Abstract
Empirical study has worn essential theoretical edges from the power transition theory and rival balance-of-power theories, leaving a misshapen question: does parity in quantitative power capabilities of opposing individual states discourage or encourage war between those two states? Distortions of both theory and evidence—mixing balances of power with balances of terror; overlooking political geography, political incapacity, and alliance formations; and confining observations to state-dyads—render the evidence poor and weak. When the distortions are removed, the very strong evidence is that approximate parity in power capabilities encouraged war between great power disputants between 1816 and 1989.
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