Which choice will a player make if he can make one of two choices in which his own payoffs are equal, but his rival’s payoffs are not equal, that is, one with a large payoff for his rival and the other with a small payoff for his rival? This paper introduces non-altruistic equilibria for normal-form games and extensive-form non-altruistic equilibria for extensive-form games as equilibrium concepts of non-cooperative games by discussing such a problem and examines the connections between their equilibrium concepts and Nash and subgame perfect equilibria that are important and frequently encountered equilibrium concepts.
RusinowskaA. (2002). Refinements of Nash equilibria in view of jealous or friendly behavior of players. International Game Theory Review, 4, 281–299.
17.
SeltenR. (1965). Spieltheoretische behandlung eines oligopolmodells mit nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 12, 301–324.
18.
SeltenR. (1975). Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. International Journal of Game Theory, 4, 25–55.
19.
van DammeE. (1984). A relationship between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games. International Journal of Game Theory, 13, 1–13.
