Abstract
This paper argues that since 2016, amid the Anglophone Crisis, the Cameroonian state’s co-optation of traditional authority in the Northwest and Southwest regions has reinforced a patronage-based political order that obstructs democratic consolidation. Chiefs have been transformed into political intermediaries, mobilizing electoral support in exchange for state patronage. Through the selective creation and recognition of chiefdoms, the regime rewards loyalists and suppresses dissent. This politicization erodes traditional governance, fragments communal identity, and intensifies regional tensions. Yet, some chiefs actively resist state encroachment, invoking ancestral legitimacy and ritual authority to assert autonomy. The instrumentalization of chieftaincy thus sustains authoritarian resilience while provoking localized forms of agency and resistance.
Keywords
Introduction
Traditional authority has long been central to African governance. In precolonial societies, chiefs, kings, and fons exercised legitimate power through lineage, ritual, and customary norms (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and van Dijk, 1999). Colonial regimes reconfigured these structures: British indirect rule and the French commandement system subordinated local rulers to centralized colonial authority, reshaping them into instruments of indirect administration (Geschiere, 1993; Jua, 1995; Mamdani, 1996).
In Cameroon, the legacies of German, British, and French colonial rule (1884–1961) continue to shape state–chieftaincy relations. French colonialism favored bureaucratized intermediaries aligned with state authority, while British rule in the Anglophone regions relied on customary institutions to secure legitimacy (Geschiere, 1993; Goheen, 1992; Jua, 1995). Post-independence, successive regimes under Presidents Ahmadou Ahidjo (1960–1982) and Paul Biya (1982–present) retained chiefs as political intermediaries, embedding them in mechanisms of surveillance and control (Fisiy, 1995; Nyamnjoh and Rowlands, 1998).
Under Biya, chiefs were formally integrated into the state apparatus through legal classification into Classes I–III, their incorporation into the civil service, and institutions such as the National Council of Traditional Rulers. They are routinely mobilized during elections, serve as brokers of patronage, and act as regime agents in local governance (Fokwang, 2009, 2011; Ndi et al., 2021a; Njoh, 2018a).
This article, however, does not examine “traditional elites in Cameroon” in general but specifically focuses on chiefs/fons in the Northwest (NW) and Southwest (SW) regions, the Anglophone regions of the country. These regions provide a particularly revealing case because of their dual colonial legacy, the politicization of chieftaincy, and the ongoing conflict between state forces and separatist movements. By narrowing the scope, the study demonstrates how chiefs’ authority is contested not only by the state but also by armed groups and their own communities, making them central actors in the Anglophone Crisis.
The timeframe of analysis is also deliberately delimited. While the article situates chiefs within their longer colonial and postcolonial trajectories, the primary focus is on the last decade, particularly the period since 2016 when the Anglophone Crisis escalated. This allows for a more precise examination of how chiefs navigate conflict dynamics, balancing state demands, separatist pressures, and community expectations within a context of widespread violence, displacement, and weakened governance.
Rather than relying on general African frameworks, references such as Mamdani (1996) are mobilized only as analytical lenses, explicitly grounded in the Cameroonian case. For example, Mamdani’s notion of “decentralized despotism” illuminates how state authority is localized through chiefs, but the analysis is rooted in specific laws, institutions, and contemporary practices in the NW and SW. In this way, the article avoids generic claims and instead demonstrates how global theoretical frameworks can be localized to explain the dynamics of power in a specific conflict-affected setting.
This article argues that the co-optation and instrumentalization of chiefs in the NW and SW since 2016 have reinforced a neopatrimonial political order that sustains authoritarian resilience while undermining traditional legitimacy. Chiefs are deployed by the state to suppress dissent, mobilize electoral support, and maintain local control, yet they also adopt strategies of resistance and negotiation to preserve autonomy and protect their communities. These ambivalent roles make them simultaneously instruments of repression and potential brokers of peace.
Drawing on legal texts, media discourse, and secondary literature, the article examines chiefs as intermediaries, enforcers, and occasional dissenters. By analyzing the agency of chiefs within the Anglophone Crisis, the study contributes new knowledge to debates on neopatrimonialism, authoritarian resilience, and hybrid governance in Africa, demonstrating that chiefs in conflict zones are neither relics of the past nor passive clients of the state, but pivotal actors whose contested authority shapes both political order and prospects for peace.
The article proceeds as follows: a historical overview of colonial and postcolonial state–chieftaincy relations provides necessary context; the subsequent section examines how chiefs have been incorporated into decentralization and state control; the third analyzes their roles in authoritarian reinforcement and local resistance during the Anglophone Crisis; and the conclusion highlights the broader theoretical and policy implications for conflict resolution, governance, and African political systems.
Traditional authority and state power in the Southwest and Northwest regions of Cameroon: colonial legacies, customary reform, and postcolonial politics
This section focuses explicitly on chiefs (fons) in the Southwest and Northwest (SWNW) regions of Cameroon over the last decade, with attention to their role amid the Anglophone Crisis. It explores five interrelated themes: (1) precolonial legitimacy of chiefs in SWNW Cameroon, (2) colonial restructuring of chieftaincy in these regions, (3) integration into post-independence state structures, (4) dilemmas of legitimacy and political instrumentalization, and (5) contemporary challenges under democratization and conflict. It argues that chiefs today occupy a contested position at the intersection of community representation and state authority in SWNW Cameroon, particularly during the Anglophone Crisis (Fisiy, 1995; Fokwang, 2009).
Before colonial intervention, chiefs (or fons) in the territories now known as Cameroon’s SW and NW regions exercised legitimate authority grounded in kinship, spiritual cosmology, and collective social norms. These traditional institutions integrated political, judicial, and religious functions, reinforcing community identity and cohesion (Fokwang, 2011). Leadership was localized, anchored in reciprocity, and rooted in accountability to the people.
This landscape was profoundly disrupted beginning in 1884 with the imposition of German colonial rule, which introduced a centralized and militarized bureaucracy over fragmented indigenous polities. German administrators suppressed or restructured traditional governance to fit the logic of colonial administration (Le Vine, 1964). After Germany’s defeat in World War I and the fall of Mora in 1916, British and French colonial powers partitioned Cameroon under League of Nations mandates. British-administered Southern Cameroons, which include today’s SW and NW regions, became a laboratory of indirect rule, in which chiefs were co-opted as intermediaries of colonial governance (Jua, 1995; Ngoh, 2001).
Under British rule, indirect governance formalized and transformed chieftaincy. Chiefs became agents of the colonial state, tasked with enforcing laws, collecting taxes, and administering customary courts. As a result, they became “bifurcated figures,” caught between fulfilling communal obligations and complying with colonial mandates (Fisiy, 1995; Mamdani, 1996). Over time, their legitimacy eroded as colonial authorities redefined chieftaincy, rigidified succession norms, and subordinated traditional authority to administrative imperatives (Geschiere, 1993; Goheen, 1992).
In French Cameroon, colonial thought was shaped by Albert Sarraut’s influential text La mise en valeur des colonies françaises (1923), which advocated using traditional leaders as symbolic instruments of colonial governance rather than as autonomous authorities. Chiefs were subordinated to colonial administrators and used to enforce French state interests under the veneer of respecting native institutions. This vision of traditional authority—as an extension of state power—persisted beyond independence, especially under Presidents Ahmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya, who retained and instrumentalized chiefs as part of the apparatus of centralized state control.
The British-imposed 1951 Macpherson Constitution further entrenched the integration of traditional rulers into formal political structures by establishing both the House of Chiefs and the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly. Chiefs were recast as political actors and lawmakers, increasingly drawn into partisan struggles in a nascent multiparty system. This development primarily affected the SWNW regions, placing local fons at the intersection of debates over identity, representation, and modernity, while also exposing them to accusations of clientelism and political manipulation, particularly by the dominant Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) (Fokwang, 2009; Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2003).
Following French Cameroon’s independence in 1960 and reunification with British Southern Cameroons in 1961, traditional rulers in the SW and NW regions were absorbed into a centralized postcolonial state that preserved their symbolic status but hollowed out their autonomy. Both Ahidjo and Biya used chiefs as tools of political consolidation, employing systems of patronage, recognition, and surveillance to reward loyalty and punish dissent (Bayart, 1993; Fokwang, 2024). This instrumentalization was particularly evident in the Anglophone regions, where British colonial legacies had left traditional authority somewhat intact—but also vulnerable to co-optation by the ruling party.
As Jean-Pierre Fogui (1990) observed, post-independence political integration in Cameroon followed an asymmetric center–periphery model in which regional authorities were systematically subordinated to a centralized state. Chiefs, especially in Anglophone regions, were politically neutralized through elite co-optation. While symbolically included, SW and NW fons were stripped of real autonomy, allowing the Yaoundé-based elite to manage dissent by incorporating peripheral leaders without empowering them (Fogui, 1990, pp. 123–125). The incorporation of traditional authority into the postcolonial state thus reflected broader trends of authoritarian state-building masked as national unity.
The reintroduction of multiparty democracy in the 1990s introduced new contradictions. Chiefs were drawn into electoral mobilization and identity politics. As Fokwang (2009) illustrates in his study of Bali Nyonga and other chiefdoms in NW Cameroon, traditional leaders had to continuously perform and renegotiate their legitimacy in a context of generational tensions, elite interests, and state interference. Customary reform efforts clashed with these pressures, complicating the role of traditional rulers (Fokwang, 2011).
The eruption of the Anglophone Crisis in 2016—initially sparked by protests from lawyers and teachers—placed the institution of chieftaincy in the NW and SW regions at the center of a deeply volatile political conflict. Chiefs in these regions have since faced immense pressure from multiple sides. Many were accused by separatist movements of collaborating with the central government and consequently became targets of violence, abduction, or forced exile. Others struggled to navigate an impossible terrain, attempting to protect their communities while balancing precarious relationships with both state authorities and non-state actors.
In response to the escalating instability, the government convened the Major National Dialogue in late 2019, an initiative presented as a platform for reconciliation but also serving to reaffirm state legitimacy through traditional institutions. One key recommendation emerging from this dialogue was the revival of the House of Chiefs in the SW and NW regions, officially positioned as part of a broader decentralization strategy.
However, while this reconstitution was framed as a step toward regional autonomy and cultural recognition, it has done little to restore genuine independence to the chieftaincy institutions. Chiefs remain subordinate to regional and divisional administrators, with their roles largely defined and controlled by the centralized state apparatus. As Fogui (1990: 144) observed, such top-down reforms often function as symbolic gestures of inclusion that ultimately reinforce centralized authority rather than devolve real power.
Fokwang (2024) argues that chieftaincy in contemporary Anglophone Cameroon embodies fractured legitimacy—caught between representing communal identity and serving as instruments of state authority. This dual positioning reflects the enduring colonial and postcolonial ambivalence toward traditional institutions in Cameroon’s nation-building project.
The adoption of a “Special Status” for the Anglophone regions—formalized in Law No. 2019/024 of 24 December 2019—was another flagship outcome of the dialogue. It created Regional Assemblies and reinstated the House of Chiefs (Fokwang, 2024; Fombad, 2020; Konings, 2019). Yet, these measures, while presented as decentralization, have primarily served to consolidate central control. Traditional rulers in the SW and NW were given prominent but largely ceremonial positions that legitimize state narratives of peace without meaningfully addressing structural grievances. Chiefs remain accountable to governors appointed by Yaoundé.
The Special Reconstruction Fund (SRF) established for Cameroon’s NW and SW regions has made minimal progress, reflecting a broader trend of ineffective post-conflict recovery initiatives. Despite the government’s allocation of 15 billion CFA francs (approximately $23.6 million) in 2023 for reconstruction efforts in these regions, the impact has been limited.
Community involvement in the SRF has been notably low, with local populations expressing skepticism about the fund’s efficacy. A study by the International Crisis Group in 2021 highlighted that while the Special Status granted to these regions introduced meaningful reforms, its impact on ending violence and rebuilding trust remained limited. Similarly, grassroots perspectives gathered by the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations in 2022 indicated that local communities felt marginalized from decision-making processes, leading to a disconnect between top-down initiatives and the realities of affected populations (Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, 2022, International Crisis Group, 2021, World Bank, 2019).
The ongoing violence in these regions has further exacerbated the situation. According to the World Bank, as of September 2019, the crisis had claimed over 3000 lives, destroyed over 170 villages, and displaced more than half a million people. These conditions have hindered the effective implementation of reconstruction projects, with security concerns deterring both local and international actors from engaging fully (Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, 2022; World Bank, 2019).
In summary, the SRF’s limited progress underscores the challenges of implementing effective post-conflict recovery strategies in contexts marked by ongoing violence and low community involvement. It highlights the need for a more inclusive and context-sensitive approach to reconstruction that genuinely incorporates the perspectives and needs of local populations.
Other post-dialogue reforms have suffered similar deficiencies. The Public Independent Conciliator, created to address administrative injustices, lacks enforcement authority and independence. The Common Law Section at ENAM, meant to protect Anglophone legal traditions, remains marginal within a judiciary dominated by Francophone norms.
Likewise, the National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) centers, launched in 2018 and expanded after the dialogue, have faltered amid ongoing insecurity, lack of trust, and operational opacity (International Crisis Group, 2020). The National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism (CNPBM) has been similarly criticized for its limited autonomy and ineffectiveness in addressing institutional inequalities.
In sum, the reforms born of the Major National Dialogue have been widely seen as superficial. Rather than empowering the Anglophone population or devolving real authority, they have preserved the centralized structure of the state while offering symbolic concessions.
In early 2025, the National Council of Traditional Rulers publicly endorsed President Biya’s reelection, lauding his “visionary leadership” despite the ongoing conflict. The Southwest Chiefs Conference similarly praised Biya for appointing Chief Dr Joseph Dion Ngute as Prime Minister and delivering selective development projects. These endorsements illustrate how fons in the SW and NW are mobilized to manufacture consent and legitimize state authority (Bayart, 1993; Fisiy, 1995; Mbu-Arrey, 2013).
Yet, this deployment of chieftaincy is fraught with contradiction. The state’s rhetoric of development often conceals elite capture and persistent marginalization. As Mbu-Arrey (2013) notes, “development” in Cameroon is frequently reduced to symbolic appointments and fragmented projects rather than systemic reform. Ateba-Eyene (2008) critiques this “organizing country paradox,” pointing to the widening chasm between the political center and neglected peripheries—even in Biya’s own South Region.
It is essential to note that traditional rulers are not merely passive agents of state power. They exercise agency and sometimes resist state domination, particularly when their authority or legitimacy is challenged (Fisiy, 1995; Fokwang, 2011; Goheen, 1992). Yet, these forms of resistance are constrained by historical legacies, structural dependencies, and ongoing insecurity.
Ultimately, the chieftaincy in Cameroon’s SW and NW regions illustrates the enduring ambivalence of traditional authority in postcolonial African governance: it remains a site of negotiation, contestation, and symbolic power rather than substantive autonomy.
This ambivalence is particularly evident when examining the last decade and the ongoing Anglophone Crisis, which underscores the intricate interplay between historical legitimacy and contemporary political constraints. In sum, this article focuses on the last 10 years and the Anglophone Crisis to contribute new insights about the state–chieftaincy relationship in SWNW Cameroon. Chiefs are historically grounded yet politically constrained, negotiating an ambiguous space between community, state, and conflict. Their authority remains contested, with implications for decentralization, democratization, and the region’s socio-political future.
Building on this context, the following section examines the strategic co-optation of traditional leaders—chiefs (fons)—in the SWNW regions of Cameroon, focusing on the last decade to illuminate their contemporary political role amid the Anglophone Crisis. While studies of African traditional elites often generalize across contexts (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Mamdani, 1996), this analysis centers specifically on the SWNW provinces, drawing on concrete cases of politically contested chieftaincy appointments. By narrowing the temporal and spatial scope, the study highlights how the Cameroonian state instrumentalizes chiefs to consolidate authoritarian control, undermining both community autonomy and democratic governance.
The instrumentalization of tradition in hybrid governance and authoritarian resilience in Cameroon
This section examines the strategic co-optation of traditional leaders—chiefs (fons)—in the SWNW regions of Cameroon, focusing on the last decade to illuminate their contemporary political role amid the Anglophone Crisis. While studies of African traditional elites often generalize across contexts (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Mamdani, 1996), this analysis centers specifically on the SWNW regions, drawing on concrete cases of politically contested chieftaincy appointments. By narrowing the temporal and spatial scope, the study highlights how the Cameroonian state instrumentalizes chiefs to consolidate authoritarian control, undermining both community autonomy and democratic governance.
In Cameroon, the strategic co-optation of chiefs has profound consequences for local governance. Rather than acting as impartial representatives of their communities, chiefs are increasingly deployed as instruments of the state, reinforcing central authority and curtailing democratic processes. This practice has exacerbated ethnic tensions, suppressed political competition, and consolidated the dominance of the ruling elite. Understanding this phenomenon requires engagement with theories of neopatrimonialism, elite manipulation, instrumentalism, ethnic politics, postcolonial state practices, and authoritarian resilience.
Neopatrimonialism illuminates how African states retain power through informal patronage systems operating alongside formal institutions. In Cameroon, chiefs operate within such a hybrid system: they are integrated into state structures in exchange for loyalty and material incentives, including government contracts, development projects, and financial rewards. These arrangements bind chiefs to the regime, undermining their independence and reducing them to local agents of central authority. Elite theory further clarifies how selective recognition and creation of chieftaincies serve political purposes, privileging regime loyalty over customary legitimacy. Chiefs become vehicles for the state, suppressing local competition while reinforcing elite dominance.
Instrumentalism and ethnic politics show how traditional identities are reshaped for political gain. Chiefs are often appointed based on political allegiance rather than lineage or cultural credentials, fostering intra- and inter-ethnic conflicts. The postcolonial Cameroonian state has inherited the colonial strategy of using chiefs as intermediaries, extending central authority under the guise of continuity while denying them meaningful autonomy. This pattern has persisted, particularly during decentralization reforms that ostensibly aim to empower local communities but, in practice, consolidate state control. Chiefs recognized or appointed by the state act as administrators with limited independence, creating a pseudo-decentralized system where participatory governance is largely illusory.
The SW region of Cameroon vividly illustrates how traditional chieftaincy has been subordinated to political interests. In the 1980s, the removal of the hereditary Fako King in favor of Chief Samuel Ekukole sparked significant resentment among the Bakweri, highlighting tensions between customary legitimacy and state intervention. Similarly, the Balondo succession in Mundemba during the 1990s was circumvented, prompting local protests and underscoring the persistent conflicts between traditional authority and political expediency (Nkwi, 1996). More recently, the appointments of Ndotoh Thomas Elinge in Ewili in 2012 and Tiko Mayor Moukondo Daniel Ngande in Ebonji in 2020 were widely criticized as politically motivated, further demonstrating the transformation of chiefs into instruments of state power rather than community representatives (Cameroon-Info.Net, 2020). Collectively, these cases reveal a pattern in which the authority of chiefs is increasingly leveraged to extend state control, eroding their traditional role as custodians of communal interests (Table 1).
Short timeline of key events in SWNW Cameroon.
These dynamics align with Chabal and Daloz’s (1999) view that apparent disorder is often a deliberate elite strategy: destabilizing traditional structures becomes a tool of political dominance. The state manipulates hierarchical classification of chiefs, a colonial legacy repurposed to consolidate authoritarianism. In Kom and Nso’, the Fons actively resist state-promoted elevation of subordinate leaders, while in Babanki-Tungo, government-backed appointments have triggered unrest, illustrating the clash between state agendas and local authority (Chem-Langhëë, 1995; Fokwang, 2009).
These processes reflect patterns of hybrid governance and neopatrimonial control observed across Africa (Boone, 2003; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Chabal and Daloz, 1999), wherein decentralization often functions less to empower local communities than to consolidate state authority through local intermediaries. Chiefs—once custodians of communal justice and cultural continuity—are reconfigured as instruments of bureaucratic control, operating under close administrative supervision (governmentality) and tasked primarily with implementing national policy. This instrumentalization erodes their moral authority and undermines the social cohesion they historically upheld. In the context of the Anglophone Crisis, this tension has become especially acute, exposing the fragility of traditional authority when subordinated to authoritarian governance.
While communities may lack formal mechanisms to oppose the state’s intrusion into traditional governance, they often engage in everyday forms of resistance (Scott, 1985, 1990). These include boycotting installation ceremonies, refusing to recognize the authority of imposed chiefs, and ritually undermining their legitimacy. For instance, the 2020 enthronement of Tiko Mayor Moukondo Daniel Ngande as chief of Ebonji Village was met with community silence and a conspicuously low turnout at his installation, an implicit form of collective dissent. Similarly, in 2012, residents of Ewili village challenged Ndotoh Thomas Elinge’s legitimacy by refusing to participate in communal rituals under his leadership (Cameroon-Info.Net, 2020).
These acts are not merely symbolic; they constitute intentional, culturally embedded strategies through which communities assert autonomy and contest the state’s claim to define legitimacy. Rituals, which traditionally serve to affirm communal consensus, are withheld or subverted to convey rejection. Symbolic acts such as withholding traditional regalia, refusing drumming or libations, or invoking ancestral taboos against illegitimate rulers become means of spiritual protest (Fokwang, 2009). Thus, local populations continue to draw on precolonial ontologies of power—where authority is legitimized through ancestry, ritual performance, and moral accountability rather than by mere state recognition.
This form of resistance also extends into collective memory and oral histories, where imposed chiefs are omitted from lineage lists or remembered as “strangers to the throne.” In the Kom and Nso’ polities of the NW region, state-imposed chiefs have been commemorated not with praise songs but with silence, an act laden with political meaning (Chem- Langhëë, 1995; Fokwang, 2009). For example, the Fon of Bafut maintains ritual autonomy despite being classified as a “first-class” chief (Fokwang, 2009), while the Fon of Kom has actively resisted the elevation of subordinate quarter heads (Atangchuo) into autonomous chiefs, viewing it as a threat to traditional governance coherence (Fokwang, 2009). In Nso’, the palace contests state interference in royal succession by invoking customary principles and ancestral legitimacy (Chem-Langhëë, 1995; Fokwang, 2009). Chiefs in Babanki-Tungo and the Meta region reject state-sanctioned classifications altogether, asserting the primacy of indigenous cosmology and legitimacy (Fokwang, 2009). These examples highlight not only resistance but also the strategic agency of traditional leaders who redefine their roles to reaffirm authority rooted in local ontologies.
One of the state’s primary mechanisms of control is the selective recognition and hierarchical classification of chiefs—a colonial legacy repurposed to entrench postcolonial authoritarianism. This strategy facilitates the co-optation of traditional authorities, fragments local opposition, and weakens customary legitimacy. In Kom, the state’s elevation of quarter heads as autonomous chiefs has been met with vigorous opposition from the Fon, illustrating the tensions inherent in state attempts to manipulate chieftaincy (Fokwang, 2009). In Nso’, similar resistance has emerged against the recognition of rival claimants (Chem-Langhëë, 1995). In Babanki-Tungo, government-backed appointments have triggered community unrest, further demonstrating the clash between state agendas and local authority (Fokwang, 2009).
Neopatrimonial networks also facilitate land dispossession. State-protected chiefs allocate communal lands to corporations, undermining local rights and fostering inequality (Ndi et al., 2021a, 2021b; Pemunta, 2017; Pemunta and Fonmboh, 2010). Consequently, traditional leaders increasingly function as political brokers rather than community stewards. Their legitimacy erodes, autonomy diminishes, and their mediatory role is compromised, weakening grassroots democracy. Communities resist through symbolic defiance, ritual refusal, and the reaffirmation of cultural values rooted in ancestry and moral accountability (Fokwang, 2009; Scott, 1985, 1990).
Hybrid governance in Cameroon blurs the boundaries between formal state institutions and informal, traditional authorities. Chiefs increasingly serve as regime functionaries, while decentralization remains a façade masking central control (Bayart, 1993; Boege et al., 2009; Mamdani, 1996). Yet this system is continuously contested. Communities refuse to recognize state-sanctioned chiefs, manipulate legitimacy rituals, and preserve indigenous histories that delegitimize imposed authority.
Ultimately, the Cameroonian state’s manipulation of chieftaincy structures reflects broader postcolonial strategies of rural governance. While co-optation of chiefs maintains short-term control, it fosters long-term instability, corrodes indigenous legitimacy, and obstructs democratic deepening. In the SWNW provinces, this tension is particularly pronounced, illustrating the complexities of hybrid political orders where local autonomy and authoritarian objectives collide. This dynamic is exemplified in the systematic instrumentalization of traditional authority in SWNW Cameroon, where chieftaincy has been reshaped from a locus of local governance into a mechanism of state control.
The instrumentalization of traditional authority in SWNW Cameroon
In the SWNW regions of Cameroon, traditional authority—particularly the institution of chieftaincy—has been systematically instrumentalized by the postcolonial state as a mechanism of political control, elite co-optation, and authoritarian consolidation (Geschiere, 1993; Nyamnjoh, 2003, specific to Cameroon). Rather than serving as autonomous vehicles for local governance, chiefs have been legally and politically transformed into auxiliaries of the state. The subordination of traditional rulers to the state was first institutionalized in Law No. 74/23 of 5 December 1974, which formally integrated chiefs into Cameroon’s centralized administrative apparatus. This process was further consolidated by Decree No. 77/245 of 15 July 1977, which codified their status by dividing them into first-, second-, and third-class categories and placing them directly under the oversight of divisional officers, governors, and other state authorities. Together, these measures transformed chiefs from autonomous custodians of local governance into auxiliaries of the central state, eroding their legitimacy as community representatives.
Within this framework, chiefs are expected to perform functions ranging from tax collection and intelligence gathering to the enforcement of government policies that extend state authority into rural areas (Geschiere and Gugler, 1998; Nyamnjoh, 2003). In the context of the Anglophone Crisis, however, these expectations place chiefs in an acute dilemma. If they report separatist fighters or collaborate with security forces, they risk being branded as “black legs” by their own communities—often facing violent reprisals, including execution. Conversely, if they remain silent or attempt neutrality, they are accused by state security forces of collusion with separatists. This double bind erodes their legitimacy, blurs the boundaries between customary authority and political expediency, and reduces chiefs to precarious local agents caught between the demands of the regime and the suspicions of their communities.
However, chieftaincy in the SWNW regions exhibits significant regional variation. In the Grassfields of the NW, chieftaincy retains deep precolonial roots and a measure of continuity through successive colonial administrations. In contrast, many SW coastal chiefdoms were shaped or invented during German indirect rule, often lacking comparable indigenous legitimacy (Goheen, 1996; Warnier, 1993). These regional differences complicate generalized understandings of traditional authority and underscore its uneven relationship with the state.
Legal instruments such as Decree No. 77/244 on Traditional Councils and the 1974 Land Ordinances have further entrenched the instrumentalization of chiefs, particularly by stripping them of their historical role in land allocation. Nationalization of land and transfer of control to state institutions relegated chiefs to advisory roles in bureaucratic procedures they cannot fully control or understand (Fonchingong and Fokum, 2015). This marginalization has weakened traditional legitimacy and generated a disconnect between chiefs and their communities, leaving many caught between state demands and local expectations.
Moreover, this subordination has enabled divisional officers, governors, and other officials to acquire substantial land, often with the complicity of chiefs they helped legitimize. This dynamic is especially pronounced in the SW region, where land is both economically valuable and politically contested, fueling conflicts, intergenerational grievances, and perceptions of exploitation. The result is a volatile landscape in which traditional authority is viewed with suspicion, not simply as a historical relic, but as a compromised institution facilitating state control under the guise of decentralization.
Despite these constraints, chiefs exercise agency by negotiating their roles within the shifting constellations of state, local elites, and communities (Nyamnjoh, 2003). Some resist state encroachment, mobilize grassroots legitimacy, or align with local movements. The Anglophone Crisis since 2016 has vividly exposed these tensions: certain chiefs were co-opted to counter secessionist narratives, while others faced backlash, exile, or even death for perceived collaboration (Awasom, 2020; Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2003). This crisis illustrates the dual fragility and strategic utility of chieftaincy in contemporary Cameroon.
Political elites frequently exploit succession disputes and chieftaincy appointments to reward loyalists, marginalize rivals, or consolidate regional support, particularly in ethnically sensitive or resource-rich localities (Nyok, 2024; Socpa, 2002). Local populations, however, actively contest imposed chiefs, invoking customary rights, historical grievances, and legal channels to resist elite manipulation, reflecting the negotiated and often turbulent nature of state–society interactions in the SWNW regions (Geschiere, 1993; Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and van Dijk, 1999; Njoh, 2018a, 2018b).
A closer engagement with recent developments in Cameroon reveals that traditional authority in the NW and SW provinces functions as a hybrid institution, positioned uneasily between community-based legitimacy and state co-optation. This hybridity reflects what Nyamnjoh (2003) describes as the instrumentalization of chiefs as auxiliaries of the state, and what Geschiere and Konings (1993) identify as the paradox of belonging—where chiefs are simultaneously custodians of local identity and brokers of central state power. In this context, chieftaincy no longer embodies purely indigenous authority but instead operates as a localized extension of state control, regulating and disciplining communities on behalf of Yaoundé while struggling to maintain credibility as authentic representatives of their people. The 2019 General Code of Decentralized Territorial Collectivities, enacted after the Major National Dialogue, formalizes chiefs’ inclusion within regional councils while maintaining their dependence on governors and divisional officers (Fombad, 2020).
While the Code offers stipends and ceremonial visibility, it does not grant substantive political power, leaving chiefs as intermediaries of the state tasked with diffusing dissent and mobilizing local populations. In practice, central control over education, justice, finance, and security remains, reflecting a cosmetic decentralization that preserves centralized hegemony. In the context of the Anglophone Crisis, chiefs’ role is similarly double-edged: extending state authority while remaining expendable when unrest exposes central failings. Chieftaincy, therefore, is culturally significant but politically compromised, resilient not because of legal authority, but because it mediates the blurred lines between state and society, tradition and bureaucracy, legitimacy and coercion.
Weakening of communal cohesion
Historically, chiefs in Cameroon played a critical role in sustaining communal cohesion and mediating intra- and inter-community disputes (Mbaku, 1998). They functioned as neutral arbiters, upholding customary law, facilitating reconciliation, and maintaining social solidarity across ethnic and regional lines (Fisiy, 1995; Nyamnjoh, 2001). Their legitimacy was embedded in cultural norms, lineage structures, and the performative enactment of local customs (Goheen, 1992). In the Northwest Grassfields, where chieftaincy has long-standing precolonial roots, traditional authority structured social life, land allocation, and intergenerational continuity (Geschiere, 1993; Jua, 1995).
However, the postcolonial state’s increasing instrumentalization of chiefs has dramatically altered their social role and public perception. Once seen as custodians of community interest, chiefs are increasingly viewed as extensions of state power, implementing government policies at the local level (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Logan, 2009; Mamdani, 1996). This shift has eroded their impartiality, producing a broader crisis of legitimacy. In the NW and SW regions, chiefs are often perceived with suspicion, regarded as political brokers rather than defenders of communal welfare (Cheka, 2008; Fritz, 2014; Nyamnjoh, 2001).
Legal and political mechanisms—such as discretionary recognition, hierarchical classification, and the state’s power to dismiss chiefs based on loyalty—have entrenched this perception (Fisiy, 1995; Fokwang, 2009; Nyok, 2024; Pemunta, 2011). Chiefs who align with state elites for material gain or political advancement often lose moral authority, weakening their capacity to mediate disputes. This fosters disillusionment and estrangement among grassroots populations, undermining chiefs’ traditional role in resolving land conflicts, inheritance disputes, and local unrest (Fokwang, 2011; Mamdani, 1996; Ndi et al., 2021a, 2021b; Pemunta, 2017).
The SW region exemplifies these dynamics. Here, chieftaincy, constructed during colonial rule, remains historically shallow, making it especially vulnerable to state co-optation (Fokwang, 2009, 2011, 2024; Geschiere, 1993). Chiefs who align with central authorities in opposition to separatist movements face threats, exile, or assassination, further undermining their ability to act as neutral peace brokers during the ongoing Anglophone Crisis (Fokwang, 2024).
Moreover, the entanglement of chiefs in clientelist politics amplifies communal fragmentation. Local elites manipulate the selection of chiefs to access state resources or consolidate regional power, fostering factionalism within chiefdoms and weakening communal cohesion (Goheen, 1992; Jua, 1995). Chiefs increasingly operate in a precarious space, balancing state demands against community expectations, often at the expense of their cultural and social legitimacy.
Conclusion
This article has examined the instrumentalization of traditional authority in Cameroon’s South West and North West regions, underscoring the central role of chiefs in the unfolding Anglophone Crisis and their wider significance for conflict studies, neopatrimonial governance, and African political systems. Historically, chiefs functioned as custodians of custom, spiritual intermediaries, and legitimate mediators in social organization and conflict resolution (Goheen, 1992; Mbaku, 1998; Nyamnjoh, 2001). However, systematic co-optation by the postcolonial state has redefined their role: through a legal framework that classifies chiefs into first, second, and third categories, they have been transformed into auxiliaries of the centralized administration, their legitimacy increasingly subordinated to state authority (Fisiy, 1995; Jua, 1995).
In the Anglophone regions, this transformation has rendered chiefs highly vulnerable. The state relies on them to enforce order, implement policies, and contain separatist demands, forcing them into a delicate and often dangerous position between state forces and local communities seeking autonomy (Fokwang, 2024; Konings and Nyamnjoh, 1997). Some chiefs strive to mediate between the government and separatist actors, attempting to protect their populations while retaining state recognition. Others, accused of being too closely aligned with the regime, have faced rejection, intimidation, or violent attacks. Communities themselves have deployed both overt protest and more subtle forms of “everyday resistance” to contest chiefs perceived as collaborators (Pemunta, 2017; Pemunta and Fonmboh, 2010; Scott, 1985, 1990).
Against this backdrop, chiefs have devised varied strategies to navigate their precarious role. Many combine visible cooperation with the state with discreet accommodations to community demands, thereby preserving a measure of legitimacy without provoking retaliation. Others draw upon their customary authority to negotiate ceasefires, protect civilians, or broker dialogue between warring parties. Symbolic gestures, ritual acts, and the selective enforcement of state directives are likewise employed to signal neutrality and maintain influence. These strategies highlight the agency of chiefs as political actors who, rather than merely being instruments of the state, actively mediate between competing pressures under conditions of protracted uncertainty.
Theoretically, these dynamics illuminate the functioning of neopatrimonial systems in Africa. They reveal how formal democratic institutions coexist with informal mechanisms of control, and how traditional authority becomes a key site of negotiation between state and society (Awasom, 2000; Boone, 2003; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Konings, 2009; Tripp, 2004; Ntsebeza, 2005). The Anglophone Crisis in particular exposes the fragility of legitimacy in contexts of armed conflict, challenging assumptions about the neutrality or stability of customary institutions. Chiefs are shown to be neither passive clients of the state nor wholly autonomous defenders of communal welfare, but hybrid actors whose authority is constantly renegotiated.
Practically, this analysis carries important implications for conflict resolution and policy design. Sustainable peace in the Anglophone regions cannot be achieved by continuing to instrumentalize chiefs as mere extensions of state power. Instead, a reconfiguration of the state–chief relationship is essential—one that restores their autonomy, empowers them as legitimate mediators, and protects their role as custodians of local interests. Such an approach could strengthen social cohesion, rebuild trust, and contribute to more inclusive democratic governance.
By linking empirical evidence from Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis to broader debates on neopatrimonialism, local authority, and conflict management, this article makes three key contributions. Empirically, it provides a detailed, context-specific study of chiefs/fons in a conflict setting that remains underexplored in scholarship. Theoretically, it localizes and refines frameworks such as Mamdani’s “decentralized despotism” by showing how they manifest in the everyday practices of chiefs under crisis conditions. Practically, it offers actionable insights for policymakers and practitioners seeking to reimagine the role of traditional leaders in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.
In sum, chiefs in the North West and South West are not simply remnants of a precolonial past but vital and contested actors whose authority continues to shape political order, community survival, and the prospects for peace. Their experience provides an important window into the complex dynamics of state–society relations in Africa and offers critical lessons for both scholarship and practice in contexts of fragile governance.
Footnotes
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
