, Barbara. ( 1994) Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press.
5.
Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker.1998. Taking time seriously: Time-series- cross-section analysis with a binary dependent variable. American Journal of Political Science42:1260-88.
6.
Bearce, David H., and Daniel C. Tirone .2008. Foreign aid, recipient growth, and the strategic goals of donor governments. Unpublished manuscript.
7.
Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett.2008. Foreign aid, foreign policy and strategic development . PhD diss., Princeton University.
8.
Berthelemy, Jean-Claude.2006. Bilateral donors’ interest vs. recipients’ development motives in aid allocation: Do all donors behave the same?Review of Development Economics10:179-94.
9.
Berthelemy, Jean-Claude, and Ariane Tichit.2004. Bilateral donors aid allocation decisions-A three dimensional panel analysis. International Review of Economics and Finance13:253-74.
10.
Bienen, Henry, and Nicolas van de Walle.1992. A proportional hazard model of leadership duration. Journal of Politics54:685-717.
11.
Boone, Peter.1995. Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid. London: Center for Economic Performance.
12.
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet, and Bradford S. Jones .2004. Event-history modeling: A guide for social scientists. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
13.
Brace, Paul, and Barbara Hinckley .1992. Follow the leader: Opinion polls and the modern presidents. New York: Basic Books.
14.
Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder.2006. Understanding interaction effects: Improving empirical analyses. Political Analysis14:63-82.
15.
Brautigam, Deborah, and Stephen J. Knack .2004. Foreign aid, institutions and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Economic Development and Cultural Change52:255-85.
16.
Brody, Richard A.1991. Assessing the president: The media, elite opinion and public support. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
17.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Randolph M. Siverson .1995. War and the survival of political leaders: A comparative study of regime types and political accountability . American Political Science Review89:841-55.
18.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith.2007. Foreign aid and policy concessions. Journal of Conflict Resolution51:251-84.
19.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith.2009. A political economy of aid. International Organization63:309-40.
20.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow .2005. The logic of political survival . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
21.
Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar.2000. Aid, policies, and growth. American Economic Review90:847-68.
22.
Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar.2004. Aid, policies, and growth: Revisiting the evidence. Policy Research Working Paper 3251, World Bank.
23.
Chenery, Hollis B., and Alan M. Strout . (1966) Foreign Assistance and Economic Development. The American Economic Review, Vol. 56, No. 4, Part 1: 679-733.
24.
Chiozza, Giacomo, and Ajin Choi.2003. Guess who did what. Journal of Conflict Resolution47:251-78.
25.
Chiozza, Giacomo, and H.E. Goemans.2003. Peace through insecurity: Tenure and international conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution47:443-67.
26.
Chiozza, Giacomo, and H.E. Goemans.2004. International conflict and the tenure of leaders: Is war still ex post inefficient? American Journal of Political Science48:604-19.
27.
Collier, Paul, and David Dollar.2002. Aid allocation and poverty reduction . European Economic Review46:1475-500.
28.
Dalgaard, Carl-Johan, Henrik Hansen and Finn Tarp. ( 2004) On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth. The Economic Journal, 114(June): 191-216.
29.
Devarajan, Shantayanan, David R. Dollar, and Torgny Holmgren .2001. Aid and reform in Africa . Washington, DC: World Bank.
30.
Dubin, Jeffrey A., and Douglas Rivers.1989. Selection bias in linear regression, logit and probit models. Sociological Methods and Research18:360-90.
31.
Dudley, Leonard, and Claude Montmarquette .1976. A model of the supply of bilateral foreign aid. American Economic Review66:132-42.
32.
Energy Information Administration.2009. International energy statistics. http://www.eia.doe.gov/ (accessed April 2009).
33.
Feyzioglu, T., V. Swaroop, and M. Zhu.1998. A panel data analysis of the fungibility of foreign aid. World Bank Economic Review12:29-58.
34.
Gates, Scott, Havard Hegre, Mark P. Jones, and Havard Strand.2006. Institutional inconsistency and political instability: Polity duration, 1800-2000. American Journal of Political Science50:893-908.
35.
Gelpi, Christopher, and Joseph M. Grieco .2001. Attracting trouble: Democracy, leadership tenure and the targeting of militarized challenges, 1918-1992. Journal of Conflict Resolution45:794-817.
36.
Gleditsch, Kristian.2002. Expanded trade and GDP data. Journal of Conflict Resolution46:712-24.
37.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand .2002. Armed conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset. Journal of Peace Research, 39:615-37.
38.
Goemans, HeinKristian Skrede Gledistch, and Giacomo Chiozza . (2009) Introducing Archigos: A Data Set of Political Leaders. Journal of Peace Research, 46(2), (March): 269-183.
39.
Heckman, James J.1979. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica47:153-61.
40.
Hensel, Paul R., and Paul F. Diehl1994. Testing empirical propositions about shatterbelts. Political Geography13 (January): 33-51.
41.
Kam, Cindy D., and Robert J. Franzese Jr.2007. Modeling and interpreting interactive hypotheses in regression analysis. Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press.
42.
Knack, Stephen.2004. Does foreign aid promote democracy? International Studies Quarterly48:251-66.
43.
Kono, Daniel Yuichi, and Gabriella R. Montinola .2009. Does foreign aid support autocrats, democrats, or both?Journal of Politics71:704-18.
44.
Kosack, Stephen and Jennifer Tobin.2006. Funding self-sustaining development: The role of aid, FDI and government in economic success. International Organization60:205-43.
45.
Lai, Brian.2003. Examining the goals of US foreign assistance in the post-Cold War period: 1991-96. Journal of Peace Research40:103-28.
46.
Lai, Brian, and Daniel Morey.2006. Impact of regime type on the influence of U.S. foreign aid. Foreign Policy Analysis2:385-404.
47.
Lai, Brian, and Dan Reiter.2005. Rally ’round the Union Jack? Public opinion and the use of force in the United Kingdom, 1948-2001. International Studies Quarterly49:255-72.
48.
Leeds, Brett Ashley, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long.2002. Alliance treaty obligations and provisions, 1815-1944. International Interactions28:237-60.
49.
Light, Paul C.1999. The president’s agenda: Domestic policy choice from Kennedy to Clinton. 3rd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
50.
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan.1996. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
51.
Lockerbie, Brad, Stephen Borelli, and Scott Hedger.1998. An integrative approach to modeling presidential success in Congress. Political Research Quarterly51:155-72.
52.
Londregan, John B., and Keith T. Poole1990. Poverty, the coup trap, and the seizure of executive power. World Politics42:151-83.
53.
Marinov, Nikolay.2005. Do economic sanctions destabilize country leaders? American Journal of Political Science49:564-76.
54.
Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers.2003. Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2002. College Park : University of Maryland.
55.
McGillivray, Fiona, and Alastair Smith.2006. Credibility in compliance and punishment: Leader-specific punishments and credibility. Journal of Politics68:248-58.
56.
McKinlay, R.D., and R. Little.1977. A foreign policy model of U.S. bilateral aid allocation. World Politics30:58-86.
57.
Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Brandon Prins.2004. Rivalry and diversionary uses of force . Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48:937-61.
58.
Mueller, John.1971. Trends in popular support for the wars in Korea and Vietnam . American Political Science Review. 65:358-75.
59.
Pack, Howard, and Janet Rothenberg Pack.1993. Foreign aid and the question of fungibility. Review of Economics and Statistics, 75:258-65.
60.
Regan, Patrick M.1995. U.S. economic aid and political repression: An empirical evaluation of U.S. foreign policy. Political Research Quarterly , 48:613-28.
61.
Svensson, Jakob.2000. Foreign aid and rent-seeking. Journal of International Economics51:437-61.
62.
Timpone, Richard J.2002. Estimating aggregate policy reform effects: New baselines for registration, participation and representation. Political Analysis10:154-77.
63.
Warwick, Paul V. ( 1992) Rising Hazards: An Underlying Dynamic of Parliamentary Government. American Journal of Political Science, 36(4):857-76
64.
Wolford, Scott.2007. The turnover trap: New leaders, reputation and international conflict. American Journal of Political Science51:772-88.
65.
Wright, Joseph.2008. To invest or insure? How authoritarian time horizons impact foreign aid effectiveness. Comparative Political Studies41:971-1000.
66.
Wrong, Michela.2007. Mystery of Mobutu’s millions. New Statesman, July 30, 22.
67.
Yambayamba, Kavwanga E. S.2007. National Integrity Systems country report: Zambia. Berlin: Transparency International.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
