Abstract
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) represents a major milestone in Africa’s economic integration agenda, yet significant variation persists in countries’ capacity to implement the agreement and benefit from trade liberalization. This article examines the political economy determinants of this uneven implementation, focusing on the interaction between resource dependence, institutional capacity, and trade integration outcomes. Building on insights from rentier state theory and institutional capacity literature, the study introduces the concept of the Rentier Integration Constraint (RIC) as a mid-range analytical framework explaining how structural characteristics of resource-dependent economies shape their ability to engage in regional trade integration. Methodologically, the article adopts a comparative political economy approach, combining an explanatory case study of Algeria with a structured comparison of selected African economies. The analysis integrates qualitative institutional assessment with quantitative indicators on resource dependence, governance, logistics performance, and intra-African trade. The findings reveal that Algeria’s hydrocarbon dependence, narrow export base, and moderate institutional coordination capacity generate a structural misalignment between domestic economic incentives and the requirements of AfCFTA implementation. More broadly, the study shows that the outcomes of continental trade integration are not determined solely by formal liberalization measures, but by the interaction between underlying economic structures and institutional configurations. The article contributes to the literature by shifting the analytical focus from expected gains of trade liberalization to the structural conditions that shape their realization, highlighting the importance of domestic political economy factors in explaining uneven integration outcomes across African economies. Ultimately, the study argues for a reversed integration logic, suggesting that AfCFTA’s external constraints must be leveraged as a policy anchor to force internal structural reforms.
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