Canada and the United Nations at a Political Turning Point

Abstract

In response to Kerry Buck and Michael W. Manulak's recommendations for the future of the UN, this essay highlights two problems that Canada faces in its current UN engagement. First, diplomacy and Global Affairs Canada are underfunded. Second, Canadian leadership has failed to adequately meet the political challenges of twenty-first century multilateralism. Focusing on the second, I argue that Canada must address key political difficulties to make a meaningful difference in the future of the UN. Without a politically sound vision and policy, increased Canadian investment in the UN is insufficient. I propose three areas where Canada can shift its engagement and recommend further actions. These include: (1) Canada-US relations; (2) the UN Charter and international law; and (3) Canada's relationship with the Global South.

Since 2012, when I took my first course in Canadian foreign policy, taught by an esteemed, retired diplomat, I have been a hopeful reader—and now, also a teacher and writer—of essays, op-eds, blog posts, and reports on the future of Canada in the world. After years of scholarship in the field and work at Global Affairs Canada, I now teach Canadian foreign policy, discussing these pieces with my students, while also contributing to the debate. Much ink has been spilled about how Canada can rethink and rebuild its international engagement, especially at the UN. Kerry Buck and Michael Manulak's recent report is a key example, and it was shaped by an advisory council with significant expertise. The report diagnoses some of the problems facing Canada and provides valuable and tangible solutions. It also aligns with the recent recommendations of the Report of The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on the future of Canada's foreign service, a document that I believe should be taken seriously.

In responding to Buck and Manulak's report, I believe that Canadian foreign policy faces two main problems: 1) High-quality diplomacy is expensive, and Global Affairs Canada remains trapped in austerity; 2) Multilateralism requires a politically astute approach, and Canadian political leadership across the last two governments has been risk-averse and out of touch. Regarding the first problem, Buck and Manulak recognize that Canada's capacities in the UN context are limited and recommend increased financial investment in diplomatic personnel by, for example, improving governance for coherence and visibility (recommendation 3), expanding multilateral capacity of the foreign service (recommendation 5), and expanding diplomatic presence in UN bodies (recommendation 6). All recommendations require staffing, training, and otherwise investing in the long-term development of the foreign service, which the budget of Global Affairs Canada does not currently support.

In terms of recommendations 1 and 2, where the authors argue for the development of a formal UN strategy and provide a short list of priorities, Canada would have to invest money in UN initiatives (i.e., in refugees or climate change) to succeed in its mission. Indeed, at the UN, to be considered serious on an issue, members must follow up their words with funds and actions. With respect to the fourth recommendation—putting forward Canada's candidacy for the next uncontested UN Security Council (UNSC) seat in the Western Europe and Others Group—we know that such campaigns are also costly, as is enhanced public engagement on UN issues (recommendation 7). Engagement is nonetheless crucial to advance this issue, for as I often observe as a historical scholar of Canadian foreign policy, past generations of Canadians were far more engaged in UN politics than they are today. And, finally, while appointing more Canadian nationals to UN secretariats (recommendation 8) is least expensive, as it is focused on individuals rather than institutions, investment in diplomatic careers is still central and requires wholesale overhaul as referenced in the Senate report. ¹

What is not discussed in Buck and Manulak's report is the political beast of multilateralism and its associated crises, which many Canadian leaders would rather avoid. Scholars must face this quagmire head-on—it is important to take seriously the UN's political dynamics and discuss the political components of how Canada engages. Moreover, no matter how much Canada invests in recommendations 1–8, the policies that emerge will fail at the international level if they are perceived as unpopular, uncooperative, and at times, morally unsound. One cannot invest in an organization whose mandate includes the peaceful settlement of disputes and, at the same time, undermine that same mandate through one's positions. My aim in this essay is to unpack this problem, demonstrating how Canada has missed the mark on its political and policy engagement in the UN and proposing ways forward. Here I discuss three key issues: (1) Canada's complicated relationship with the US; (2) Canada's contradictory positions vis-à-vis international law and Charter violations; and (3) Canada's declining—and misguided—relationships across the Global South. Each of these relates to broader foreign policy questions, and each hampers Canada's ability to maximize its effectiveness, credibility, and respect within the UN, demonstrating that multilateralism is not just technical, but also political. Hard choices must be made, not only regarding financial investment, but in terms of the political outcomes of that investment and the principles upon which it is built.

Canada and the US

The significance of Canada's most important relationship—with the US—should not be underestimated economically or politically. Perhaps inconveniently, in the decades since the Second World War, the US relationship has loomed over other bilateral and multilateral relationships for Canada. When making strategic multilateral decisions, Canada must consider how they might impact and, alternatively, be affected by, the US relationship. The interests of multilateralism and its preservation often clash with US interests, and, at times, Canada has been forced to choose between them. For example, in 1966, when deciding whether to seek a seat on the UNSC, Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson was cautious, as he was concerned that a seat might require Canada to engage in public discussions that he would rather not have in that forum. His personal opposition to the Vietnam War was well-documented—it had already put him in conflict with President Lyndon Johnson—and he was concerned that having to take public positions on the war (among other issues) could be detrimental. ² However, owing to political and diplomatic commitments to the UN, Canadian officials, led by Pearson, sought the seat nonetheless. ³

The continued dominance of Canada's ties with its neighbour presents multiple difficulties. First, as one of the most powerful UN member states, the US monopolizes that institution. Second, there are obvious political constraints that emerge from the unequal relationship between the two countries that make it difficult for Canadian leadership to act independently in the UN context. As a result, on and off since the creation of the organization other member states have accused Canada of being too close to the US, or an extra American vote in UN bodies. ⁴ Consequently, historically Canada's work in the UN has been a careful game of balancing its relationship with the US—and to a similar but lesser degree the UK and France—and its relationships with the “rest.” ⁵ Past imperial powers, and present great powers, have overshadowed Canada's work in the organization.

Over time Canada has shifted back and forth, sometimes aligning itself with the US and at other times standing in opposition, in both the UNSC and the General Assembly. While from 1980 to 2017 Canada's most similar voting partners in the General Assembly were Western European states rather than the US, ⁶ the US's outsized influence nonetheless has been central to Canadian political decision-making. Historically, Canada has made decisions that risked its American relationship, and, sometimes, it has managed successfully to separate its bilateral economic relationship from multilateral political preferences. In 1955, a Cold War deadlock in the UNSC was preventing new members from having their applications to join the UN accepted. Canada led the charge to work towards compromise, assisting with the confirmation of sixteen new member states. In gathering from other UN members unanimous opposition to American policy, which sought to prevent many countries from joining, Canadian leadership achieved what John Holmes called “one of the most remarkable feats in the history of the general assembly.” ⁷ This was done under the threat of American retaliation and American frustration with Canadian officials. Holmes noted that it was the first time that the US was “so overtly forced to alter its policy” ⁸ due to mass opposition from small and medium member states. A future where Canada becomes more influential in the UN is one where it likely would be required to take independent positions from the US; if the UN is “the world's counterweight to polarization,” ⁹ Canadian leadership in that organization must not simply double one of the poles.

In any quest for independent leadership in the UN, Canada must also keep in mind that US policy towards the UN is inconsistent and, often, oppositional. Untethering Canada from the US multilaterally is therefore important. Regardless of the party in power in Ottawa, Canada must maintain consistent engagement. American support of the UN has varied over time in terms of use of its veto, funding for the organization, and general cooperation and respect for rules and norms. ¹⁰ These factors have varied based on administration, with no guarantee that Democrats or Republicans will behave in a certain way while in the White House. Obviously hostile to the UN, the Donald Trump administration implemented some of the funding cuts common to Republican administrations. ¹¹ However, as Buck and Manulak point out, “many key Trump-era policies have continued under the administration of President Joe Biden.” ¹² Moreover, as American funding for the UN comes from a variety of mechanisms (including Congress), not the executive alone, major cuts could happen even during a friendlier Democratic presidency. ¹³ In the 1990s, under Bill Clinton's administration, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) fought to withhold US contributions and reduce the US's overall UN share. As a result, the US “nearly lost its vote at the General Assembly as millions of dollars in unpaid assessments accrued.” ¹⁴ By the time the issue was solved, it was only a few short years before the US, under a Republican administration, violated the UN Charter by invading Iraq. Moreover, despite President Biden initially signalling a turn towards friendliness to the UN and support for multilateralism, especially around UNSC reform in 2022, the US has now reverted to using its veto to prevent the Council from acting in opposition to Israel. ¹⁵ These moves have grossly undermined American credibility with regards to UN reform, and towards cooperative multilateralism in support of peace. ¹⁶

Succinctly, the US is incredibly unpredictable in the UN context and often a spoiler to progress. Other P5 states, most notably Russia, have acted similarly. However, Canada does not consider Russia a close friend and actively opposes its behaviour. If Canada is to increase its influence within the UN, it cannot tie itself to American hypocrisy and American sabotage, which could happen under any administration, at any time. Canadian leadership of any stripe must consider this political calculus. If Canada is to invest in multilateralism and cooperation, and commit to the principles of the UN Charter, its leaders must be willing to navigate pushing back against the US when it opposes Charter principles, choosing different political positions from the Americans and building coalitions of similar-minded smaller states. It is very possible to openly disagree with the US and push back against their unilateral moves, especially when they are anti-UN, but it must be done effectively, with creativity, and political commitment to the organization. As in 1955, the US may threaten to retaliate bilaterally, but rarely has that played out in ways that severely damaged the economic relationship or Canada more broadly. Canada cannot build its influence if it seems too politically cozy with or indebted to the US. It also cannot credibly influence the direction of multilateralism, pursuit of peace, support for humanitarianism and human rights, and the principles of cooperative, collective action if it so easily capitulates to American pressure.

International law, the P5, and Canada

Canada's recent relationship to international law and UN Charter governance also deserves attention, though it relates directly to the question of decoupling from the US on issues of multilateralism. The veto, as the most powerful tool set out in the Charter, is frequently used by the US and Russia to support their own interests and those of client states. Becoming increasingly obstructive, Russia recently has been using its veto to halt different UN efforts around the world. ¹⁷ Even at their most polarized, the US and Russia, and to a lesser degree, China, have more in common than it appears. While the power of the UN veto is through design rather than accident, ¹⁸ American and Russian interests are also at the heart of two major world conflicts at present: Russia's assault on Ukraine and the Ukrainian people and Israel's assault on Gaza and the Palestinian people. Unfortunately, Canada has not treated both conflicts and positions equally and coherently. While Canada has forcefully condemned Russia's actions, it is clear that Canadian political leaders do not hold the US—and Israel—to the same standard, even as Russia and Israel have violated the Charter, and Israel has increased its attacks on UN personnel and indiscriminately killed civilians on a massive scale. ¹⁹ As I write elsewhere, this is bad for Canadian interests, ²⁰ but especially dangerous for the UN. It signals to other countries that the law and global governance mechanisms more broadly are optional, and that member states may condemn peace and security violations according to their whims. It suggests that the rules-based international order is only rhetorical for Canada. While a “double standard” towards certain conflicts is par for the course at the UN, ²¹ Canada does not have to perpetuate it. If Canada is serious about supporting the viability and legitimacy of the UN and its underlying framework of international law, it must actively support both, regardless of the government of the day.

Preferential treatment for allies is not new, of course, as many Western states have supported their allies in war-making, from the US in Iraq to France in Algeria. Many non-Western states have done the same, as in Russia's present invasion of Ukraine. However, if one argues, as Buck and Manulak do, that the UN remains relevant for Canada and its interests, then it is in Canada's interest for the organization to remain credible and functional, something Pearson considered central to UN policy in the 1960s. ²²

The UN can only remain credible and functional if its member states consistently uphold the Charter and treat their friends and their enemies equally. If member states are willing to treat the UN as flexible, as the great powers do, then it is disingenuous for those states to say they are invested in the organization. International law is a flawed institution—as is the UN itself—but as a bare minimum, member states seeking to support and benefit from the organization must commit to upholding it, even when they do not like its outcomes.

An important example of this dissonance in Canadian foreign policy is Ottawa's response to the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor's May 2024 application for arrest warrants for Israeli and Hamas leaders. Established by the Rome Statute, the ICC is an “independent judicial body,” ²³ one separate from the UN and determined by UN negotiations of international criminal law. The UN and the ICC have formal legal relationships related to cooperation, the role of the secretary-general, and UNSC powers. ²⁴ While legally distinct, this body is politically connected to and emerges from the UN's role in global governance. In May 2024, the ICC prosecutor, Karim Khan, filed applications for arrest warrants for leaders of Hamas, in response to their crimes on 7 October 2023, and for both the Israeli prime minister and minister of defence, in response to their crimes in the intervening months. As Khan specified, “if we do not demonstrate our willingness to apply the law equally, if it is seen as being applied selectively, we will be creating the conditions for its collapse.” ²⁵ Indeed, both parties should be investigated and held responsible for their respective atrocities via thorough, internationally governed standards.

Canada's response immediately distorted the ICC statement, not unlike some of its statements regarding decisions of the International Court of Justice (a UN principal organ) in January and July 2024 on both the question of genocide and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. While indicating that Canada respected the court's authority, both Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau claimed that they were alarmed that the court was equating Hamas and Israel. ²⁶ That is fundamentally a misreading of international law and the statement itself, as the ICC action was to judge each party against the standards of international criminal law as set by the Rome Statute, not against each other. ²⁷ In the case of Hamas, the request concerns the actions of 7 October 2023 and subsequent crimes against hostages. In the case of Israel, the request refers to seven war crimes committed since 8 October 2023 against Palestinians, including, but not limited to, starvation as a weapon of war; intentionally directing attacks against civilians; and extermination. ²⁸ Those are separate violations of different laws for which both parties should be held accountable. In Israel's case, its operations in Gaza are so massive in scope that the death toll there may exceed 186,000 people. ²⁹ That Canadian political leadership is willing to be so misleading is irresponsible and, when observing the evidence of death and destruction in Gaza, morally reprehensible. Positions like these, which Canada does not take on other conflicts, are not viable in spaces like the UN—they are fundamentally unserious and ethically unsound.

Additionally, although Canada was not alone in taking this position, ³⁰ public statements by Canadian political leadership undermine a major Canadian historical achievement in multilateralism as well as current commitments to safeguarding and supporting the so-called rules-based international order. It is true that, in pursuit of their own interests, states make hypocritical or unproductive statements and often disregard the high principles of the UN. However, demonstrating such lack of care towards the ICC as an institution of multilateralism is notably sticky for Canada. Without engaging in hagiography, Canada's contribution to the creation of the ICC was critical and monumental, especially the engagement of Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy and other diplomatic and political leaders. ³¹ Canada was the first country in the world to integrate obligations of the Rome Statute domestically, adopting the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act in 2000. ³² A Canadian, Philippe Kirsch, served as the ICC's first president, following many years of diligent work establishing the Court. ³³ While not a UN secretariat role, Kirsch's work is in the spirit of Manulak and Buck's eighth recommendation: appointing more Canadians to this type of position in the UN. Canada's achievement and leadership is something that the government has frequently hailed as an example of Canadian multilateral excellence—as it should—and its policy towards the UN and international law, including the ICC, must not undercut its own credibility and leadership aspirations.

If Canada is to effectively rethink its capacity at the UN and work towards a more functional UN, then its political leadership must at least respond in good faith to basic standards of international law, not just repeat platitudes about its importance. This is outside the scope of what diplomats do at the UN or in Ottawa; this is a political choice about how Canada sees the role of international organizations and courts, how Canada sees its own past and present in these organizations, and, most importantly, how Canada responds to its moral and legal obligations.

Canada and the Global South

Buck and Manulak encourage the Canadian government to develop a formal UN strategy and recommend some potential priorities. Further, they write that “too often, Canada's domestic social priorities have preoccupied its foreign policy agenda and successive governments have spent too little time listening to what the rest of the world has to say.” ³⁴ The rest of the world has much to say, and it is not always in favour of Canada's version of multilateralism and cooperation. Canada must strategize based on where the rest of the world actually is, not just where Canada (or the US) wants them to be. So, in developing a formal strategy—and as part of its substance—Canada must engage with member states outside its usual group of allies. That would include those in the G77 and the African Union, or those historically part of the Non-Aligned Movement. Yet Canada's engagement with the Global South—a nebulous term for a heterogeneous group of states—is middling, at best.

In terms of Canada's current policy outputs, the Indo-Pacific Strategy has minimal substance regarding how Canada will engage with the Indo-Pacific in the UN setting. ³⁵ A recent call for public consultations on Canada's approach to partnerships in Africa contains no mention of the UN. ³⁶ Of course, this is not the whole picture, but it signals that multilateral cooperation through the UN with countries in the Global South is not a high priority. Yet, if Canada is to deepen and broaden its presence and influence at the UN, it must also do so with the member states outside of its traditional circle. It also must start to view those countries as partners in the project of multilateral governance and not just as recipients of international assistance or objects of economic extraction.

Increasingly, states in the Global South are leading the charge for UN reform, working more closely together in UN bodies, and finding ways to creatively navigate deadlock and obstruction by the world's more powerful states. Reform is more than just a technical exercise for the workings of the UN; it is a realignment of power and a reshaping of how states participate in global governance. For states in the Global South, this is about countering glaring inequalities that have existed for generations. Canada would be wise to look for opportunities to collaborate on these initiatives and follow their lead on the issues that affect them most intensely (i.e., those related to global health, food security, and climate crises). Since 2020–2021, three African members, plus one Caribbean member, have formed the A3 + 1 group in the UNSC. Working as a bloc, this group has coordinated its efforts on the UNSC with those in the African Union and has acted in a unified, credible way to influence the UNSC's work. ³⁷ Their efforts have also furthered the push for an African Union permanent seat.

The A3 + 1 group's dynamic is not without challenges (much like the African Union itself), but the group has nonetheless proven to be a strong force on resolutions, public statements, and the Council's agenda. Following the contributions of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Guyana has stepped up as the Caribbean member of the group, outperforming expectations of small, non-permanent members who are often at a disadvantage when compared to wealthier countries. ³⁸ Alongside A3 + 1 efforts, Guyana's work has included championing UN reform efforts; women, peace, and security initiatives; and calls for an end to the war on Gaza.

As states in the Global South change how they engage with the UN, Canada should pay close attention. In choosing priority issues, Canada will need to attend to the shifting political dynamics and the increasing leadership and entrepreneurship of states in the Global South. This may include engaging in good faith with political positions that Canada has not supported before. Increased diplomatic presence and capacity at the UN also involves the need to demonstrate deep knowledge and engagement on these issues and to recognize the labour of these states to be taken seriously as potential partners and leaders. Finally, in addition to developing a coherent vision amidst a multitude of perspectives, in order to return to the UNSC, Canada would also need to account for how the Council's political dynamics have changed even over the last four years, as well as the influence of new partnerships like the A3 + 1.

Conclusion

The challenge ahead for Canada is significant. The UN has changed drastically in the last twenty years and there are obvious difficulties for Canada. This is not an indictment of Canada's diplomats, who have made the best of a complex situation and work effectively within the constraints of the public service and austerity. Their job is now harder than it ever has been. However, part of what makes their job difficult is their leaders’ resistance to providing adequate support for multilateral diplomacy as well as a generalized lack of political creativity, flexibility, and strategy—something that is often forgotten in the ongoing discourse of the future of Canadian foreign policy and Canada in the UN. Many politicians treat multilateral policy as solely technocratic, but politics cannot be cast aside. In this essay, I have provided three major political challenges that must be addressed, though no doubt there are other pressing issues that should also be addressed to help Canada strengthen its position at the UN.

As Buck and Manulak point out, Canadian leaders have not undertaken many high-level visits in recent years and have often neglected the UN as a centre of international networks. This is an excellent point, and any reinvigoration of UN policy would require a hands-on approach from a minister or prime minister. This is both to demonstrate serious commitment and to make effective use of the UN system, but also because it is an opportunity to work through political issues substantively and provide political leaders with experience with the UN's dynamics. Any new UN policy will require working knowledge of the system and its political contours and a committed leader should be willing to engage on the ground with other state leaders and senior UN officials as much as they would in any other international forum. Committing to high-level visits would also force leaders to tackle issues, crises, and solutions of the UN head-on rather than delivering talking points for the press from Ottawa.

In closing, I turn to Buck and Manulak's fourth recommendation, an issue that strongly requires high-level political leadership: putting forward Canada's candidacy for an uncontested UNSC seat. Regardless of whether a seat is contested or not (i.e., whether it is competitive), one point deserves attention: leadership positions in the UN, including UNSC seats, should not be “domestic political trophies.” ³⁹ Since the 2010 campaign, seats are now a partisan issue for Canada, and this situation should be remedied. If Canada chooses to seek a seat again, Buck and Manulak are correct that the election should proceed from a longer-term commitment and a well-strategized overarching foreign policy. Research demonstrates that UNSC seats are certainly valuable for states, ⁴⁰ but how Canada would win a seat within the global electorate is much less certain. The three issues I address above have also either served or hampered Canada's success in past campaigns for UN seats, because these elections provide other states with opportunities to scrutinize others’ foreign policies. So, the contentious issues at hand for Canada are simultaneously ones that would arise in any UNSC election. Leaders of any stripe must be prepared to address issues for their own sake, and also understand what they may reveal to other states.

Historically, Canada's mixed record on Palestinian self-determination, statehood, and Israeli occupation have been contentious issues in Canada's elections and during its prior UNSC terms. ⁴¹ In earlier decades, South African apartheid held a similar importance, as did the Vietnam War before it. ⁴² More recently Canada has been hampered by its diminished relationships across the African continent and particular bilateral relationships and positions on world issues. ⁴³ These are not the only reasons that Canada may have won or lost its bids for the UNSC, but they are very important examples of why strategizing about the future of Canadian commitment to the UN must not scrub politics from the agenda. How Canada acts, votes, cooperates, and engages in the UN system is just as important as anything else in determining its future on the UNSC or in the organization more broadly.