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Abstract

Although in reality, states simultaneously pursue direct and extended deterrence, extant theories of deterrence have considered direct and extended deterrence situations separately. Furthermore, extended deterrence theories have not modeled all three actors in extended deterrence situations. To overcome these limitations in the literature, the author develops the three-party extended deterrence game and analyzes it with both complete and incomplete information, allowing conclusions to be drawn regarding deterrence and the related areas of alliance reliability and war expansion. For example, the findings indicate that deterrence is most likely to succeed when the alliance between Defender and Protégé is reliable. However, neither Defender nor Protégé wishes to be a more reliable ally than the other; if there is an asymmetry in reliability, Challenger will chose the more reliable state to attack in order to avoid a multilateral war. This counterintuitive conclusion was only reached by considering all three actors in extended deterrence.

Keywords

extended deterrence direct deterrence alliance reliability targeting decision

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