Revisiting the Somatic Death Objection to Penal Substitution: Original Sin and the Nature of Consequences

Abstract

In an essay titled ‘The Logic of Reparative Substitution: Contemporary Restitution Models of Atonement, Divine Justice, and Somatic Death,’ Joshua Farris and S. Mark Hamilton articulate a largely ignored objection to the penal substitutionary atonement theory: the Somatic Death Objection. In this essay I respond to Farris and Hamilton’s Somatic Death Objection by appealing to the doctrine of original sin and the distinction between, what I call, mere consequences and penal consequences. I begin by defining the model in question: Penal Substitutionary Atonement. I then examine the Somatic Death Objection as Farris and Hamilton articulate it. Having done this, I provide two eschatologically based responses to the objection but argue that these responses are found wanting for various reasons. Finally, I turn to the doctrine of original sin and the distinction between mere consequences and penal consequences to argue that the Somatic Death Objection need not undermine penal substitution.