Emerging Economic Partners: Revisiting BRICS-Zimbabwe Trade and Investment Relations Under Western Sanctions (2000

Abstract

The expanding economic and political footprint of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) on the global landscape is generating heated debates, yet surprisingly, BRICS’ economic relations with countries subjected to Western economic sanctions have received limited scholarly attention. This article aims to fill this gap in the existing literature by analysing the evolving trade and investment relations between BRICS and Zimbabwe. The findings reveal that BRICS has provided alternative economic partnerships amid Zimbabwe’s isolation by Western economies helping to mitigate the adverse effects of the sanctions. These findings are important for scholars and policymakers to reconsider the efficacy of economic sanctions in an era of multipolarity characterised by the growing influence of BRICS.

Keywords

BRICS Zimbabwe emerging economic partners economic sanctions sanctions-busting trade foreign direct investments

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Emerging Economic Partners: Revisiting BRICS-Zimbabwe Trade and Investment Relations Under Western Sanctions (2000–2016)

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Keywords

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