A policy change tightened job search requirements regarding geographical mobility for unemployment insurance–benefit recipients in Germany. Those affected by the policy change were individuals without family ties and whose reemployment prospects were low in their home labor market region. The author finds that after one year the policy change led to a 4.6 percentage point increase in employment among women without children who lived in regions with relatively high unemployment. Women responded to the policy change by taking up jobs in their home labor market region as well as outside of that region. The author does not find any effects of the tightened mobility requirements for men.
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