Explaining variation in perceived managerial autonomy and direct politicization in European public sectors

Abstract

Public sector reforms aimed at ‘making the managers manage’ granted public managers autonomy and tried to depoliticize the administration. There is substantial variation in the degree of direct politicization and in managerial autonomy. This article tests four sets of hypotheses to explain variation in perceptions of direct politicization and managerial autonomy in European public sectors. Data from a new survey in 15 countries among several thousand top public sector managers in central government are used. Findings show that variation in perceived direct politicization and managerial autonomy is partially determined by the formal status of an organization as an agency, and the hierarchical position of the manager within the organization. Managers from very large organizations also experience more autonomy, but organization size has no impact on perceived politicization. The policy field within which the respondent’s organization is situated has mixed effects. The article also finds that the models are better at explaining the variation in perceived managerial autonomy than that in direct politicization.

Points for practitioners

The article shows that top public managers in European central administration perceive different levels in the extent to which politicians try to influence senior-level appointments, as well as in the extent of management autonomy that they have. These differences in perception are mainly explained by whether or not they work in an agency, as well as by the hierarchical position that they occupy within the organization.