Abstract
When Stephen Harper became the first Canadian prime minister to speak in the Knesset, he declared unwavering loyalty to Israel. Liberal prime minister Justin Trudeau, Harper's successor, echoed this sentiment. Following the Hamas-led attacks on 7 October 2023, Israel's responses in Gaza have been deemed by the International Court of Justice to be “plausible genocide.” How far does Canada's position of standing with Israel go, and does it include genocide? This article offers a close analysis of the Harper years (2006–2015) to demonstrate the significance of this period in cementing Canada's close relationship to Israel, and explores how the Trudeau Liberals sustained certain dimensions of that relationship. The article argues that during the Harper government, Canada's foreign policy towards Israel and Canada's domestic policy became increasingly intertwined. Based on analysis of policy, document, and media accounts, the article addresses: (i) the interface with Israel in foreign policy and in the United Nations; (ii) a pattern of what we term the “Israelization” of Canadian domestic politics; and (iii) the continuities since Justin Trudeau's election in 2015, which appeared in sharpened relief between 2023 and Trudeau's resignation in 2025.
“Through fire and water, Canada will stand with you.” —Stephen Harper, Speech to Israeli Knesset, 20 January 2014. “We know that we have more than an ally in Israel. We have a real trusted friend on whom we can count, and who can count on Canada to continue to stand by its side through thick and thin.” —Justin Trudeau, Speech to United Jewish Appeal Top Gifts Dinner, Toronto, 2 April 2019.
It is clear that the 2023–2025 period was one in which it became difficult for Western states, including Canada, to continue to ignore Palestinians. The Hamas-led attacks of 7 October 2023, and Israel's responses, are both understood by a United Nations (UN) Independent International Commission to constitute war crimes, but only Israel is identified as having committed crimes against humanity. Moreover, in these Commission findings, the events of 7 October 2023 and Israel's responses are not seen to have taken place in isolation. 3 While some analysts might hold that Israel “had to respond” to the events of 7 October, it does not follow that this response had to be in the form of military force and massively escalating violence, given the range of tactics that states have at their disposal, including negotiation and ceasefire agreements. This consideration is especially critical given that in 2024 the International Court of Justice (ICJ)'s interim ruling deemed Israel's military actions in Gaza a “plausible genocide.” 4 As a consequence of this interim ruling, a pressing question facing Trudeau in this period was: how far does standing with Israel go? Are there limits, and, if so, do such limits include genocide? That there is even a discussion of Canada's complicity in actions widely seen as state genocide against the Palestinian population in Gaza 5 has much to do with historic logics and patterns of disregarding Palestine and Palestinian lives, particularly over the past two decades.
As we will trace, the Harper years (2006–2015) are significant in this regard, as this period saw the further cementing of Canada's close relationship with the state of Israel, and the distinct linking of foreign and domestic policy in ways that have proven to be enduring. Indeed, Trudeau sustained certain dimensions of this relationship once he came to office in 2015, despite political differences from Harper's Conservatives on many issues and some rhetorical distinctions. Harper came to power with a minority government in 2006, followed by another minority government in 2008, and then a majority government in 2011. Trudeau, in contrast, came to power with a majority government in 2015, followed by two minority governments in 2019 and 2021, before he stepped down as Liberal leader and prime minister in 2025 in advance of a federal election. 6
In what follows, we attend to this close relationship between foreign policy towards Israel and domestic policy, and indicate how these advanced together, specifically during the Harper years. We note that the Harper period was consistent with previous Canadian government policy since the founding of the state of Israel in 1948, insofar as they have all taken a pro-Israel position. 7 We argue, however, that the Harper Conservative period was unique and pivotal in its fusing of bilateral (Canada/Israel), global (United Nations), and, especially, domestic (Canadian) interests into a uniformly pro-Israel stance. Any semblance of “balance” by attending to the interests of Palestine as an occupied territory, or viewing the Palestinians as a dispossessed and racialized people suffering from settler-colonial violence and systemic human rights abuse, was notably absent under Harper, and remained in a chokehold under Trudeau.
Canada's position under successive governments before Harper was often masked by discourses of Canada as a “peacekeeping middle power” and “helpful fixer” in the international system. 8 Many analysts concur that during the Harper years, there was a decisive shift in foreign policy. The Harper Conservatives “reshap[ed] the ideological context of Canada's position in the world,” 9 and did so in ways that eschewed neutrality by embracing Israel—a position that Trudeau continued. 10 However, scant attention has been paid to the impacts of this reshaping: how it has further dispossessed Palestinians of their land, disavowed Palestinian human rights, and cast a chill on those in Canada who defend Palestinian human rights. These are lacunae we address.
In centering consideration of Palestine and Palestinian human rights, and in highlighting the uniquely fused bilateral, international, and domestic elements of the Harper government's position on Israel/Palestine, we draw on key policy documents, media accounts, and secondary analyses. The argument proceeds in three parts. First, we address the ways in which the Harper government interfaced with Israel as part of its foreign policy vis à vis Israel as well as in the UN. Second, we address what we term the “Israelization” of Canadian politics, focusing on how Israel/Palestine impacted domestic policy and organizations within Canada. Third, we consider the continuities of Canada's pro-Israel stance since the election of Trudeau—which appeared in sharpened relief between 2023 and 2025, and are set to continue through the aftermath of the 2025 federal election.
Harper and foreign policy on Israel
Canada's relationship to Israel/Palestine changed quickly with Harper's ascendance as prime minister. Stephen Harper came to Ottawa with a demonstrated history of support for Israel, expressed in his leadership of the Canadian Alliance Party, a predecessor to the Conservative Party of Canada. 11 In April 2003, Harper spoke to a meeting of conservative supporters in Toronto, organized by the Civitas Group, a self-described alliance of Canadians who “bring together people with an interest in conservative, classical liberal and libertarian ideas.” 12 There, Harper articulated a commitment to “values questions” that would affect foreign affairs as well as defence, criminal justice, family, health care, and social services. 13
Many of those who formed the base of the Canadian Alliance Party were western Canadian supporters of the earlier Reform Party; among them, pro-Israel Christian Zionists were strongly represented. 14 However, the pivot in the federal government's orientation to Israel/Palestine cannot be attributed merely to popular pressure or efforts to appeal to a pro-Zionist—Jewish or Christian—electorate, as some have argued. 15 In fact, the Harper government selectively appealed to some groups which claimed to represent the Jewish Canadian community as a whole, while actively targeting and marginalizing other Jewish organizations and voices that were critical of Israel or supportive of Palestinian rights. 16 This method of appealing only to selected factions that would be supportive of Harper's particular conservative agenda was not unique to the issue of Israel/Palestine. Rather it reflected a broader move away, since 2006, from historic “brokerage politics” designed to capture the vast majority, appealing instead to niches and fragmenting the electorate. 17
Over the period of the Harper government, Canada was also home to some of the most significant initiatives to support Palestine and Palestinian rights. These included efforts to advance the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel, with wide support from student, labor, and LGBTQ community sectors, as well as Christian, Muslim, and Jewish civil society organizations. 18 It would be difficult to understand the longevity and well-articulated vision of this activism—such as the Palestine encampment at the University of Toronto in 2024 in support of divestment from Israel and Palestinian rights 19 — without considering this much longer history of Canadian organization around BDS and Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW). These initiatives began at the University of Toronto in 2005, and thereafter spread nationally and globally. 20 Despite considerable efforts to repress BDS and campus activism, comprehensive polling evidence suggests that over the 2000s support for Palestine, and criticism of Israel's practices and policies against Palestinians, have been growing in Canada, including among Jewish Canadians. 21
Harper's minority rule from 2006 to 2008 was a significant period for a minority government in Canada. It was critical in redefining Canada's relationship with Palestine, also under a newly elected government, with Hamas's electoral victory on 25 January 2006. Canada distinguished itself as the first country after Israel to cut off aid and all diplomatic relations with the government democratically elected by the Palestinian population in Palestine, on the grounds that Ottawa had deemed Hamas a terrorist organization. This led to the suspension of $7.3 million in aid to Palestine, which had been intended for housing and other social projects, and to the convening of an international meeting of ministers of justice. 22 One analyst called the move “an astonishingly resolute decision for a government without experience,” 23 and an indication of more such decisions to come. Specifically, it marked a more explicit identification between the governments of Canada and Israel in terms of aid and trade.
A key moment in the tightening embrace between Canada and Israel was Israel's war on Lebanon in the summer of 2006. During this thirty-four-day war, starting on 12 July, Israel launched a massive military assault, which it claimed was in retaliation for a rocket attack from Hezbollah fighters on an Israeli border town and the abduction of two Israeli soldiers who were taken in an attempt to demand the release of some of the hundreds of Lebanese and Palestinian political prisoners. Then Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert later stated, however, that Israel had “planned” the attack, with the military preparations advanced at least four months prior to the specific events. 24 As the assault was unfolding, Stephen Harper declared that Israel was exercising its right to “defend itself” and characterized its military response as “measured.” 25 However, this was not a battle of equivalent forces. Israel's military incursion with air and ground attacks saw 1,109 Lebanese civilians and twenty-eight soldiers killed, and extensive damage to homes and infrastructure; forty-three Israeli civilians and 116 soldiers died in the war. 26 Even Condoleezza Rice, then US secretary of state, urged Israel to exercise restraint, while also condemning Hezbollah. 27
Significantly, the close association forged between Canada and Israel during this period was not only in terms of traditional foreign policy elements like aid, trade, and security; it was also explicitly ideological. Over the next nine years, following the election of two recurrent Conservative governments under Harper, Canada earned the reputation as Israel's closest global ally. This same period saw Israel come under increasing criticism internationally—in the United Nations, among states in regions such as Latin America and western Europe, and widely among civil society groups. As then Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni stated at a press conference in Jerusalem in 2007, “Since its election in January 2006, the Canadian government headed by Prime Minister Stephen Harper has maintained particularly warm relations with Israel. … Bilateral and diplomatic ties are currently at their peak.” 28
In actuality, the peak had not yet been reached. Harper's government redefined the relationship between domestic and international relations by going so far as to adopt the role of another sovereign state in order to ensure Israel's interests. From 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009, Israel militarily attacked Gaza, amidst widespread international criticism. Hugo Chávez, then president of Venezuela, condemned Israel's actions and responded on 14 January 2009 by cutting off all diplomatic relations with Israel and expelling Israeli diplomats from Venezuela. Similar actions were taken by Bolivia and Ecuador. 29 This response was consistent with the demands of the Palestinian unified call for boycott, divestment, and sanctions issued in 2005. 30 Canada's then minister of state for Latin America, Peter Kent, in turn announced an unusual move: Canada would represent Israel's diplomatic interests in Caracas, Venezuela. This arrangement was, according to the Canadian embassy in Ottawa, based on “Israel's request.” 31 In confirming Canada's diplomatic role in Venezuela on Israel's behalf, Kent also added that Ottawa was also “currently doing this for Israel in Cuba.” 32 While states do at times perform diplomatic functions for other states, Venezuela's response in this case had to do with Israel's violence in Gaza, and it was unusual to see Canada taking up this role for the state of Israel under such circumstances.
This close relationship between Canada and Israel continued to strengthen. On 20 January 2014, Stephen Harper's address to the Knesset drew attention to the countries’ ostensibly shared interests. Examples in the speech included the Israeli-built reconnaissance equipment used by Canada's mission in Afghanistan, shared foodstuffs, and common “values,” in an apparently seamless interconnectivity constituting “the special relationship between Israel and Canada.” Harper also noted the Canadian Jewish population and its long history, drawing on stories of Jewish immigrants and their commitment to “hard work and perseverance.” 33 Notably absent were examples of Canada's historic refusal to allow entry of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany during the Second World War, when the policy was summarized as “none is too many.” 34 (A Canadian government apology for this racist exclusion was only offered in 2018 by the Trudeau Liberals. 35 )
One day after the Knesset speech, on 21 January 2014, a broad agreement was announced promising to integrate security, energy, international aid and development, innovation, and notably, global human rights, according to a strategic partnership between Canada and Israel. The “Canada-Israel Strategic Partnership MOU” (Memorandum of Understanding) was symbolically announced in Jerusalem, promising a wide array of new and continuing initiatives that would advance the two countries’ “common interests.” 36
The increasingly close Canada-Israel relationship was not only apparent in terms of bilateral relations—it also went global. The Harper government's overt and unproblematized pro-Israel position reached new heights in terms of Canada's stance and presence in various UN fora, including voting patterns in the General Assembly. 37 It also included taking the lead to boycott the UN World Conference Against Racism review in 2009 on contested grounds that it was “antisemitic,” 38 and decreasing, then ceasing, all funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) devoted to the humanitarian assistance of more than five million Palestine refugees. The reason on offer from the Harper government was that UNRWA was accused of being a kind of “repository of Hamas-directed radicalism and terrorist activity,” 39 a claim for which there was, and remains, no evidence. 40 The actual reasons are arguably more rooted in the Harper government's persistent pattern of uncritical pro-Israel politics. Even verbal concern for the actual living conditions and rights of millions of Palestinian citizens in the region and in the diaspora disappeared amidst anti-Arab and anti-Muslim rhetoric, which were tragically characteristic of the post 9/11 period. 41
The UN context in terms of Israel and Palestine is long and complex, a detailed account of which goes beyond the scope of this discussion. It is significant to note, however, that although the state of Israel was the product of UN intervention in 1947–1948, it has consistently failed to adhere to international law as prescribed by the UN in regard to the human rights of Indigenous Palestinians. 42 Issues of particular relevance include, for example, the right of Palestinian refugees to return, the civil rights of Palestinians living within Israel proper (1948 territory), and Israel's lengthy and illegal occupation and settlement of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip) and East Jerusalem. 43 The UN has also been one of the few arenas where representatives of, and advocates for, Palestinians have voiced claims to hold these violations to account. Such advocacy has included Palestinian claims for state status and representation, demands from Palestinian civil society movements and organizations, and non-Palestinian support for Palestinian human rights internationally. 44
The Israelization of Canadian politics
Between 2006 and 2015, the Harper Conservatives’ uniformly “pro-Israel” foreign policy stance also found its way into political discourse and policy rationales impacting both governmental and non-governmental institutions at a national level, a process we label “the Israelization” of Canadian politics. We propose the concept of Israelization to indicate that this is an embrace of a particular relationship between Canada and Israel in the contemporary twenty-first century period, bearing implications directly on domestic politics. This was evidenced in parliament, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and arms-length agencies (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations or QUANGOs). The multidimensional impact this process clearly signaled was that freedom of speech associated with Israel/Palestine was to be regulated in the name of Canadian values. Moreover, Canadian individuals and organizations critical of Israel on grounds of human rights for Palestinians would face punishing consequences. These consequences could affect government access, government funding, and even institutional survival. 45
The Israelization of Canadian politics also signaled, more broadly, support for an explicit Canadian “value” which adopted political Zionism as the lens through which Canada's domestic and foreign policy regarding the Middle East would be viewed. Here we use Zionism to refer to a political strategy—as distinct from Jewish identity or Judaism as a religious faith—which addresses antisemitism through support for an exclusive, ethnically defined state in historic Palestine. 46 However, unlike Zionism, which has wider ideological and historical meanings, 47 our use of “Israelization” is specific, contextual, and policy-related. Israelization effectively served to create new lines of citizenship belonging and out-casting in Canada. 48 Select examples that are illustrative of the Israelization of Canadian politics are found in discourse in parliament, NGOs, and QUANGOs, as addressed below.
Under the Harper government, the Canadian parliament became the institutional and ideological site of new support for Israel through a specific discourse, one that equated human rights criticisms of Israel's policies towards Palestinians with antisemitism. This misleading and inaccurate discursive equation flowed from multiple sources, but directly followed the domestic impact of the World Conference Against Racism meeting initially in 2001, with a review in 2009 as noted above. 49 In particular, in February 2009, Canadian parliamentarians participated in the Inter-parliamentary Committee for Combating Antisemitism (ICCA) in London, United Kingdom, and by March 2009, the Canadian Parliamentary Coalition to Combat Antisemitism (CPCCA) was launched. 50 Although the Conservatives were not the only party represented in the CPCCA, Jason Kenney, who held leading posts in the Harper government, was both a key initiator of the Coalition and ex officio member. Moreover, Kenney provided the CPCCA with close to half a million dollars for its operating budget as Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism. 51 The CPCCA, which functioned between 2009 and 2011, concerned itself with the “new antisemitism,” which was understood to be operating through criticisms of Israel as evidenced in Canadian university events such as Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW). 52
As noted, IAW is an ongoing educational event which began at the University of Toronto in 2005 before spreading to hundreds of cities globally. 53 In Canada, IAW has brought together Palestinian, Jewish, and other Canadians in common cause around issues relating to Palestinian human rights and support for the 2005 call by Palestinian civil society groups for a BDS campaign against Israel. Accordingly, as Rafeef Ziadah and Adam Hanieh note, 54 IAW is one expression of a larger Canadian-based solidarity movement with Palestinians.
However, expressions of solidarity with Palestinians, and any form of comparison between Israel and South Africa under apartheid, were consistently characterized as antisemitic by the Harper government. This charge went beyond the Conservative Party and drew the support of other party leaders. In 2009, Jason Kenney asserted that he was “deeply concerned” by IAW events on Canadian university campuses, rhetorically questioning “whether these activities are beneficial or are simply an effort to cloak hatred and intolerance in an outward appearance of ‘intellectual inquiry.’” 55 In 2010, Conservative MP Tim Uppal introduced a motion in the House of Commons which held that “this House condemns IAW for seeking to delegitimize the State of Israel by equating it with the racist South African apartheid regime.” 56 While this motion failed, both Harper and then opposition Liberal leader Michael Ignatieff went on record to challenge IAW events in Canada on the grounds of the apartheid comparison. 57 Relatedly, on 10 March 2011, both Harper and Ignatieff addressed a Toronto audience hosted by a pro-Israel advocacy group called the Canadian Jewish Political Affairs Committee. Here, Harper, decried “antisemitism” on university campuses, especially identifying IAW, which he asserted made antisemitism increasingly “intellectually acceptable.” 58
But perhaps the most extreme example of the Israelization of Canadian politics was the way in which the Harper administration linked the existence of Israel—specifically “as a Jewish state”—to ascribed Canadian values, even declaring this in the 2013 speech from the throne. 59 This insistence on linking Canadian values with pro-Israel sentiment also pervaded Harper's visit to Israel in January 2014. In his Knesset speech, Harper insisted that “Canada supports Israel because it is right to do so. This is a very Canadian trait, to do something for no other reason than it is right.” 60 He also took the opportunity in this speech to criticize the use of the term “apartheid” as applied to Israel on Canadian university campuses, a reference to IAW. Harper made no criticism, however, of Israeli illegal settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories or other Israeli human rights violations.
Given this pattern, it was perhaps not surprising, if no less troubling, that there would be tension with some NGOs. One of the largest was the Canadian Arab Federation (CAF), the national umbrella association founded in 1967 to represent Arab Canadian organizations across Canada. In direct response to the Knesset speech, the CAF asserted that Canadians “have yet again been let down by their Prime Minister.” 61 The CAF had a long history of partnering with the Canadian government in the context of the advent of official multiculturalism in 1971. The CAF consistently drew attention to stereotypes in the portrayal of Arab Canadians, biases in media reporting about Arabs and the Middle East, and violations of human rights. 62 However, the organization's ability to retain legitimacy in the eyes of the Conservative government was now severely constricted. The government's ideological commitment to a “pro-Israel” position was qualitatively distinct from the approaches of earlier Canadian governments since 1947, and, as noted, was not in step with Canadian public opinion. 63
The constricted discursive space in which the CAF was forced to articulate its positions was revealed clearly in the lead up to, and aftermath of, Israel's twenty-two-day war on Gaza (December 2008–January 2009). In this period, CAF representatives had a verbal confrontation with Jason Kenney, then Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, over the Harper government's support of the war. At the same time, Kenney's department failed to renew the CAF's federal grant that funded immigrant language instruction. 64 The removal of federal funding for language and employment cost the CAF severely in organizational and financial strength. In being cut off from interfacing with elected government officials, the national organization representing Arab Canadians turned to the courts, responding with a legal strategy against the federal government. This move reflects a broader historical trend wherein racialized minorities in Canada have turned to court action when there were no other politicaloptions, in attempts to defend their rights, prior to the institutionalization of multiculturalism and the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 65 More broadly, the case of the CAF—as well as Palestine House, which shared a similar fate in having its funding for language training revoked by the Harper Conservatives, leading to job losses and a diminution of its organizational strength—is illustrative of what Ziadah has called “the silencing of Arab Canadians.” 66
The Harper Conservatives’ pro-Israel position affected not only Canadian NGOs, but also QUANGOs, a phenomenon we have traced extensively elsewhere. 67 This impact included the unprecedented scrutiny given to the peer-reviewed conference entitled Israel/Palestine: Mapping Models of Statehood and Paths to Peace. The scrutiny, leading to threat of cancellation, included a remarkable intervention by Canada's national academic funding agency, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), even after this same body had supported the conference following a competitive peer-review process. 68 An inquiry made by NGO Monitor, an Israeli advocacy group, was a factor in decisions made at Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) when grants for projects on Palestinian political participation and on the rights of Palestinian women were suddenly terminated. 69 The demise of the arms-length Canadian federal agency, Rights and Democracy, raised profound questions regarding the perceived suppression of the organization's independence in the face of a new kind of political positioning on the Middle East and Israel by the Harper Conservatives. 70 The untimely death following a heart attack of its former president, Rémy Beauregard, added to the tragic circumstances surrounding this important human rights advocacy organization. 71
These developments during the Harper years—in parliament, and regarding NGOs and QUANGOS—demonstrate how the staunch positions advanced in bilateral relations with Israel, and international relations expressed in the UN, also came to impact domestic politics in unprecedented ways. This “Israelization” of Canadian politics was distinct, reflecting the broader impact of the Harper government's avowedly pro-Israel stance. It highlights cascading consequences not only for Palestinian rights and Canada's international standing, but also for citizenship and civil society organizations in Canada.
After Harper: Trudeau and the politics of continuity
As we have demonstrated, the Harper government stands out among Canadian federal governments in the post-Second-World-War period. Rather than framing Canadian foreign policy around a projected image as a “middle power” and “helpful fixer,” Canada's foreign policy began to be portrayed, to both international and particularly domestic audiences, as more in keeping with a “warrior nationalism.” 72 Consistent with this discourse, military victories and examples of military history were heavily drawn upon in commemorative events and portrayals of the Canadian nation (such as the 2012 commemoration of the war of 1812). 73 The new narrative promoted an aggressive support of Israel, including opposing longstanding Palestinian claims in the region regarding borders and Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. While vacillation on such issues is not unique, the Harper government's intransigence is notable.
Harper's distinctive pro-Israel orientation in some ways prefigured developments in both the US and the evolving Conservative Party of Canada. The 2018 decision of then US president Donald Trump to move the US embassy to Jerusalem was in keeping with the same unfettered support of Israel exhibited by the Harper Conservatives. A similar plan to move Canada's embassy was, not surprisingly, proposed by the former federal Conservative leader Erin O’Toole. 74 The shift under Harper can be seen in the context of a prior Tory government, recalling when Progressive Conservative prime minister Joe Clark assumed office in 1979, and quickly reversed an election promise to move the Canadian embassy to Jerusalem due to a variety of domestic and international factors, both political and economic. 75
In retirement from federal politics, Stephen Harper has continued to play a role in the region. For example, he visited Israel in February 2019, and was compared favorably to Trump by US ambassador to Israel David Friedman. Friedman stated on the occasion of the visit: “It was an honor to meet today in Jerusalem with the 22nd Prime Minister of Canada, Stephen Harper. With the exception of my boss [Trump, then US president], I can think of few if any world leaders who have been better friends of Israel over the past generation.” 76 Notably, Trump also removed US funding from UNRWA in 2018. More recently, in February 2024, Harper wrote a commentary in the National Post entitled “Israel's war is just: Hamas must surrender or be eliminated.” Here, Harper stressed that he had “meant it” almost a decade earlier when he said that the Canada he represented would stand with Israel through “fire and water.” 77
The Harper legacy also affected Liberal prime minister Justin Trudeau, who came into office in 2015. Although Trudeau did not embrace the glorification of the military and wartime nationalism associated with Harper, neither did he elevate the “peacekeeping” image associated with previous Liberal governments, especially Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson. Trudeau retained from Harper a commitment to supporting Israel, indicated not only by Trudeau's own acknowledgement that his views and approach on Israel did not differ from Harper's, 78 but also by his linking of a pro-Israel position with ascribed Canadian values. For instance, in the 2019 speech to the United Jewish Appeal, Trudeau averred that “Israel is a democratic state in a dangerous region,” and that “Canada and Israel share a special bond—one rooted in mutual respect, a shared history, and common values.” 79
Trudeau also did not substantively reverse the Harper government's legacy in other ways. Prior to, and since, his re-elections, Trudeau consistently condemned the BDS movement and treated IAW activities as effectively un-Canadian. 80 Further, he increased the possible ways in which charges of “antisemitism” might be used against human rights defenders of Palestinians who criticize Israel's policies, adopting in 2019, and again in 2024, the controversial International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism in Canada's federal anti-racism strategy, while effectively refusing to recognize anti-Palestinian racism within that strategy. 81 While both antisemitism and anti-Palestinian racism need to be strongly countered, the IHRA definition of antisemitism has been widely criticized for equating antisemitism with criticism of Israel. 82
The international context is also relevant here. During the first Trump presidency (2017–2021), the US embassy was moved to Jerusalem, a controversial move that Canada, under the leadership of Trudeau at the time, did not emulate. Still, the Trudeau government was exceptionally muted, in contrast to other Western countries, on the subject of the move of the US embassy, suggesting the prime minister was “quietly” continuing the Harper policies; 83 indeed, in the UN, Canada was one of only thirty-five countries to abstain from condemning the US for this move. Moreover, the Trudeau government chose to ignore the extensive, carefully researched report of the international organization Human Rights Watch in April 2021, which found that Israel practiced apartheid. 84 This is both curious and disturbing, given Canada's engagement with Human Rights Watch reports on other countries, Trudeau's denunciation of settler violence towards Palestinians in the Jerusalem neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah in 2021, 85 and renewed Israeli military violence in Gaza in the two weeks following the report's release. 86
Meanwhile, the ongoing Nakba (or catastrophe) for Palestinians was tragically demonstrated by Israel's renewed attacks on Gaza in 2021, 87 and even more horrifically in 2023–2025. It is worth noting that in the months that followed October 2023, the Trudeau Liberals were slow to call for a ceasefire, and paused UNRWA funding for humanitarian aid for Palestinian refugees based solely on Israel's allegations that UNRWA employes were involved in the 7 October attacks. (It was subsequently restored, following an interim report on the matter.) 88 Trudeau also equivocated on the ICJ interim ruling on genocide, rejected the findings of the International Criminal Court (ICC) holding both Israeli and Hamas leaders responsible for war crimes, and pursued a murky path raising questions about how Canada might be militarily aiding Israel in the siege on Gaza. 89
It is true that Trudeau indicated that he would abide by the ICC ruling treating Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, as a war criminal. At the same time, however, the long reach of the Harper years remains visible in contemporary politics in Canada, and in the tenor of debate within the Conservative Party. For instance, Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre has attacked the decision to abide by the ICC ruling, indicating that he does not “recognize the legitimacy” of the international court, and that Netanyahu would be “welcomed as a friend” in Canada. Poilievre has also stated that he would remove any ban on weapons sales to Israel, and defund UNRWA and domestic institutions like Canadian universities and museums pursuing what he refers to as a “woke antisemitic agenda.” 90 While unclear exactly what he means by “woke,” let alone a “woke antisemitic agenda,” it might be reasonably inferred that this agenda has to do with defending Palestinian human rights and criticizing Israel's policies. In this sense, the Harper government's legacy regarding Israel/Palestine is proving to be remarkably tenacious within the Conservative Party, suggesting that, perhaps depending in part on the 2025 election outcome, Canada's foreign policy towards Israel will continue to be fused with domestic politics.
Significantly, Trudeau did not embrace warrior nationalism, and did not adopt blatantly one-sided discursive support for Israel. This is exemplified in the May 2018 call for an “immediate independent investigation” to identify the evidence for what Trudeau saw as an “inexcusable” use by Israel of “excessive force and live ammunition” in Gaza. 91 However, many other indicators remained unchanged from the Harper era. Despite Trump's pressure for a ceasefire prior to his inauguration in January 2025, a second US presidency of Donald Trump (2024–2028) promises intensifying threats to Palestinian rights by his suggestion of relocating Gazans to Egypt and Jordan, 92 even as Israel continues to reject and refuse to adhere to international law. An uneasy ceasefire forced a welcome pause in the genocidal attacks on Palestinians in Gaza in early 2025, but the context in the region and internationally remains no less threatening. All this suggests the continued significance of the Harper years in shaping the terrain of political discourse on Israel and Palestine in a direction that unwaveringly embraces Israel's state policies, and is complicit in the unmaking of Palestine, the continued denial of human rights to the Palestinian people, and in military and political actions widely identified as genocide.
Conclusion
In this article, we have examined Canada's foreign policy in relation to Israel, paying special attention to the period in which Stephen Harper was in power (2006–2015). This period marks a moment in which Canada's foreign policy became more fused with domestic policies, in what we have termed the Israelization of Canadian politics. The reach of the Harper years continued under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and while the tenor and discourse somewhat differed, significant elements suggest the ways in which Canada's foreign policy and support of Israel continue to intersect with domestic policy. With Trudeau, these included a rejection of civil society mobilizations in support of Palestinians, such as the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement, and an embrace of the controversial IHRA working definition of antisemitism in Canada's antiracism strategies for 2019–2022 and 2024–2028.
Overall, perhaps what is most remarkable about this period of foreign policy continuity is that it coincided with a decided escalation of violence in the region from 2023. Israel's responses in Gaza and the utter destruction of schools, universities, and hospitals, alongside the deaths and mutilating injuries of tens of thousands of civilians, raises profound ethical concerns. Israel's intent and actions will likely continue to be scrutinized by the ICJ and future historians in relation to the crime of genocide. This reality sits uneasily with Canada's stance of support for Israel in this period. This stance not only clashed with forms of vibrant civil society mobilization in Canada that challenged Israel's actions—most evident in spring and summer 2024 at universities across the country, when Palestine solidarity encampments were organized that were multiracial, multifaith, and multicultural in orientation. 93 It also clashed with Canada's long postwar tradition of supporting human rights.
Following Justin Trudeau's resignation, and a federal election in 2025, a new prime minister will enter office and Canada's foreign policy has the potential to be reset. This is all the more apparent given that Canada's postwar close bilateral trade relationship with the United States is facing an undoing through President Donald Trump's imposition of tariffs and threats on Canadian sovereignty. However, when it comes to the Middle East, all signs are that the state of Israel will continue to be supported in Ottawa and that the fusion of foreign and domestic policy will continue within both the Liberal and Conservative parties. This suggests that “standing with Israel” requires increasingly more ideological justification, if not coercion, for the Canadian public, as Palestinian rights continue to be denied well into the twenty-first century.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
For comments on an earlier draft of this paper we thank Reem Bahdi, Jeremy Wildeman, and this journal's anonymous reviewers, and for research assistance we thank Lois Moorcroft. This article is written equally and jointly by the authors who self-identify as Jewish (Bakan) and Palestinian (Abu-Laban).
Declaration of conflicting interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Government of Canada, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (grant number 435-2018-0931).
