This study aims to investigate the regional impact of the sanctions imposed by the West on the Russian Federation. To this end, we used two samples to estimate the determinants of bilateral trade. The first dataset belongs to ex-Soviet countries between 1992 and 2019, and the second dataset expands it with bilateral trade data relating to China, Iran and Turkey. The results reveal that there are structural differences between the two samples regarding the determinants of the bilateral trade flows and sanctions that have spillover effects in the region. We also projected our findings to the recent events.
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