India's Quest for Status and Neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine War: BRICS,a Case Study

Abstract

Employing BRICS as a case study, this paper argues that India's neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war is not influenced by its quest for status via BRICS because a souring of the India-Russia bilateral relationship will not affect India's quest for status through the BRICS. First, India and Russia have joined and co-developed BRICS to achieve their national and foreign policy goals such as great power status, challenging US hegemony and achieving a multipolar world order, reform of the liberal international order and Bretton Woods institutions and other objectives. Both countries have much to lose by allowing their problematic bilateral relationship to adversely impact the BRICS. Second, the BRICS is structured in such a way that its operating procedures/principles including consensus-based decision making and intentionally omitting controversial issues implies that bilateral problems between member states are not tabled and they do not make the group dysfunctional.

On 24 February 2022 Russia invaded Ukraine. The West, led by the US, has imposed a vast tranche of sanctions to coerce Russia to stop the war by crippling its war-making capabilities. According to French finance minister Bruno Le Maire, the aim of the sanctions is to “cause the collapse of the Russian economy.” ¹ As the war has continued, the US and its allies have introduced resolutions in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other organizations to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The US and its allies also called upon the developing world to condemn Moscow for invading Ukraine.

India has adopted a policy of “neutrality” towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine. New Delhi has neither condemned (nor condoned) Moscow for invading Ukraine, and it has not publicly identified Moscow as the instigator of the crisis. The Modi administration has not criticized Russia for invading Ukraine in international fora such as the UNSC, UNGA, and IAEA. The UN Human Rights Council, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other organizations have blamed Russian forces for war crimes and crimes against humanity such as torture, enforced disappearances, rape, summary executions, and other unlawful killings in Bucha and other towns and cities in Ukrainian territory occupied by Russian forces. ² India has condemned the atrocities in Bucha and other parts of Ukraine, but it has stopped short of blaming Moscow specifically, and has instead called for an independent investigation. ³

As part of its “neutral” strategy, New Delhi has called Moscow and Kiev to restore peace and end the war and human suffering through diplomatic means. In his phone calls with both President Vladimir Putin and President Volodmyr Zelensky, Prime Minister Nagendra Modi has called for restoring peace and for direct talks between Moscow and Kyiv to end the war through “dialogue and diplomacy,” and he has expressed concerns regarding the humanitarian crisis and suffering in Ukraine. ⁴ India's statements in the UNGA and in the UNSC have also repeatedly called for an “immediate cessation of violence and end to all hostilities…[as well as] an urgent ceasefire and ensuring safe passage for stranded civilians…emphasized to all member States of the UN that the global order is anchored on international law, UN Charter, and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of states.” ⁵

Additionally, unlike the US and its allies, New Delhi is unwilling to be a part of the sanction's regime against Russia. New Delhi's contention is that it respects and adheres to the UN charter and, hence, conforms only with sanctions imposed by the UN and not by any individual country or countries. Moreover, unlike the US and its allies, which have undertaken measures to reduce or eliminate fossil fuel imports from Russia, India has purchased Russian oil in increasing quantities at discounted prices since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war. This is again despite criticism from the West and warnings from the US to stop or reduce oil imports from Russia. ⁶ Moreover, on 7 December 2022, India's minister of external affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, stated that India will continue to purchase oil from Russia at a discounted price. ⁷

In its quest of becoming a “leading power” or great power, New Delhi wants to achieve the troika of economic development, security, and status. India has not publicly condemned Russia for invading Ukraine and has not called out Moscow as the aggressor because New Delhi believes Moscow is a very important strategic partner, one that is vital for India's rise. New Delhi believes that Moscow can play a significant role in enhancing the twin foreign policy pillars of security and status. ⁸

India's neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war is deeply influenced by its security pillar. The Indian military relies on Russian arms and weapon platforms, and this dependence will continue for decades to come. The Modi government is concerned that if it criticizes the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it might lead to a breakdown in bilateral and defence ties between the two countries, which would jeopardize India's national security. Additionally, New Delhi's position is also influenced by India's rivalries with China and Pakistan, two countries that New Delhi perceives as a direct threat to its national security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. With both Beijing and Islamabad seeking to strengthen ties with Moscow, New Delhi believes that criticizing Moscow's invasion of Ukraine would bolster Russia-China ties and push Moscow to establish strategic ties with Islamabad, which would be detrimental to Indian national security. ⁹

Regarding the status pillar, in the past, India has shied away from major power politics. ¹⁰ It was reluctant to categorically state its great power ambitions. ¹¹ However, under the Modi administration, India has embraced and enunciated its ambitions to be a leading power. It has sought to enhance its status through a strategy of networking or building social capital to climb the hierarchical ladder of contemporary international society. This social capital allows India to build networks, make connections, and build coalitions, and enhance its esteem and influence. During the twentieth century, it sought relationships with weak states, but in the new millennium, it seeks to enhance its relations with aspiring or existing major powers to elevate its status through multiple strategic partnerships. ¹²

This has manifested in India attaining positions in global and regional multilateral organizations. The former includes the G-20, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), and IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa). The latter includes the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Indian Ocean Rim Association, and the East Asia Summit. These groups elevate India's status by complementing the networks involving the major powers, aiding in political mobilization for membership in important institutions, ensuring that any policies adopted do not compromise India's interests, and building strategic connections pertaining to balance-of-power interests. ¹³

This paper seeks to illustrate whether India's neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war is also influenced by its quest for status. Russia aids India in enhancing its status regionally via the SCO and globally via BRICS. This paper examines the case of BRICS and argues that India's neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war is not influenced by its quest for status. Any issues in the India-Russia bilateral relationship will not affect India's quest for status through BRICS.

First, India and Russia have co-developed BRICS to achieve their national and foreign policy goals. It is not in the interest of both countries to allow their bilateral problems to make the group irrelevant and/or dysfunctional. Second, BRICS is structured in such a way that its operating procedures and principles hinge on consensus-based decision-making, and so omitting controversial issues means that problems between member states are not tabled and do not make the group dysfunctional. My paper also undertakes a case study of India-China rivalry and illustrates that the competition between the two “Asian giants” has not rendered BRICS dysfunctional or irrelevant because of group's structure and operating principles. Bilateral problems between the two countries are not discussed in the group, which instead focuses on cooperation and collaboration to achieve common goals. Thus, any bilateral squabbles between India and Russia would not render BRICS dysfunctional nor affect India's quest for status. The conclusion summarizes the argument and provides avenues for future research.

India's and Russia's rationale for BRICS

BRICS is an acronym for five leading or emerging economies and aspiring powers, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. While BRICS was initially perceived as a talking shop, it has transformed into an established and sustainable group with social and institutional connectedness through track one and two processes. ¹⁴ BRICS is now all-encompassing, with its countries cooperating and collaborating with each other in cultural, economic, education, security, and other domains, resulting in sectoral cooperation in more than thirty subject areas. ¹⁵

The influence of BRICS has increased in the first half of the twenty-first century, especially after the launch of the US$100 billion New Development Bank (NDB) in 2014 (perceived as a challenge to the Bretton Wood system and Western model of development) and the establishment of the Contingency Reserve Agreement (CRA) of US$100 billion in 2015 to help with the balance of payment crisis. BRICS has also launched initiatives such as the BRICS basket reserve currency, BRICS payment system, and BRICS Joint Statistical Publications. Due to the group's rising influence, BRICS is considered by some as the foremost geopolitical rival to the group of developed countries represented by the G-7. Numerous countries have expressed interest in joining and BRICS is considering expanding the group to include other developing countries.

Even before BRICS was coined by Goldman Sachs in 2001, its member states sought higher social status. Thus, the primary driver behind BRICS is status concerns, and these inform the foreign policies of its members. ¹⁶ As a forum that provides legitimacy and authority to its members, BRICS has enabled each member state to enhance its status globally as an emerging and dynamic power with significant economic attributes and the ability to play an important role in global affairs. It has also provided a significant degree of social recognition among established powers by presenting BRICS members as the next generation of great powers. ¹⁷

Apart from being a status club, BRICS has provided loans for infrastructure development to further advance the great power status of its members. ¹⁸ BRICS has also helped its members to achieve individual or joint national goals. For instance, BRICS has increased its members’ bargaining power by speaking in one voice vis-à-vis the G-20. At the 2009 summit, the G-20 leaders accepted most of the substantive recommendations proposed by the finance ministers of the BRICS member countries. Its collective voice allowed BRICS members to become “agenda setters,” leading to the 2010 quota reforms of the International Monetary Fund. ¹⁹ Therefore, BRICS countries present themselves as allies and cooperate with each other to achieve higher status.

India and Russia regard each other as valued friends and need each other to elevate their status through BRICS. India, Russia, and other BRICS countries are critical of the existing US-led Western liberal order that they consider as discriminatory. India, along with Russia and other BRICS countries, seeks a just, democratic, and multipolar world order, reform of international financial institutions, and a predictable, stable, and more diversified international economic system. ²⁰

India's interests and gains through BRICS

India believes that the existing world order adversely affects its socioeconomic development through discriminatory trade, climate, and nuclear regimes, and the UNSC. India has sought to promote norms that conform with its interests. ²¹ In light of this, New Delhi has unanimously welcomed membership in BRICS. It seeks reform of the international liberal order and a diversified monetary system. It is challenging the hegemony of the US dollar and has advocated that BRICS member states increasingly use their own currencies for intra-BRICS trade. As India's economy continues to expand, New Delhi is likely to continue to attach importance to BRICS and to enhance trade with BRICS member countries and ensure the stability of the group. ²²

BRICS helps to elevate India's status in global affairs. BRICS is perceived in India's democratic society as a means to enhance its status and has been accepted as such by the polity and the public. ²³ As an equitable multilateral group in an imperfect world where, often, might is right, BRICS allows India (and other member states) more visibility on the global stage. ²⁴ BRICS has increased India's status and bargaining power, with New Delhi willing to accept “no deal” rather than comprising to achieve a deal and perceiving compromise as a sign of “weakness and loss of respect or status.” ²⁵ India has gained considerably from BRICS because it has been placed in the same category as China, despite lagging behind China in terms of its material power and economic attributes. BRICS has been accepted in India because within it, New Delhi does not have to play second fiddle to Beijing. ²⁶

Additionally, China is the focal point for India's approach to its membership in the group. Although BRICS elevates India's status by helping to usher in a multipolar world, “India's approach is increasingly positioned as a response to China.” ²⁷ While China's strategic logic for participating in BRICS is to confront the US-led West, ²⁸ India aims to soft-balance against China within the group. ²⁹ New Delhi wants to ensure that Beijing does not dominate the institutional space of South-South cooperation. Beijing's outsized influence in BRICS directly challenges and undermines India's traditional position as the leader of the developing world or the Global South. As China's economic and military power has increased rapidly in the new millennium, this position has been threatened, with China's economy now more than five times the size of India's economy and its military expenditure more than three times greater than India's. ³⁰

New Delhi cannot afford to reduce its participation or quit BRICS or allow the group to become irrelevant due to worsening rivalries with China or any souring of bilateral ties with Russia (if India is publicly critical of Moscow's decision to invade Ukraine). Doing so would be committing hara-kiri. Not only would India forfeit its membership in BRICS, but it would also lose its ability to soft-balance against and tame the Chinese behemoth. India's strategy is to use international and regional institutions and organizations like the SCO, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, BRICS forum, and RIC framework to soft-balance against China and moderate China's hegemonic ambitions. ³¹ Thus, BRICS is an important and necessary institutional mechanism to moderate the Chinese juggernaut (but not the only one).

It is also not in India's interests to allow bilateral ties with other BRICS member states to negatively impact BRICS after investing in the co-creation and co-development of the group for more than seventeen years. ³² It is in India's interests to be part of BRICS because the group offers India (and other member states) benefits in multiple spheres by indirectly supporting domestic regime stability, boosting regional authority, providing flexible means of alignment in foreign policies, and protecting members from undesirable outside interference. ³³ Moreover, other member states also gain from India's membership in the group.

Not only are there strategic costs to an exit or a dysfunctional BRICS, but New Delhi has invested US$18 billion in the NDB and its contribution to the BRICS CRA is substantial. ³⁴ BRICS also allows India to attract Chinese investments and reduces India's dependence on a few lending and investment partners. BRICS through the NDB has invested significant sums in India. The NDB permits bilateral cooperation and assuages concerns of over relying on just one country. ³⁵ By 2020 the NDB had approved eighteen projects worth US$6.9 billion in India. ³⁶ In December 2020, New Delhi received a loan of US$1 billion from the NDB for “‘supporting India's economic recovery from COVID-19’ by supporting expenditures on rural infrastructure related to natural resource management and rural employment generation under [the] Government of India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS).” ³⁷ In January 2021, NDB and New Delhi signed an agreement for a loan of US$646 million to upgrade district and state highway networks in the state of Andhra Pradesh. ³⁸

Russia's interests and gains from BRICS

In 2006, Russia initiated the creation of BRICS. Moscow considers BRICS as “one of the most significant geopolitical events of the early twenty-first century.” ³⁹ Other scholars have called China and Russia the “father” and “mother” of BRICS respectively. ⁴⁰ BRICS is a key pillar of Russia's foreign policy because it helps Moscow to achieve its goals of “a multipolar world characterized by key principles of sovereign equality, independence, non-interference, and pluralism of political culture and civilizational behaviours.” ⁴¹ Russia wants to transform the BRICS from a forum “for coordinating positions on a limited number of issues into a full-fledged mechanism for strategic and current interaction.” ⁴² Hence, it is inconceivable for Russia to allow BRICS to become dysfunctional or irrelevant or to quit the group due to bilateral problems with one of its members.

As Russia's relations with the West have undergone a downward spiral in the new millennium, especially after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia's focus has been on increasing its economic ties with non-Western countries and reforming and/or transforming the liberal international order. BRICS not only elevates Russia's status, but also provides it the means to make the international financial and monetary system fairer, more effective, and more stable. Through BRICS, Russia seeks to increase the living standards of its citizens by diversifying its economy and undertaking innovative development and technological modernization. BRICS also allows Russia to jointly confront the West led by the US and reduce the negative impact of such a confrontation. The group also helps Moscow to strengthen its multi-vector foreign policy, develop and strengthen relations with BRICS member states, and broaden its cultural, linguistic, and informational presence in the world. ⁴³

BRICS also accepts regional spheres of influence, which is a key pillar of Russia's foreign policy. Russia perceives the “Near Abroad” or region comprising the countries in the former Soviet Union as its sphere of influence. The BRICS operating principles allow for the creation and acceptance of regional authority. Since the group's operating principles are designed to respect the national interests of its member states and not to discuss bilateral grievances while maintaining a non-Western identity, it enables the creation of regional backyards. The facilitation of regional spheres of influence is not an official target of BRICS, but is accepted through the group's formal and informal operating principles and mechanisms (discussed below). The group can support the regional positions of its member states due to their relative separation (barring India and China, which are regional rivals) and geographic spread. ⁴⁴ Although BRICS countries did not endorse Russia's occupation of Crimea, Moscow's actions were deemed legitimate because of Russia's key national security concerns arising out of revolutionary events occurring in Ukraine. Consequently, BRICS treated the Crimea issue as a Russian domestic issue and allowed Moscow to project power in its sphere of influence. ⁴⁵

BRICS has also prevented the international isolation of Russia, especially after the Russian annexation of Crime in 2014 and its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In March 2014, BRICS countries rejected Australia's suggestion that Russia should be excluded from the G-20 summit to be in held in Brisbane. Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop proposed that Putin should be barred from attending the G20 summit. However, the BRICS countries issued a joint statement expressing concerns over Bishop's comments and opposing any restrictions on Putin's participation. Western attempts to isolate Russia and sequester Putin had also been frustrated in 2014, when India, Brazil, and China abstained from a UNGA resolution that condemned Russia's policy in Ukraine. BRICS's official response called for a peaceful resolution of the situation through political dialogue. ⁴⁶ In accordance with their formal and informal operating mechanisms, BRICS countries have not criticized the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The member countries do oppose the Russian invasion as well as NATO's eastward expansion. They have provided Russia with breathing space by issuing a statement seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict. ⁴⁷ Therefore, it is in Russia's interests that its bilateral relations with India and other member states shall not compromise BRICS.

BRICS structure, coherence, and operating principles render bilateral squabbles meaningless

Pessimists have often cast doubts over the future of BRICS and predicted the demise of the group. Some have highlighted the asymmetries in power between the member states, with Russia and China eager to assume roles as great powers while the other three members have more limited ambitions. ⁴⁸ Scholars and analysts have highlighted the inability of the BRICS to compete with IBSA regarding reform of the UNSC, South-South cooperation, and steadfastness to democratic principles. Others have pointed to concerns such as slowing growth rates among the BRICS countries, the disconnect between BRICS and the needs of its member countries’ citizens, and political turmoil due to less BRICS-friendly administrations (for instance, the Bolsonaro administration in Brazil). ⁴⁹

BRICS is also not exempt from great power rivalry (a hallmark of the twenty-first century). This trend is characterized by increasing geopolitical competition between opposing powers such as the US and China, India and China, and the US and Russia (especially in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war), among others. Some scholars and analysts believe that the Russia-India-China security matrix, and especially the India-China rivalry, has prevented BRICS's institutionalization and is likely to lead to the group's demise. ⁵⁰

However, scholars have argued that these concerns and debates over whether BRICS is revisionist are unfounded and based on external parameters. Western-centric International Relations theories have found it difficult to comprehend cooperation among BRICS, considering its members’ diversity and conflicting interests. ⁵¹ BRICS has been described as an insignificant political alliance based on its members’ locations across continents and sometimes in “conflictive settings within their own region” ⁵² as well as their different economic and political systems. ⁵³ While these are valid characterizations, they miss some important dimensions; that is, they ignore the purpose, structure, and internal operating mechanisms of the BRICS grouping. ⁵⁴

The purpose of BRICS (and any other foreign policy group such as the SCO or ASEAN) is to maximize the common interests of the member states. Its operating principles have been designed to meet the needs and expectations of its members. Its core principles emphasize the formulation of a non-Western identity, endorsement of a multipolar world order, stress on classical sovereignty, proclivity for state-led processes, and avoidance of military alliances. The corresponding informal rules involve omitting discussions regarding domestic problems within countries or political opposition between members, avoiding criticism within the group, accepting other countries’ national interests, making decisions based on consensus, and providing a friendly and safe international environment for leaders of the BRICS countries. ⁵⁵

While the structure and grouping of BRICS is important, so too is the group's coherence and unity. Any internal divisions in the group and its ability to be a strong alliance are less relevant. The operating mechanisms of the group have been designed to manage internal tensions so that they do not weaken the group. ⁵⁶

The group enables member states to cooperate with each other despite different positions and weak or fragile bilateral ties. The group hosts more than one hundred meetings every year, including about two dozen at the ministerial level and track two processes. These meetings are technical and not political, with the aim of fostering continued coordination and cooperation among member states regarding issues such as global governance, reform of the global financial system and the World Trade Organization, and sustainable development goals, as well as attempts to increase intra-BRICS trade with the formation of the BRICS Business Council and similar alliances, which are important for developing countries. This has led to increasing cooperation between BRICS members and the launch of the BRICS STI Framework Programme (FP) at the 2016 BRICS summit in India. ⁵⁷ Since its launch, more than one hundred BRICS research projects have been funded and the STI FP has created a “truly BRICS scientific identity with more than 4000 research teams from five countries involved in the preparation of 1500 project proposals.” ⁵⁸ The STI FP has served the member states well on different occasions and will continue to do so in the future.

Since the group is a loose coalition of member states, “a loose policy forum is the better suited institutional framework.” ⁵⁹ This is not a sign of institutional deficiency but a deliberate design feature which ultimately adds more value to the group. The design reflects the divergent interests of the member states and their penchant for sovereign and independent foreign policy, and it gives members the freedom to pursue policies of multi-alignment in an increasing complex and multipolar world. Therefore, internal tensions do not render the group dysfunctional. Moreover, BRICS countries do not enjoy deeply shared values (such as democracy or human rights). There is also a limit to joint action and collectivist perspective because the group is a sum of the individual interests and preferences of its member states. ⁶⁰

BRICS wants to portray a harmonious appearance. Controversial and compromising issues which may lead to conflicts of interest or cross other member states’ “red lines” are not tabled or discussed in BRICS to prevent group paralysis. The group protects itself from unwanted external interference by following the general club principles of “consensus rule” and “critique taboo.” ⁶¹ Accordingly, BRICS decisions and actions are a result of general agreement rather than bargaining, compromise, or infighting over any one issue. ⁶²

For instance, controversial topics such as Kashmir, South China Sea, Crimea, and Ukraine are excluded from the BRICS agenda and not discussed. ⁶³ It would not be possible for BRICS countries to take a common position on these, and, moreover, BRICS's internal mechanisms do not force members to do so. ⁶⁴ Additionally, lack of discussion around a controversial issue is an advantage for BRICS because it recognizes regional spheres of influence in global politics and the high table in international affairs. ⁶⁵ Consequently, BRICS summit meetings and declarations have no place for open criticism of member states or for agenda items that may conflict with a member's national interests.

India-China rivalry and BRICS

India and China suffer from a “protracted, enduring, strategic, and positional rivalry.” ⁶⁶ Both countries were rivals even before India achieved independence in 1947. While China considered itself a great power and leader of Asia (because of its historical and civilizational past), it perceived India as a younger brother and lesser power. ⁶⁷ Tensions between India and China rose over Tibet and the disputed border in the 1950s, exacerbating the misperceptions and mistrust between the two Asian giants and leading in 1962 to a war between the two countries in which India was defeated. This further aggravated the rivalry and mistrust between the two countries. Since 1947, India and China have competed for influence over developing countries, especially countries in Africa. The rivalry has also manifested itself over India's permanent membership with veto power within the UNSC and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, with China unwilling to endorse India's candidature. ⁶⁸

In the twenty-first century, as China's comprehensive national power has increased, it has sought regional hegemony in Asia. Under the aegis of President Xi Jinping's “China Dream” of national rejuvenation, China now has ambitions to become the predominant global power by 2049. It seeks a unipolar Asia with China at the helm, and a multipolar world order with China as one of the poles. On the other hand, India seeks a multipolar Asia and a multipolar world with India as one of the poles. ⁶⁹ To counter-balance a rising, aggressive, and assertive China, India has increasingly aligned itself with the US, as Beijing tries to surpass Washington to become the preeminent global power. ⁷⁰

Border tensions between India and China are also on the rise due to the influence of nationalist leaders in both countries, with skirmishes occurring in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2017. Both Modi and Xi have taken a hawkish stance on their country's respective territorial disputes and are unwilling to compromise on their respective territorial claims. The two nuclear-armed Asian giants were on the brink of war during the Doklam/Donglang standoff in 2017. Further vitiating bilateral ties was the ongoing standoff since May 2020 along the disputed border in Eastern Ladakh, which resulted in fisticuffs and injuries on both sides, and the June 2020 Galwan Valley crisis, which led to casualties on both sides after more than four and a half decades of relative peace. India perceives China as its number one enemy and primary security threat. New Delhi has reactivated the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) comprising the US, Japan, Australia, and India, aligning itself closer with the US. Beijing perceives the Quad as an “Asian NATO” or an “arc of democracies” aimed at containing China's rise, which has further exacerbated the rivalry. ⁷¹

New Delhi has also strengthened diplomatic, defence, and strategic ties with countries such as Australia, Japan, Vietnam, and other East Asian countries wary of a rising China. Due to India's expanding involvement in the Indo-Pacific, the epicentre of US-China rivalry, New Delhi's place in Beijing's strategic calculus has evolved. The bonhomie between India and the US has intensified India-China rivalries, with China perceiving that India views the strategic competition and souring bilateral ties between China and the US as an opportunity to strengthen its position and barraging power with respect to China. Consequently, China has strengthened its strategic partnership with Pakistan. ⁷² As China becomes closer to Pakistan, India becomes closer to the US and Japan, enveloping the two countries in a vicious circle and leading to increasing mistrust between India and China and deterioration in their bilateral relationship, with the two countries suffering from a persistent security dilemma. ⁷³

BRICS has not become dysfunctional despite India-China rivalry and border clashes

Since its inception, BRIC(S) has been insulated by India-China rivalry. India-China animosity has not rendered BRICS paralyzed or dysfunctional or irrelevant, even during tense periods in bilateral ties between the two countries, such as the border skirmishes of the 2010s and the ongoing standoff in Eastern Ladakh. ⁷⁴

In June 2017, tensions along the India-China border intensified when Indian troops stopped Chinese troops from constructing a road in the disputed Doklam/Donglang area at the tri-junction of Bhutan, India, and China. The standoff, which lasted for seventy-two days, cast a dark shadow over the BRICS summit which was set to be held in September 2017 in Xiamen, China. The approaching summit put pressure on the two sides to present to the public the expected picture of harmonious emerging world leaders. If Modi's visit to China was cancelled due to the border conflict, BRICS would have suffered irreparable damage. However, if Modi were to attend the BRICS summit with the conflict ongoing, that would undermine the group's carefully crafted image of harmony and cause its consensus-based approach to be questioned. The upcoming BRICS summit in Xiamen thus served as an instrument of conflict containment, as both sides agreed to withdraw from the disputed area. ⁷⁵ The current border standoff in Eastern Ladakh and the 2020 Galwan Valley clash have also left untouched both BRICS and its processes, meetings, and summits. Despite the security dilemma and mistrust after the Galwan Valley clash, the two sides did not allow the tensions to affect BRICS processes, and the summit was held in November 2020.

The 2020 BRICS summit was chaired by Russia. If there was any tendency towards fragmentation and dissolution, these might have emerged in the security sector, but this was not the case. The theme of that year's summit was “BRICS Partnership for Global Stability, Shared Security and Innovative Growth,” with members adopting the first official BRICS document, the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Strategy. This move highlighted the desire of BRICS member states to strengthen cooperation, as the document emphasizes non-interference in the internal affairs and national sovereignty of member states, and thus continues its internal operating principle of smooth relations amongst the BRICS grouping. ⁷⁶

The 2021 BRICS summit, chaired by India, and the 2022 summit, chaired by China, have also been held without interruption or mention of the ongoing rivalry and border standoff. China and India are in opposition, with China wanting to establish hegemony in Asia and India wanting to contain China's influence. Both countries would like to have their positions accepted at the international stage, but the best solution for BRICS is to omit the disputed border issue from its summits and meetings. ⁷⁷

Since BRICS wants to depict a harmonious group of rising powers, conflicts between member states are not discussed within the group. It also does not make any statements with respect to such conflicts. Therefore, India-China border disputes and bilateral problems are not discussed in BRICS and the group will not take an official position on those or other issues between member states. This pattern has been systematic and stable since BRICS's inception. Both India and China are aware that discussion(s) regarding their bilateral relationship and disputed border would be against the operational principles of the group and have no bearing on the business of its more than one hundred meetings throughout the year. ⁷⁸

Additionally, BRICS is not a strategic alliance, and a defence pact or security policy between the member states is not desirable, in part because of the India-China rivalry. The group's ambitions are also moderate. Hence, the consequences of the border dispute and broader India-China rivalry are less dramatic and can be managed easily. Were BRICS a strategic alliance, the group would become dysfunctional in the wake of a conflict or war between two of its member states. ⁷⁹

Therefore, India-China disputes and the ongoing border standoff did not merit discussion in the group's meeting and subsequent summits. This troublesome bilateral issue, like other difficult issues, is considered outside the scope of BRICS. Similarly, the souring of India-Russia bilateral ties will find no place for discussion in BRICS, nor will it adversely impact the group. Hence, disputes between India and Russia will not affect India's quest for status at the global level via the BRICS forum, and India's neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war is not influenced by its quest for status via BRICS.

Conclusion

Maintaining a neutral position vis-à-vis the Russia-Ukraine war, India has not publicly criticized Russia for invading Ukraine and has abstained from resolutions critical of Russia in international organizations such as the UN and IAEA. Unlike the US and its allies, India has refused to impose sanctions against Russia. New Delhi has also purchased oil at discounted prices from Russia, whereas US and the European Union have tried to reduce their dependence on Russian fossil fuel imports by imposing restrictions or import bans.

Prior research has highlighted that India's neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war is influenced by its concerns regarding India-Russia bilateral ties. New Delhi is apprehensive that its public criticism of the Russian invasion of Ukraine will sour India-Russia bilateral relations and impact the security pillar of its foreign policy goal of becoming a leading power. This paper has examined whether India's neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war is also influenced by New Delhi's quest for status, because Russia helps elevate New Delhi's status globally through the BRICS forum and regionally through the SCO. By examining BRICS's operating principles, this paper shows that India's neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war is not influenced by its pursuit of status, for two reasons. First, both India and Russia need BRICS to achieve their great power aims and to challenge US hegemony and achieve a multipolar world order, as well as reform of the liberal international order and Bretton Woods institutions, a more diversified, stable, and equitable economic and financial system, and development objectives. Both countries have much to lose by allowing their bilateral relations to negatively impact the work of the BRICS forum.

Second, the group's structure, coherence, and unity is underlined by its formal and informal operating principles which disallow the discussion of bilateral relations or disputes between member states. BRICS wants to present a picture of a harmonious group of rising powers and will not criticize member states or discuss controversial issues which impact their members’ national interests. BRICS operates on a consensus principle and is unwilling to take a position on an issue if one of its member countries does not agree. Moreover, evidence indicates that India-China tensions have not adversely impacted the group. On the contrary, the formal and informal principles have forced the two countries to refrain from discussing their issues and the two countries have cooperated on common goals and objectives within BRICS.

Further research needs to be undertaken to determine what factors have influenced the BRICS countries’ unwillingness to publicly criticize the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Similarly, research should also be undertaken to determine the unwillingness of the “BRICS plus” or prospective BRICS countries to be critical of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Research should also be undertaken to examine whether India's quest for status at the regional level through the SCO has influenced New Delhi's decision to remain neutral in the Russia-Ukraine war. Similar research can/should also be undertaken with respect to other SCO member countries.