Recent experiments show that offender decision making is characterized by the use of cognitive heuristics. Questions remain about what this means for deterrence research and policy. I argue that the primary task is to identify ways to leverage decision-making biases to reduce crime. I outline three avenues for future research on deterrence, and discuss their relevance for crime policy. To illustrate these lines of inquiry and stimulate additional studies, I provide initial experimental results for each topic. I report evidence that (a) pseudocertainty publicity can increase perceived arrest risk and deterrent fear, (b) the availability heuristic can help explain how target characteristics affect situational perceptions of crime benefits and costs, and (c) individuals experience declining sensitivity to increases in sanction severity.
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