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Abstract

In this study, we explore the various ways online fraudsters define money through an analysis of posts on fraud-centered message boards located on the dark web forum Dread. Our examination of over 4,000 posts from 2019 to 2024 finds that online fraudsters view money in several conceptually distinct ways: as easy, difficult, tangible, initial, and risky. We add to understanding of the multifaceted character of digital money and the ways offenders define money. We discuss implications of these findings for models of decision-making, such as deterrence and rational choice. We also provide suggestions for policy-makers and practitioners to better catch or deter the individuals committing online fraud.

Keywords

online fraud money fraud meanings of money

From ancient civilizations to modern societies, individuals, or “fraudsters,” have long used deception to steal information or money from victims (Levi, 2006; Sandywell, 2013). Following the introduction of the internet in the late 20th century, enterprising fraudsters moved their scams online. Each year, the various forms of online fraud perpetrated by these offenders (e.g., online romance scams, cyber-sextortion, and phishing) are estimated to cost individuals and businesses billions of dollars (Federal Trade Commission Center, 2023). In 2020 and 2021, over 450,000 individuals were victimized through scams such as phishing, online non-payment/non-delivery, extortion, and investment schemes and reported annual losses exceeding $2 billion as a result (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2022). Owing to losses such as these, online fraud is considered to be the foremost threat to e-commerce (Cross, 2019; Jotwani & Dutta, 2016; Maimon et al., 2019). Furthermore, the toll on victims extends beyond financial losses; studies have documented significant emotional, psychological, and practical challenges faced by victims of online fraud (Cross, 2018a; Drew & Webster, 2024; J. Wang et al., 2024). Publication findings from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Identity Theft Supplement reveal the pervasive risk of victimization, underscoring the need for enhanced victim support services and broader public awareness (Harrell, 2024).

Both offline and online fraudsters are motivated by financial reward (Chen et al., 2021; Hernandez et al., 2018; Maimon et al., 2023; Ogunleye et al., 2019; Teitcher et al., 2015). Nonetheless, most studies of online fraud treat the financial gains obtained by fraudsters as a uniform construct (Junger et al., 2020; Levi, 2017; S. Y. K. Wang & Huang, 2011). That is, they assume online fraudsters strictly view this money as a medium of exchange and do not give it qualitative meaning.

Economic sociological studies suggest people assign diverse meanings to money rather than view it as homogenous and interchangeable (Soman & Ahn, 2011; V. A. Zelizer, 2011). They categorize money based on its source or intended purpose (Thaler, 1985; V. A. Zelizer, 2011) and base their behavior and decisions on this categorization (Chong et al., 2021; Noll & Weick, 2015; V. Zelizer, 2005). For instance, individuals may treat money from windfalls (e.g., lottery winnings) differently from earned income, leading to distinct spending behaviors (Gartman, 1991; V. A. Zelizer, 2011). Recent criminological studies demonstrate that offenders driven by financial motives also perceive money in different ways. They view money as essential for solving problems, as guilt free or belonging to them, or as easily obtained and disposable (Dickinson, Topalli and Wright, 2023).

While this research argues that people in general, and offenders in particular, give different meanings to money and guide their actions with these meanings, criminologists have yet to explore whether and how offenders operating in online contexts may do likewise. In the present study, we fill this gap by investigating the different ways a group of online fraudsters view money. To do so, we thematically analyze over 4,200 posts on several boards centered on fraud located in the dark web forum Dread.

We begin by discussing extant literature examining the meanings of money before describing online fraud and dark web forums. After detailing our data and methods, we discuss the ways the online fraudsters who posted to this particular forum qualitatively define money. We demonstrate how they see money as easy, difficult, initial, tangible, and risky. We end with implications of our findings for understanding of money among criminals operating in cyberspace and for theories of decision-making such as rational choice and deterrence.

The Meanings of Money

Money is traditionally considered as “a universal yardstick against which to measure and evaluate the universe of objects, relations, services, and persons” (Mauer, 2006, p. 16). In other words, because money is treated as fungible, it is used to represent disparate items or actions. It is this quality, for example, that allows us to compare the values of activities like farming apples with those that are radically different like calculating insurance risk. While early social theorists (e.g., Simmel, 1907/1991; Weber, 1920/1978) highlighted how this characteristic of money abstracted and thus loosened the bonds between individuals and social groups, they did not consider whether money itself could carry different symbolic meanings (Dodd, 2016; Gilbert, 2005).

Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, scholars argued against this traditional view of money as a homogenous and universally interchangeable construct. Rather, people define money in accordance with where they obtained it or who or what they may spend it on (Dodd, 2005; V. A. Zelizer, 2011). V. A. Zelizer (2011), for instance, argues that people give money meaning by “earmarking” it or designating it for specific purposes (see also, Thaler, 1985). Zelizer argues that when people set aside some money for bills but dedicate other money for recreation or other purposes (e.g., gifts) they impute meaning to it. Although the money involved is objectively the same, that which is designated for bills is subjectively viewed as inappropriate to spend on a night out at the movies; that which is saved for a gift is reluctantly spent on car repairs. Hence, the meanings people give to money are important because these meanings guide their money-related decisions and actions (see also, Chong et al., 2021; Noll & Weick, 2015).

The meanings people give to money also shape and are shaped by their social relations. V. A. Zelizer (2011) describes how individuals reaffirm their identities as good parents to themselves and their children by earmarking money as college savings. Here parents distinguish some money as savings because they are trying to fulfill the role expectations attached to their relationships with their children (i.e., being a “good parent”). Defining money in this way then also confirms their identities as good parents in their children’s eyes. Thus, the ways people define money can influence how they see themselves and how they are seen in the eyes of others.

Such meanings are learned through socialization (Dodd, 2016; V. A. Zelizer, 2011). This socialization is grounded in structural and socio-historical conditions. Lamont (1992), for example, highlights how the relatively underdeveloped welfare state in the United States (i.e., a lack of universal health and childcare, access to higher education, etc.) has differentially shaped the meanings American upper-middle class men impute to money in contrast to similarly affluent French men. Lamont argues that because Americans must pay for such needs, having the money to do so is seen as an indicator of status and success.

Because structural and socio-historical conditions are dynamic, so are the meanings of money. V. A. Zelizer’s (2011) work highlights how, as money entered the domestic sphere in the twentieth century, people distinguished money in new ways, invented new forms of currency, and “marked distinct categories of social relations. . .by means of distinct categories of monetary transfers” (p. 138). Of specific importance to the present study, Zelizer (2011) suggests the proliferation of digital currency or, in her words, “electronic money” throughout society in modern times will likewise result in people distinguishing money in different ways.

Delaney (2012) argues that the ways people earn money also play a key role in their understandings of money. More specifically, Delaney argues that the manner in which people are paid, what they do on the job, and the role of money in these jobs all shape how people view money and their identities in relation to it. Consider salespeople. Successful sales often, if not always, require that salespeople “sell themselves” or present themselves in such a way that clients like and trust them. Because of this, they view money earned through sales as representative of how much they have worked and how much they are trusted (Delaney, 2012, p. 87).

Not all work is legal, however. Criminologists have highlighted how earning money through illicit means also shapes how offenders give it meaning. In a study of young, male Muslim drug dealers in Germany, Bucerius (2014) notes how these young men distinguish drug money as haram para or “dirty money” (p. 134). This then guides their decisions on what they do with it. Because it is dirty, they do not spend it on “honorable things” like their families (Bucerius, 2014, p. 135).

Likewise, in a study exploring the meanings of money among armed robbers, Dickinson and colleagues (2023) argue these offenders define money in a variety of ways that influence their offending. They are motivated to commit robbery by seeing money as essential to their survival. Following robberies, they define money as easy and guilt-free, which attenuates their sense of the work or risk involved in future robberies. When they have cash in hand from robberies, they treat it as fast money—or money to be spent with reckless abandon—except in the case of credit cards, which they distinguish as too time-consuming and risky to use.

Thus, extant research has demonstrated that non-offenders and offenders alike give different meanings to money. It has also shown that these meanings play important roles in shaping offenders’ decisions and attendant behavior. What is less understood, however, is whether and how offenders operating in online contexts define money. Specifically, no research to our knowledge has yet explored whether and how online fraudsters who deal in digital money give various meanings to it.

Online Fraud

Fraud is woven into human history. In ancient Rome, for example, emperors and politicians used fraudulent practices to maintain power and influence (Lintott, 2023). As financial markets expanded with the dawn of the industrial age, fraudsters gained new opportunities involving complex financial instruments. These included infamous scams such as the Spanish Prisoner in the early 19th century (Gillespie, 2017) and the Ponzi scheme in the early 20th century (Carey & Webb, 2017). The rise of computing technology and the internet, however, has enabled fraudsters to access and target potential victims on a global scale (Cross, 2019). Fraud¹ facilitated by the internet, or online fraud, is defined as “the experience of an individual who has responded through the use of the internet to a dishonest invitation, request, notification or offer by providing personal information or money which has led to. . . a financial or non-financial loss of some kind” (Cross, 2019).

Online fraud takes on many forms, including auto-fraud scams, online dating/romance scams, extortion scams, auction scams, and phishing (T. Cole, 2022; Lee et al., 2023; Maimon et al., 2023; F. Wang & Topalli, 2023). These various forms of fraud result in staggering financial costs for nations as well as individual victims. Moreover, the impact extends beyond monetary harm. Victims of online fraud often endure emotional distress, feelings of violation, and long-lasting disruptions to their lives (Cross, 2018b; Drew & Webster, 2024). This is particularly the case when fraudsters enact their scams by impersonating romantic figures and exploiting victims’ emotions (i.e., online romance scams; R. Cole, 2024; Sorell & Whitty, 2019). These consequences highlight the importance of addressing victimization as an integral part of understanding the broader implications of fraud.

Studies of online fraud have explored the important role of financial reward in fraud (Dickinson, Wang and Maimon, 2023; Ghazi-Tehrani and Pontell, 2021; Barnor et al., 2020; L. M. J. Bekkers & Leukfeldt, 2023; Mikhaylov & Frank, 2016). In a study on online romance fraudsters, Dickinson and colleagues (2023) investigated how these offenders’ deceptive behaviors varied in response to different levels of monetary rewards. Similarly, Ghazi-Tehrani and Pontell (2021) found that online fraudsters deployed multiple phishing scenarios primarily driven by financial incentives, with customer compliance and cooperative attitudes playing crucial roles in the success of these schemes. Importantly, to justify their motivations for financial rewards, Barnor et al. (2020) observed that fraudsters employ a wide range of neutralization techniques to deny victimization and rationalize their fraudulent behavior. Lastly, online fraudsters’ pursuit of financial gain is evidenced by their increased involvement in earning virtual currency and cashing out illicitly obtained funds through the utilization of money mules—individuals who allow their bank accounts to be use for illicit money laundering—and virtual casinos (L. M. J. Bekkers & Leukfeldt, 2023; Mikhaylov & Frank, 2016).

The financial rewards of online fraud have also been highlighted through their comparison with its perceived costs. Objectively, cybercrimes are often treated as less serious than offline crimes by law enforcement and the public with few of its perpetrators ever seeing justice in America and the United Kingdom (Button et al., 2022; Cross et al., 2021; Handa & Ansari, 2022). This is partially driven by legal frameworks, such as the UK’s Computer Misuse Act of 1990, that treat computer crimes with lighter penalties than comparable offline crimes.

Subjectively, offenders and the public at large attenuate the costs of online fraud by seeing such crimes as “victimless” or having negligible impact, particularly when victims are corporations or the wealthy (e.g., Sarfi et al., 2023). Such detachment from real-world consequences reduces the psychological barriers to committing these crimes. Research on online offenders more broadly has also noted that some of the characteristics of online interaction can similarly shape how these offenders view the costs of their crimes. Specifically, the anonymity provided by the internet can attenuate offenders’ sense of cost by reducing their perceptions of the likelihood of being detected by law enforcement (e.g., Cunliffe et al., 2017; Decary-Hetu et al., 2016). Fraudsters who recruit money mules through social media draw on these objective and subjective attenuations of risk, as well as potential mules’ ignorance of legal consequences, to inflate the perceived rewards of laundering money vis-à-vis their costs (L. M. Bekkers et al., 2022).

These studies show that online fraudsters, like those operating offline (see Cressey, 1973), are motivated by financial need. While they have made important in-roads into understanding of the modus operandi, decision-making, and cost/benefit calculi of online fraudsters, all treat the financial rewards of fraud as the same. At the very least, they do not consider whether fraudsters view money obtained through their crimes in different ways. In the present study, we address this gap in the literature by analyzing data from a dark web chat forum centered on online fraud.

Online Chat Forums

In addition to giving fraudsters access to large numbers of potential targets and extra methods by which to rip them off, the internet also provides a setting wherein fraudsters can communicate and work with each other on a large scale. Specifically, throughout the clear web and the dark web (i.e., the portion of the internet intentionally inaccessible to traditional web browsers, such as Mozilla Firefox or Google Chrome), fraudsters connect with each other on online forums. These forums serve as hubs where fraudsters engage in discussions, conduct transactions, and exchange knowledge about illegal products and services. They also facilitate large-scale criminal endeavors, like for-profit spam, by allowing fraudsters to break these endeavors down into manageable tasks to be tackled by disparate parties (Chua et al., 2007; Dupont et al., 2017). Online fraudsters are not unique regarding their use of online forums, as there are forums dedicated to a variety of licit and illicit activities, including payments, gaming, credit cards, accounts, and merchandise (e.g., Bermudez-Villalva & Stringhini, 2021; E.R. Leukfeldt et al., 2017; Motoyama et al., 2011). Notably, however, forums centered on fraud (and those focused on carding and hacking) attract the largest numbers of active participants (e.g., Yip et al., 2013).

Scholars from various fields, including criminology, have analyzed data collected from various online forums to explore a wide variety of crime-related topics. For example, prior research has used forum data to explore offenders’ social networks (e.g., Motoyama et al., 2011; Pastrana et al., 2018; Yip et al., 2013), transactional characteristics (e.g., Bermudez-Villalva & Stringhini, 2021; Haslebacher et al., 2017), organizational structure (Afroz et al., 2013; Lusthaus, 2019), and forum content (e.g., Fang et al., 2019; Haslebacher et al., 2017; McAlaney et al., 2020). It has also used forum data to explore interactions among offenders (e.g., Overdorf et al., 2018; Q. Wang et al., 2021) and their perceptions of the risks associated with online forums (Bada & Chua, 2021; Benjamin et al., 2016; Biswas et al., 2022).

Hence, online forums provide an ideal source of data for the exploration of the worlds of online offenders. In particular, because forum users discuss various aspects of online offending (e.g., target selection, risk management, and financial rewards) that may have monetary aspects, such forums may also provide an ideal source of data concerning the ways online offenders discuss money. We therefore inform the present study with messages posted on several boards focused on fraud on the dark web forum Dread. We now turn to a description of these data and our methodology.

Data and Methods

As described earlier, the present study draws from data collected from the dark web forum Dread. Dread is one of the most renowned and active forums on the dark web (Jones, 2024; Kiel, 2019). It serves as a hub for discussions on various topics, particularly focusing on privacy, security, and anonymity. Users on Dread often share information and resources related to cryptocurrencies, encryption, and software tools designed to enhance online privacy. Notably, forums on Dread cover a range of controversial and sensitive subjects, including illegal activities. This is in large part due to Dread’s reputation as a relatively secure platform featuring strong encryption and decentralized hosting that helps those on it avoid detection by authorities (Tor links, 2023). This makes it a valuable resource for researchers seeking to gather firsthand qualitative conversational datasets.

To collect data from Dread we drew from a dataset collected and provided by the Cambridge Cybersecurity Center (CCC). This dataset includes detailed information about the types of subforums, the threads within these subforums, the anonymous names of group members, the content of their posts, and all associated details such as posting time, date, and more. To access the data for inclusion in our sample, we utilized “Postcog” a restricted webpage created by the CCC for the purpose of easing researcher access to the wealth of forum data the group collected in SQL format. Postcog is a user-friendly interface that allows parties with access to perform searches through all the CCC collected data. It also allows users to narrow down their searches by forum (e.g., Hack Forums, Garage for Hackers, The Hub, and Stressor Forums), specific forum boards (e.g., Coders, Beginner Hacking, and Bragging Rights), forum language, post intent (e.g., moderate, gratitude, and aggression), post type (e.g., offerX, exchange, and comment), crime type (e.g., DDoS, VPN, access to systems, and bots/malware), and date range. Postcog can also provide forum statistics and categorizes general themes in each forum (Pete et al., 2022).

For our analysis, we sampled all posts on the boards “fraud,” “fraudulence,” and “fraudresources” on Dread from 2019-01-01 to 2024-01-01. Only forum posts in English were included in the sample. We selected this timeframe because it was the most recent 5 years of data available at the time of analysis. This sampling procedure netted 8745 posts. Posts ranged from a few words to several paragraphs in length. The posts covered a wide range of topics but almost all focused on different aspects of fraud.

It should be noted that our entire study design was deemed exempt from Institutional Review Board (IRB) review by the IRB at both the University of Texas at Arlington and the University of Alabama because the data consist of deidentified secondary data (i.e., it was not collected directly from human subjects). Specifically, while the data are comprised of online posts about actual crimes by individuals ostensibly involved them, the CCC removed all personally identifying information from the data (e.g., original email addresses, etc.) prior to making it available for our analysis. As additional ethical safeguards, we also (1) stored the data analyzed on an encrypted cloud drive; (2) did not share data outside the research team; and (3) substituted randomly generated pseudonyms for all the subjects quoted in the findings.

Analysis of these data proceeded as follows. To begin, the first author performed an initial analysis comparing the content of over 2,000 posts. The posts were then separated into broad, general categories on the basis of similarities and dissimilarities in their content (see Spradley, 1979, pp. 173–184 for a description of this type of thematic analysis). For instance, posts discussing the money needed to begin online fraud were distinguished from posts concerning the difficulties associated with earning money or converting it into spendable cash. Over the course of this analysis, emergent examples of universal themes regarding the ways the fraudsters defined money were compared with subsequent cases in the sample (see, e.g., Maruna, 2001). When themes were unsupported or contrasted by subsequent cases they were reexamined and, if necessary, discarded or refined. The second author then analyzed a subset of these data using the same steps. Both authors then compared their analyses. This comparison did not result in any differences (i.e., both authors distinguished the same broad categories).

In the second stage of the analysis, the first author then performed the same procedure on the next 2,200 posts. No new broad thematic categories were identified in this procedure. Both authors then worked in tandem during the third stage of analysis by separating the broad categories identified in the first stage into smaller, more narrowly defined subcategories on the basis of similarities and dissimilarities (Spradley, 1979). All themes identified in this process were labeled and conceptualized through discussion and agreement between both authors. For instance, the broad category “money being associated with difficulty” was separated into money requiring skill or knowledge to obtain (i.e., “difficult money”) and money that was difficult to turn into spendable currency (i.e., “tangible money”).

Findings

Our analysis of the forum posts reveals that the individuals posting about online fraud do not discuss money obtained from fraud as a fungible construct but instead view it in multiple, overlapping ways. They view it as easy or fast because they consider it easily obtained. Conversely, they also view it as difficult because of the skills required to obtain it. Moreover, the fraudsters also see the money needed to initiate fraud—initial money—as different from that earned from it. In addition to seeing fraudulent gains as easy and difficult, they view the gains they turn into cash as different because of the process required to “cash out.” Finally, they view stolen credit cards in physical form as distinct from other forms of stolen capital owing to the heightened risk that accompanies their use.

Easy/Fast Money

The first way the fraudsters defined money taken through fraud was by referring to as its easy money or, in other words, money that required a minimum of time or effort to obtain. Some made statements referring to it as “quick cash” (Tr1x²) or wrote that “bank fraud [was]³ most certainly. . .easy money” (N1ght0WL). Others did so by comparing fraudulent gains to money gotten through legal means. WYV3RN wrote, “Ten ways that would give 5$ to 20$ working 6 hours a day legally and many illegal ways to earn hundreds or even thousands of dollars per day.” Another echoed this, stating, “you can make way more money with fraud than earning quick cash on street” (Blade0202).

These referrals to easy money were most common among those fraudsters who were new to online fraud or who were in urgent financial need. They would refer to monetary gains from fraud as easy when asking for advice or help from others on the forum to get this money. Angrygrrl stated, “Hi everyone, Hail Satan, I need someone to show me an easy way to earn some money, I am broke AF.” Another (PrimaDonna) stated, “Without going into too much detail, I got into some shit and need to get my hands on some cash. . .if there’s someone here willing to share a guide to reliably and quickly cash out, I would be. . .grateful.”

Hence, much like how some people view lottery or gambling winnings as different than other money because they are easily had (V. A. Zelizer, 2011), these fraudsters’ comments suggest that, because they view fraud as easy, they view the money to be had from it in a similar fashion. This also suggests that they view it as different than money obtained through other means. Despite some of the fraudsters defining fraud money as easy, throughout the forum posts it was also evident that many of the other fraudsters also saw this money in a contrary way: as difficult money.

Difficult Money

That some of the fraudsters viewed fraudulent gains as difficult was suggested in several ways. This sometimes involved the fraudsters making direct statements disabusing “noobs” (cybercrime novices; in this case, fraudsters) of the notion that such money was easily obtained. Some, like Neur0515, told such noobs to “change this attitude.” HamHam stated, “fast and easy [money]–> there is no such thing. . .instant money is not possible.” As Question13 put it, “Doing any sort of fraud takes work and balls its not a cake walk like people think.” Badshrub spoke from personal experience: “Thought this shit would be easy and soon realized it wasn’t as expected.”

For these fraudsters, money from fraud differed from other money because it was something that represented learned skills. That is, to get such money, one had to use a varied set of complex skills that took time and dedication to learn. Cashout89 put it succinctly, “Remember that making money takes time and effort.” First, the fraudsters stressed, one had to learn the technique or “method” of a specific type of fraud. Yellowbird wrote, “The best way to make money from fraud is to pick one type (there are so many: carding, check, cpn, fullz exploitation, etc⁴), learn as much as you can about it and try stuff out for yourself.” These “methods,” Cashout89 explained, are “taken from experience.”

A key part of these methods was how to avoid getting caught by law enforcement. Referring to this, PrimaDonna wrote:

Carding, loans, checks, making transfers. Figure out the right opsec [operational security] you need to keep yourself safe and from there figure out how to get the resources to pull off that job. Figure out what documents they need and how to source them without it leading back to you.

Another part was how to avoid getting scammed by other fraudsters (see also, T. Cole, 2022). As SonicH3X warned, “Rippers/scammers. . .will pretend its all easy then get you[r] money and vanish.” This involved being able to discern scams from “legit fraud tricks” (UncleCharlie). The importance of this came across when many of them made a point of sharing this knowledge with others. For instance, Blueduck stated, “Don’t rely on reviews on any market for making purchase. That shit can be made up. As for Paypal transfers, I tend not to trust them. They are almost always scams. SO I would be very careful dealing.” Interestingly, Witch3R wrote “WU [Western Union] is a scam, beware. The only transfers that work is paypal.”

Thus, while some fraudsters defined the money gained from fraud as easy because they perceived it as easily obtained, others viewed it contrarily. Because it was difficult to obtain, they saw it as different than money acquired in other ways. It instead represented their time, dedication, and knowledge. This is conceptually similar to the ways that others differentiate money earned through working from that gained through unexpected windfalls such as lottery winnings (see V. A. Zelizer, 2011). The only difference here being that the “work” put in by fraudsters is illegitimate in nature (see Fagan & Freeman, 1999; Matsueda et al., 1992 on crime as work).

In defining money gained through fraud as easy and difficult, the fraudsters demonstrate that they give varying meanings to money. Moreover, for those whose views of money change as they gain more knowledge and experience, these meanings can shift over the course of their offending careers. In addition to these considerations of money, the fraudsters’ forum posts also suggested that they also further distinguish money earned through fraud. Money still in digital form was difficult, but turning this money into a form they could spend—tangible money—was more difficult still.

Tangible Money

According to the fraudsters’ posts, a crucial step in fraud is converting stolen digital currency into money they can use or “tangible currency” (Molit8). Tangible money, in the words of GraceJeans, is “actual cash in hand without any trace to yourself.” This money is thus conceptually similar to money that has been “laundered” by other types of offenders operating in online and offline contexts in attempts to hide its illicit origins and facilitate its use in the licit economy (see Berry et al., 2023). The fraudsters considered such money similar to difficult money in that it required a specific set of skills to acquire. Throughout their posts, however, they indicated that they viewed this money as conceptually distinct in a few key ways.

First, although many of the fraudsters had obtained difficult money, not all were able to convert this money in its digital form into cash. Molit8 was one of these:

I have a large supply of CVVs from some of the wealthiest zip codes in America. I have a huge amount of fullz and bank acct info. Also have a large amount of physical cards needing last 4 to activate. . .I know and have been implementing standard security and operational procedures but have had little success converting what I have into tangible currency.

Voodoosnail had similar problems with establishing a bank account by which to convert his funds:

I have a bunch of bank drops but they are all seriously compromised in some way (ie, nursed out of my own bank account, applied from my home network) not out of lack of awareness just out of lack of resources. Im trying to plan out my transition to actually usable accounts.

Second, perhaps because of the additional skills required to obtain tangible money, the fraudsters reserved a term for it they did not use when referring to stolen funds in general: cash. In fact, the process of turning stolen funds into tangible currency was commonly referred to as “cashing out” (see also, Gundur et al., 2021) Finally, that the fraudsters consistently referred to cashing out as a process of conversion outright indicates that they saw tangible money as different. Put simply, they saw this money as different because it had been changed from what it was before.

Initial Money

According to the fraudsters’ posts, obtaining money through fraud not only requires time and skill but also another distinct type of money: “initial money” (Cflinch). For instance, they explained that novice fraudsters needed an initial financial investment to learn fraud. PantherPants05 explained, “Finding good [methods] and step by step [instructions] may cost you money, as mentors are not free.” Himz33 echoed this, stating, “Loan fraud is not a beginner’s game. . .Get yourself a good mentor if you can find one, and no, it will not be for free. It will cost dollars.”

The fraudsters also noted that money is needed to purchase the hardware, software, services, and other items needed to pull off a fraud. ButcherBoy detailed such expenses. “You’ll be looking at about $15-30/month for registrations for the services described,” he stated. “Grab a netbook for your burner laptop, about $100. Shop around for VPNs, roughly $30/year. Fulls are usually between $4-11/each. Estimated Startup Cost = $200.” The fraudsters’ comments suggested they saw this initial money as different than difficult money or tangible money—money they could earn through fraud—because they acquired it in more laborious ways, such as a legitimate job or selling drugs offline. These varied but, importantly, never involved the more skill-based forms of online fraud. Cflinch offered this advice on how to get initial money. “Trying getting a minimum wage job and use your first check,” they stated. “If you can’t get a job for some reason look into other avenues to get some initial money. Try financial domination/ewhoring or selling drugs.” Bankfiend, on the other hand, provided step-by-step instructions:

Create or buy fullz [fake identities]. . .Create a[n] Uber Eats driver account and you just repeat with more fullz. . .I had 10 or so accounts. . .once you get the accounts verified. . .you start deliveries ride your bike or walk to pickup food. . .but never deliver it use the app and say there was a problem they will give u the minimal 5 dollars for picking up. . .do this around 10 times before they catch on and flag the account make sure u use instant cash out via card after every two deliveries so they dont hold your funds. . .this is valuable because you are getting around 50 or more before they close the account and say u have 10 accounts easy money real fast that you can use to reinvest in bigger schemes.

The fraudsters also indicated they saw initial money as different than other types of money by emphasizing that it was that which they spent on knowledge and materials lost when refining their skills. Cashout89 wrote, “took me about 12,000 dollars, 2 years and so many failures before it[fraud] clicked.” Whydixon stated, “You will spend almost as much as you lost in fraud learning how to do it.” Qxxd echoed these statements, writing, “It could be anywhere from 750 to 5,000 before you see success.”

Thus, the fraudsters viewed initial money differently than other types of money because it was a means to an end: larger amounts of money that took skill to obtain. It was also viewed differently because it was money dedicated to this purpose. Money saved or devoted to other purposes was instead seen as something else. In the words of B3h3moth, it was “scared money.” And unlike initial money, scared money “don’t make no money.”

Risky Money

As previously discussed, many of the fraudsters defined the money from fraud as difficult because of the skills they had to learn to obtain it. In addition to this, they also viewed some types of money they or others could potentially earn from fraud in a different way: as risky money. More specifically, the fraudsters’ posts suggested they viewed some money as more likely to lead detection and arrest by police. For instance, Brisky3 wrote about how money earned through laundering money for other criminals—or from being a “money mule”—was more likely to lead to fraudsters’ arrest: “You wanna know why money mules get paid 30-40%? Because you will eventually go to prison once they [law enforcement] connect you to the money.”

By and large, however, the fraudsters primarily referred to physical credit cards as risky money. Referring to a stolen card, Gimmesock5 emphatically stated, “It’s gonna get reported as missing and you’re gonna use it and potentially get caught.” PathoGYN echoed this, stating that in dealing with stolen credit cards “you may get fucked because its physical someone gonna report that shit lol.” Because they saw this money in this way—and thus as different—they were less likely to pursue it and would often discourage others from doing so as well. Unknowncardz did so in a blunt and vulgar manner. In responding to another fraudsters’ posted question about what to do with a stolen credit card, they said, “PUT THAT CARD INTO YOUR MOM’S VAGINA, best thing you can do with it NO offense.”

Although physical credit cards are often regarded as equivalent or interchangeable with other forms of currency, such as printed banknotes (i.e., “cash”) in real-world settings or digital representations of state-issued currency in online contexts (i.e., “digital money”)—both of which can be used to purchase goods or services (Bergman et al., 2008; Scholnick et al., 2008)—the fraudsters we studied perceive them differently. To these individuals, credit cards are not treated as a straightforward form of currency because they carry a heightened level of risk. In digital spaces, this distinction becomes even more pronounced, as the concept of “cash” in these contexts often refers to something immediately tangible and accessible, such as physical currency or direct digital transfers. Similar to how armed robbers in prior studies (e.g., Dickinson, Topalli and Wright, 2023; Nguyen et al., 2023) treat cash differently from other assets, these fraudsters tend to avoid using credit cards when possible, reflecting their complicated risk assessment in both digital and physical domains.

Discussion

Online fraud is a crime residing at the intersection of technology and human behavior that proliferates through fraudsters sharing illicit knowledge on online forums. Our study adds to prior work examining the communication methods and evasive tactics of fraudsters on these forums by exploring whether and how online fraudsters give different meanings to money. Through our analysis of Dread fraud forums, we find that online fraudsters define money in a variety of ways. Noobs see fraudulent proceeds as “easy money” or easily attainable. Contrarily, experienced fraudsters view it as “difficult money” because of the skills required to successfully obtain it. They also view money taken from victims in digital formats as different than “tangible money” or money that can be easily spent. Additionally, fraudsters distinguish the proceeds from fraud from money needed to successfully undertake fraud or “initial money.” Finally, although all fraudsters recognize that defrauding others is inherently risky, they view some money obtained in this way—physical credit cards—as even more risky to use.

V. A. Zelizer (2011, pp. 146–147) argued some time ago that despite “first impressions that electronic money. . .[is] an absolutely impersonal and uniform medium” it would instead “facilitate a wild multiplication of differentiations” as it proliferated throughout society. Our findings support this argument by demonstrating that online fraudsters distinguish digital money in a variety of ways. Zelizer speculated that such distinctions would be based on who issues digital money (e.g., private institutions vs. banks) or “programmed. . .restrictions” (p. 147) on how it could be used. Building on the arguments of Delaney (2012) regarding the influence of work on money’s meanings, we illustrate that the meanings given to digital money are also derived from the processes by which people make it, even if through illicit means.

Recall that V. A. Zelizer (2011) also argued that the meanings imputed to money are socially constructed and also shape social relations. Here we find that these same processes occur even when money is in digital form. This was suggested in the ways the fraudsters spoke of easy money versus difficult money or tangible money. More specifically, the fraudsters’ comments suggest they learn about the difficulty of obtaining money through fraud from personal experience or through reading the posts of other, more knowledgeable fraudsters. Hence, in the latter case, the meanings fraudsters give to fraud money are derived from social sources. Moreover, the fraudsters who spoke of difficult money often did so by positioning themselves, and their knowledge of the difficulties inherent in getting this money, as distinct from noobs or the individuals who thought such money was easy. In short, in defining money as difficult they defined who they were—experts who could get this money—in relation to others who were less knowledgeable. Thus, our findings support Zelizer’s arguments that the meanings of digital money (at least among online fraudsters) are socially derived and can influence social relations.

As previously stated, some of the characteristics of online interaction have been argued to shape online offenders’ perceptions of the potential costs of their crimes by deflating their sense of risk (see Cunliffe et al., 2017; Decary-Hetu et al., 2016). Our study adds to this literature by noting that the unique characteristics of online fraud versus its real-world counterpart may also inflate fraudsters’ views of cost as well. Specifically, our findings that online fraudsters define some money from online fraud as difficult to obtain or to cash out owing to the challenges required to obtain it can also be read as them defining this money as more costly to obtain. Hence, while the online context may reduce some perceived risks, it may simultaneously increase others.

Like armed robbers (see Dickinson, Topalli and Wright, 2023), online fraudsters see physical credit cards as different than other types of money because cards are riskier to use. Unlike armed robbers, however, the money online fraudsters steal from victims cannot be used unless it undergoes an additional process—cashing out. Hence, online fraudsters must contend with delayed gratification. Prior studies (Flessert & Beran, 2022; Willard-Kyle, 2023) have demonstrated that delayed gratification can increase rationality among individuals (e.g., among mobs) by forcing them to consider long-term benefits rather than short-term impulses or desires when making decisions (Campana, 2011; J. B. Jacobs, 2020). Because the online fraudsters in our study sometimes reinvest stolen digital money in learning new techniques and acquiring materials thought to improve their chances at pulling off frauds (i.e., they use it as initial money), this suggests this is the case among these offenders as well.

Recall how the armed robbers studied by Dickinson and colleagues (2023) identify cash taken from victims as “fast money.” They therefore spend it quickly on frivolities. In doing so, they deplete their resources and return themselves to financial desperation which, in turn, promotes their continued involvement in armed robbery. While our study suggests that the delayed gratification inherent in online fraud shapes fraudsters’ actions by encouraging them to reinvest digital money as initial money, what it cannot answer is whether and how it affects their continued involvement in online fraud. For example, given the increased difficulty in obtaining tangible money, how do online romance fraudsters treat money once they have it in hand? Is it this treatment that promotes their continued involvement in online fraud? If not, what shapes the etiological cycle of their offending? These are important questions that need be addressed in future research.

Our findings also contribute to current understanding of rational choice and deterrence frameworks of decision-making as they apply to online fraud. Extant literature exploring rational choice and deterrence has primarily focused on how offenders’ decisions are influenced by their perceptions of risks or costs (e.g., Akers et al., 1979; Ekland-Olson et al., 1984; B. A. Jacobs, 1993, 2010; B. A. Jacobs & Cerbonneau, 2014; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). A smaller body of literature has also examined how perceived reward, and particularly money, can also guide offenders’ decisions (e.g., Piliavin et al., 1986). This latter body of work typically conceptualizes money as a fungible, objective construct (e.g., Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Nguyen et al., 2022; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Uggen & Thompson 2003). Here we add to this prior literature by demonstrating that the financial rewards of a crime can vary in meaning to offenders over the course of their offenses (see also Dickinson, Topalli and Wright, 2023). Moreover, we also highlight that among online fraudsters the financial rewards of crime can be conflated with other psychic rewards.

Prior research has argued that oftentimes offenders will consider their ability to successfully accomplish an instrumental crime (i.e., one committed with the intent to obtain money or goods) as part of its reward. This has been noted among various types of offline and online offenders, including burglars (Bennett & Wright, 1984), persons convicted of property and violent crime (Brezina & Topalli, 2012), criminal telemarketers (Shover et al., 2003), and methamphetamine “cooks” (Deitzer et al., 2022). We add to this literature by demonstrating that this also occurs among online fraudsters. Recall how the fraudsters in our study defined money from fraud as difficult. Also recall how when doing so they contrasted themselves and this view of money against fraudsters who were less adept or skilled than themselves who viewed fraudulent proceeds as easy. If considered through the lens of the well-established literature on symbolic boundaries (see Lamont & Molnár, 2002), this suggests that these fraudsters position themselves as superior to noobs in doing so. This, in turn, may bolster their positive group and self-identities and thus act as a psychic reward. Hence, if models of decision-making of online fraud are to be fully specified, they need to conceptualize the rewards of this crime as multifarious—they are not just money, but various types of money as well as feelings of self-efficacy.

Policy Implications

Our findings that online fraudsters define some money as tangible or risky has important implications for policymakers and practitioners developing strategies intended to stymie or thwart online fraud. Recall how the fraudsters in our study referred to some of the difficulties in turning digital money into tangible hinging on their (in)abilities to access legitimate bank drops, complete identity verification processes, and acquire phone lines necessary to complete transactions. It is at these stages of online fraud that financial institutions, phone services, and law enforcement may have the best opportunity to disrupt this crime. For example, both financial institutions and phone services (particularly physical stores) could implement stricter identity verification procedures and enhance monitoring of transactions with security cameras and personal surveillance. Law enforcement agents should also be educated about the steps involved in cashing out so as they can focus their intervention efforts therein.

If institutions, services, and law enforcement focused their efforts on disrupting the cashing out process they could decrease fraudsters’ abilities to reap the rewards of their crimes. If this was done on a large scale, knowledge of it would surely be shared on forums such as Dread. This, in turn, could then increase perceptions of the difficulties in turning stolen digital money into cash among individuals considering fraud (including noobs and seasoned professionals). If fraudsters see the rewards of fraud as difficult when weighed against its risks and required effort, this may then discourage them from undertaking fraud in the first place and thus reduce the soaring rates of victimization.

The individual and communal definitions of money for cybercriminals are areas for further exploration. Understanding the cognitive and social use of money can inform more effective law enforcement strategies. In particular, the delayed gratification highlighted in our study suggests that some fraudsters might view their activities as a form of entrepreneurial endeavor. This perspective could inform the development of targeted interventions that address the underlying psychological drivers of fraud, such as greed or financial desperation. Examining the discussions and peer influences within online fraud communities can reveal how definitions and norms around money are transmitted or reinforced among fraudsters. Interventions that attempt to alter the perceived norms around online fraud should aim to reduce its prevalence and appeal.

Limitations

Like all research, the findings from our study should be considered in light of the limitations of our research design. First, because our study utilizes a sample drawn exclusively from fraud-based forums on Dread it may suffer in terms of its generalizability. That is, it is possible that fraudsters who communicate using other platforms or forums or those who do not communicate with others at all may differ significantly from those in our sample. Hence, it is possible that other fraudsters define money in different ways than those comprising our findings. While Dread is the most popular forum for this content and is likely to provide representative insights into the attitudes of a specific (and largely English-speaking) subset of online fraud offenders, the data may not be representative of the broader global population of cybercriminals. We do believe that there is likely to be similarity here as white-collar crimes tend to be uniformly distributed globally and will manifest differently due to varying economic structures (Karstedt, 2001).

Second, prior research has demonstrated that fraudsters may make exaggerated or false claims on online forums (Cassiman, 2019; Gold, 2011; Holt et al., 2012; Howell & Burruss, 2020; Lazarus, 2018). If this is the case among the fraudsters in our sample, this may call into question the validity of our findings. Nonetheless, despite these limitations our study makes important strides in illuminating the ways one group of online fraudsters define money and the roles these definitions play in their offending.

Finally, as the forum posts from the fraudsters we studied were ostensibly centered on discussions of fraud targeting traditional state-backed money, our findings may be limited to only describing the varying ways fraudsters define money in this financial system rather than other more novel financial systems such as those characterized by the exchange of cryptocurrency (see Gundur et al., 2021 for a thorough discussion of various financial systems targeted by cybercriminals). Recent research exploring online fraud occurring in such financial systems has noted how these systems both promote and are supported by a “cryptoculture”—or a subculture “designed to attract individuals into purchasing and holding cryptocurrencies” (Dulisse et al., 2024a, p. 1; see also, Dulisse et al., 2024b; Holt & Cross, 2024). Questions remain as to whether and how participating in such financial systems and the subcultures created and maintained by them may influence the way people define money. For instance, one aspect of this subculture is the pressure to make risky investments in cryptocurrency. Taking such risks is then seen as a sign of prestige among subcultural members (Dulisse et al., 2024a). Perhaps this leads to these individuals, including fraudsters, to define cryptocurrency as a symbol of respect and daring. Future research should focus on exploring this question as well as how the other distinct characteristics of these financial systems, such as blockchain technology, may influence fraudsters’ definitions and perceptions of money in novel and unique ways and thus shape their offending decisions.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Fangzhou Wang

Timothy Dickinson

Notes

Author Biographies

Fangzhou Wang, PhD, is an assistant professor at the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Texas at Arlington. Dr. Wang’s research specializes in analyzing the behaviors and linguistic strategies employed by online romance fraudsters. Dr. Wang’s work also focuses on identifying the risk factors and protective mechanisms related to victimization in online romance scams. Furthermore, her research also delves into the study of image-based violence within digital environments.

Timothy Dickinson is an assistant professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Alabama. His work focuses on exploring how various elements influence the decisions, actions, and identities of persons involved in criminal activity.

Adam Ghazi-Tehrani is an assistant professor in the Criminology and Criminal Justice department (with specializations in cyber-crime and white-collar crime) at Indiana University Bloomington . Adam holds a BA from the University of California at Davis, an MS from the California State University at Long Beach, and both MA and PhD degrees from the University of California at Irvine. He is interested in regulatory, compliance, governmental, and societal factors on cyber and white-collar offenses.

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Not All Money Is the Same: The Meanings of Money in Online Fraud

Abstract

Keywords

The Meanings of Money

Online Fraud

Online Chat Forums

Data and Methods

Findings

Easy/Fast Money

Difficult Money

Tangible Money

Initial Money

Risky Money

Discussion

Policy Implications

Limitations

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

ORCID iDs

Notes

Author Biographies

References