This article explores the influence of two types of signalling on the career success of civil servants in the federal ministerial bureaucracy of Germany. Whereas ‘ability signalling’ displays bureaucratic expertise in the sense of both political craft and administrative management competencies, ‘intention signalling’ indicates party politicization. Data are drawn from the biographies of 341 civil servants within the two highest ranks in federal ministries and the chancellery who held office between 2002 and 2013. Taking gender, formal education and career patterns into consideration, we are able to find clear evidence for ‘intention signalling’, whereas ‘ability signalling’ plays only a minor role. Over time, the accelerating effect of ‘intention signalling’ on administrative careers is increasing.
Points for practitioners
How important is political loyalty for senior civil servants in merit bureaucracies? This article investigates the relationship between the merit principle and politicization in the German federal bureaucracy. By analysing the importance of certain career steps, we find clear evidence for party politicization. Employment in positions that signal party political loyalty accelerates the careers of ministerial officials, even if the data also prove that there is no distinct ‘fast track’ to leading administrative positions in Germany. Moreover, our analysis reveals an under-representation of women in administrative top positions, as well as the continuing dominance of lawyers. Regarding career patterns, considerable differences between state secretaries and directors-general are evident.
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