Economists have contributed important theoretical and empirical findings to the study of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, but a deliberate study of the effect of UI taxation’s unique structure remains undone. We summarize available evidence on UI taxation, describe the history and institutions of experience rating, and outline important lines of inquiry for future work. As unemployment has risen, so has the need for a body of policy-relevant knowledge about the function and financing of UI systems.
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