Abstract
This article zooms in on the pre-conditions on the citizens’ level for deeper Nordic cooperation on civil defence matters. Historical ties, Nordic security cooperation, high-trusting citizens and the fact that all five Nordic states now are members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) speak in favour of increased cooperation on civil defence. Still, the experiences from the Covid-19 pandemic with different strategies, diverging policies and closed borders, as well as heated exchanges of views, provide us with contradicting expectations. Based on a unique dataset with over 11,000 Nordic respondents, we address these mixed expectations and study the trust of the Nordic citizens in both their respective government’s civil defence preparedness and the citizens’ preferences regarding Nordic and other forms of international cooperation in this area. The results show a significant variation of trust in the civil preparedness of national governments (Finland highest trust, Sweden lowest trust). The variation returns in the desire for deeper international cooperation with considerably lower level of support for enhanced Nordic cooperation among the Danish respondents and strong support for such cooperation among the Finns, Norwegians and Swedes. Hence, our results indicate a potential for enhanced cooperation among some Nordics, but not all.
Introduction
The Nordic countries have for some time been moving towards deepened cooperation on ‘civil defence’. Cooperation on such non-military defence matters has, however, developed in differentiated forms with sometimes an all-five approach to cooperation, but at other times in bilateral or trilateral settings. Pre-conditions for deeper Nordic cooperation on civil defence matters have further improved due to the institutionalization of the so-called Haga process, aiming at cooperation on emergency preparedness, civil security and crisis management, and by the fact that all five Nordic countries now are members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which encompasses civil defence cooperation in the form of the so-called baseline requirements along with its military dimensions.
Another arguably important precondition strengthening the prospects for Nordic cooperation on civil (and military) defence matters are the high levels of interpersonal as well as institutional trust across the Nordics. The Nordic states all have among the highest levels of interpersonal trust in the world (WVS, 2024). With high levels of interpersonal trust, preconditions for social cohesion are improved, transaction costs are lowered (since trusting citizens can move forward with different agreements without complicated negotiations) and compromises are facilitated. This high level of interpersonal trust is therefore often referred to as a ‘Nordic gold’ (Andreasson, 2017; Holmberg and Rothstein, 2020). In addition, and related, to high levels of interpersonal trust, the Nordic citizens also tend to have high levels of trust in public institutions (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2024), presumably reflecting effective government services and perceived low levels of corruption. All of the five Nordic states can thus be characterized as high-trusting societies, both on an interpersonal and an institutional level.
Adding the long-shared history, close political cooperation with open borders, similar political systems and shared political values, one would expect the high levels of interpersonal and institutional trust in the individual Nordic countries to spill over into trust between the Nordic neighbours, in turn facilitating transnational cooperation of various sorts. In line with such expectations, Nordic cooperation has advanced quite far since World War II, including a passport union and an open labour market since 1958 (Heinikoski and Hyttinen, 2021). The Finnish (2023) and Swedish (2024) membership in NATO has resulted in an increased convergence of security policies within the Nordic group, which can be expected to facilitate increased trust among the Nordics.
Still, when the Covid 19-pandemic hit the world, the Nordic states soon chose different strategies with Sweden emphasizing recommendations and keeping society open, while the other Nordic countries followed the international trend of closing down, resulting in closed borders within the Nordic region (Christensen et al., 2023). The public debate during the pandemic also displayed quite heated exchanges of views among both public officials and citizens (Heinikoski and Hyttinen, 2021), reflecting a possible decline in cross-border trust among the Nordics. This situation provides us with mixed expectations, with most favourable preconditions for deeper cooperation in terms of history and institutional arrangements within and between the Nordic countries, but with experiences from the Covid 19-pandemic pointing in another direction.
In this article we address these mixed expectations when we turn to the trust of the Nordic citizens in both their respective government’s civil defence preparedness (including issues about civil security, civil protection and crisis management) and the citizens’ preferences regarding Nordic and other forms of international cooperation in this area.
Studying public perceptions is motivated by the central link between public opinion and policy outcomes in democratic societies (Burstein, 2003; Wlezien and Soroka, 2009 see also Ahrens, 2024 for a recent overview). Public opinion ultimately matters because it translates into election outcomes, but it can also influence individual policy choices, especially in salient policy issues (Ciuk and Yost, 2016). In the security and defence field of interest here, the decisions of the Finnish and Swedish governments to abandon non-alignment and apply for NATO membership are good cases in point (for an analysis of the Finnish case, see Pesu and Iso-Markku, 2024, see also Michalski et al., 2024 for a comparative analysis the Finnish and Swedish cases). But public opinion also matters for the legitimacy of policy choices made and, by implication, for the willingness of the public to accept and respect political decisions and legal regulation as well as make sacrifices for society. The deteriorating security situation in recent years has led the Nordic governments to redirect both military and civil defence policy, effectively demanding more of its citizens. Against this background it becomes imperative to investigate public opinion about both national preconditions and Nordic cooperation. In this article we focus on civil defence, while acknowledging the integrated approach to security and defence of all the Nordic countries (see further below).
Our empirical study rests on a unique dataset based on surveys we have carried out in all of the five Nordic countries, with the same set of questions. More specifically, these data allow us to compare attitudes across the Nordic region concerning trust in the national government regarding civil defence, different actors’ responsibilities in this policy area, severity of a range of societal threats and the desire for enhanced Nordic and other international cooperation about civil defence matters.
Based on our data, we thus answer two sets of research questions concerning patterns of similarities and differences across the Nordic countries:
To what extent do Nordic citizens trust their own national government’s preparedness in the area of civil defence, and how do they perceive the distribution of responsibilities in this area, and severity of different potential threats to society?
To what extent do Nordic citizens perceive a need for deeper international cooperation in the area of civil defence? Specifically, to what extent is Nordic cooperation preferred?
We now proceed by outlining our empirical expectations based on theories on interpersonal and institutional trust, and international cooperation, specifically joint crisis management. Thereafter, we contextualize our empirical study by elaborating competing expectations about Nordic public opinion, after which follows a section on methodology and data. Our analysis then presents the results of the surveys centred around issues of trust, responsibility, threat perceptions and international cooperation. In the final section, we summarize and problematize our findings and relate them to the general question of prospects for Nordic cooperation on civil defence matters including joint crisis management.
Interpersonal trust, institutional trust and international cooperation
The theoretical framework for this study revolves around the relationship between interpersonal trust, institutional trust and international cooperation. As a phenomenon, trust can be conceptualized in a number of different ways, for instance, as a rational approach to other individuals or to institutions based on risk calculation, from a constructivist perspective as a social phenomenon based on shared norms and values, and as a psychological mechanism involving pre-existing beliefs, cognitive biases and so on (for application in IR scholarship, see Ruzicka and Ketaing, 2015; further Haukkala et al., 2018). In this article, we primarily draw on rationalist and psychological approaches in conceptualizing interpersonal as well as institutional trust.
Two key propositions inform our analysis. As hinted above, in terms of referent object, scholarship on trust falls into two main analytical categories – interpersonal and institutional trust. A key assumption is that there is a positive correlation between interpersonal and institutional trust. Societies with high levels of interpersonal trust are expected to also display high levels of citizen’s trust in their government’s capacity for delivering essential services, for instance, non-military aspects of defence, as well as managing crises.
We also posit that interpersonal trust is transnational in nature, to the effect that there is a positive correlation between trusting people in the home country and people in other countries. In consequence, this would mean that citizens in high-trusting societies are more open to international contacts, such as institutional cooperation.
Both of these propositions warrant a deeper conceptualization of key components of the argument. Interpersonal trust refers to the disposition that in a situation of dependence, other people will not exploit or harm you but rather honour promises made. In a relational perspective, without being certain of the outcome, trusting parties pursue interaction in the conviction that the confidence will not be exploited. Interpersonal (and institutional) trust can be conceptualized as a cognitive mechanism that reduces uncertainty in a context of incomplete information. It thus works as a means for facilitating agreements and exchanges of various forms (Cook and Santana, 2017; Holmberg and Rothstein, 2020; Newton et al., 2017; Uslaner, 2017).This conceptualization of interpersonal trust is intimately related to discussions on social capital (Putnam, 1993).
Institutional trust, on the other hand, can be understood as ‘the extent to which individuals accept and perceive institutions as benevolent, competent, reliable, and responsible toward citizens’ (Spadaro et al., 2020: 3). As such, it forms the basis of the ‘social contract’. In this perspective, institutional trust is an individual’s subjective perception of the performance of institutional actors (public and private collective actors, etc.). The level of institutional trust is important for the legitimacy of the actors concerned, in turn related to the willingness of the public to comply with regulations and to take on responsibilities and make sacrifices for society (Esaiasson et al., 2020: 9–10; Spadaro et al., 2020: 2). To an extent, institutional trust is based on prior experiences. If the citizens are not familiar with the decision makers and the actual institutions, they are less likely to be able to evaluate the degree of benevolence, competence and reliability of the respective institution. This leads to a decreased ability to hold the decision-makers of the institution responsible.
Existing research gives no clear-cut answers as to the causal relationship between the two forms of trust; evidence points in different directions, reflecting that there are most likely also other variables at play. For our purposes, however, it suffices to note that most research points to a positive correlation between the two, albeit unclear how strong (Newton et al., 2017). It leads us to expect that in societies with high levels of interpersonal trust, there is also high level of trust in institutions, and vice versa.
Turning to the relationship between trust and international cooperation, the conceptualizations of trust above imply that international cooperation is facilitated by high levels of trust (see, for instance, Haukkala et al., 2018; Ruzicka and Ketaing, 2015). In parallel to the role of trust in domestic societies, high level of trust contributes to lower transaction costs in exchanges of various sorts, a lubricant that fosters agreement in the face of uncertainty. The literature on joint crisis management, which has repeatedly included arguments for joint crisis management as a way to deal with cross-border threats (cf. Bynander and Nohrstedt, 2020; Kornprobst, 2019; Kuipers et al., 2015), can help us conceptualize the relationship further. Building institutions for joint crisis management is surrounded by challenges, not least the ability to build trust between states. These challenges are rooted in variations in fundamental characteristics of the participating states, like variation in identity, administrative traditions, institutional affiliation and societal norms. Blondin and Boin (2020) suggested that chances of a joint crisis response improve if the group of participating states is small, if there are symmetric and evenly distributed threat perceptions, if it is not possible for the involved states to escape the threat and finally, if the involved states already share a certain degree of historical interaction aiming at crisis preparation.
These contributing factors relate to the ability to build trust between the involved states. With lower coordination costs, trust is more likely to flourish, especially in a small group. If the involved states share the same threat perceptions, and the threat is likely to be present for the foreseeable future, their incentives for developing cooperation to address the threat increases. More importantly, in relation to trust, this shared threat perception forms the basis for a shared worldview and therefore the ability to understand each other (cf. Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). Finally, shared experiences of interaction are likely to build trust in so far as these experiences have resulted in a positive outcome and it has proven possible to cooperate. To sum up, these factors are likely to strengthen ‘the belief held by state officials, that specific others are likely to be trustworthy, that is willing and able to reciprocate cooperation in the future’ (Elhardt, 2015, see also Kydd, 2005).
Still, it is one thing to build trust between states represented by political elites, and another thing to build trust among citizens of these states. Since the political elites of states cooperating in a given policy area interact and share experiences on a regular basis, they are more likely to build trust among themselves and in joint political institutions (Checkel, 2005; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). However, compared to elites, preconditions for citizens to build interpersonal trust with citizens of other states are less conducive since they interact less often and share experiences to a lower degree. It is thus an open question if trust between elites from different states is reflected in trust between citizens of these states.
The challenges to build institutional trust, on the national level but even more so on the international level, run the risk of blocking institution building or make it less feasible over time. In conclusion, while trust among elites is likely to be a necessary condition in order for a policy initiative to be taken in the first place, citizens’ trust in institutions is not a necessary condition for a political initiative to create a new institution but it is a key contributing factor in order to increase the feasibility of the institution over time (cf. Michalski et al., 2024). Hence, severe lack of institutional trust among the citizens inhibits institutionalized cooperation.
We have so far discussed the challenges of joint crisis management and the challenges of building trust in such institutional initiatives. Still, there are reasons to also point out that in situations when national policy measures/crisis management institutions fail, international collaboration for joint crisis management can be a sought-after alternative. After all, many crises are truly cross-border in character and the capacity of national institutions to deal with such crises is limited, which may create citizen demand for joint crisis management. In the European Union (EU) context, for instance, a recent survey from Eurobarometer shows that 90% of the EU citizens see a need for coordinated EU response to disasters in the EU and other countries (with all Nordic EU members above the EU average, see European Commission 2024).
For a variety of reasons, including experience of national agencies in the past, public trust in the national government may be limited and trust in international bodies higher. This situation is, for instance, found in a number of EU member states, where trust in EU institutions is markedly higher than trust in national authorities (see European Commission, 2023 for a recent example). In consequence, we may therefore have competing expectations on what to expect in terms of inclination for civil defence cooperation and joint crisis management.
Contextualizing Nordic public opinion about neighbours
Referring to the research questions above, existing studies on public trust in the Nordic countries lead us to hypothesize that the Nordic publics have high and similar levels of trust in their respective government’s preparedness in the area of civil defence. The OECD compiles data on the degree to which the citizens of the member-states trust their own governments. The figures are remarkably clear: with the exception of Switzerland, the Nordic countries have the highest scores of all OECD countries – in the latest available figures (from 2022), 77.5% of the Finnish respondents say that they trust their government, followed by 68.8% for Sweden and 63.6% for both Norway and Denmark, with Iceland somewhat lower at 51.5% (OECD, 2024). 1 This picture is mirrored in the European Social Survey’s cross-national survey from 2021 to 2023, containing data on 12 European countries. Finland occupies the top position, followed by Sweden and Iceland (ESS, 2024). 2 Against the background of the link between interpersonal and institutional trust as elaborated above, existing survey data points in a similar direction: the Nordics have comparably high levels of interpersonal trust, which in turn is conducive to institutional trust. In the latest wave of the World Values Survey (WVS, 2017–2022) covering 91 countries, only 9 countries have a majority of their respondents agreeing that ‘most people can be trusted’ – the five Nordic countries are in the top with the addition of China in fourth place (WVS, 2024). 3
A set of similarities across the Nordics lead us to expect mutual identification and a desire for cooperation in general. The Nordic states are small, open societies facing structural dependencies and vulnerabilities which underpin a general desire for cooperation in rules-based and institutionalized form. Moreover, a number of intra-Nordic dimensions point in the same direction: shared history, common value base (centred on freedom of speech, equal human rights and open and democratic processes), similar political systems and welfare states, and similar language base. Conditions for regional cooperation are thus conducive and have since World War II also resulted in an integration process encompassing for instance a Nordic passport union, a common labour market, reciprocal social security arrangements, educational cooperation and a language convention, among other things. Institutional expressions include the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM).
It is to be noted, however, that in the policy area of security and defence, Nordic cooperation has been largely absent – for a long time Nordic security and defence cooperation remained deliberately limited, reflecting the sensitivity of such cooperation in the context of the Cold War logic, maintaining a ‘Nordic balance’ (Haugevik and Sending, 2020, see also Saxi, 2018) and including variation in institutional membership in the EU and NATO. Adding to this, both the EU and NATO have structures for cooperation on civil defence and civil preparedness developed over time. Within NATO, this has been done based on the so-called baseline requirements for civil resilience, while in the EU, it has taken the form of the civil protection mechanism among other things. The former has a closer military connection, while the latter relates closer to civil emergency situations. With these different initiatives and varying memberships among the Nordics, it may not be seen as surprising that a rather hesitant EU member but devoted NATO member and close US ally as Denmark has emphasized the cooperation within NATO (cf. Wivel, 2018). To some extent, the same can be said about Norway (Græger, 2018) and Iceland (Thorhallsson, 2018), while Finland, with its role within the core of the EU, and to some extent Sweden have put greater emphasis on the EU (Wrange et al., 2024).
Through the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) on the military side and the so-called Haga process concerning civil security and crisis management aiming at cooperating for more robust and resilient societies, things have changed dramatically in the last 15 years, also before the security-political reorientation of Sweden and Finland in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Nordic security and defence cooperation has revolved primarily around Finland, Sweden and Norway, while Denmark was joining later and to a somewhat less enthusiastic degree due to its orientation towards the United States (Wrange et al., 2024; cf. Wivel, 2018). Iceland, with its special defence preconditions and lack of conventional armed forces, is only partially involved in military defence cooperation. In short, Nordic security and defence cooperation has thus far been characterized by a degree of differentiation (Bengtsson, 2020; Brommesson, 2018). Finnish and Swedish NATO membership can, however, be expected to imply a more homogeneous situation moving forward (Brommesson et al., 2024). Moreover, all Nordic countries work with a ‘total defence’ model comprising military and civil defence dimensions. While conceptualizations and administrative structures vary somewhat, the Nordics share a policy approach characterized by a comprehensive – or integrated – perspective on security and defence matters (see further Wither, 2020; Wrange et al., 2024).
To summarize, high levels of trust, common identity, several societal similarities and long-standing cooperation across a range of policy areas and notably a shift towards convergence within security and defence in recent times lead us to expect positive and similar attitudes to international cooperation in general and Nordic cooperation in particular.
Yet, the quite different Nordic responses to the Covid-19 pandemic and the relative ease with which Nordic interaction came to a halt point us in a different, less positive direction (Brommesson and Edström, 2021; Christensen et al., 2023). Conditions on the citizens’ level as well as on the political level yielded an expectation that the Nordic states would approach the challenges of the pandemic in concert (cf. Stie and Trondal, 2020). But they did not, with especially Sweden standing out with a policy emphasizing keeping society open, and the question remains, if the lack of cross-border trust in the measures taken by the Nordic neighbours during the pandemic reflects a more general hesitation or lack of belief in joint Nordic crisis management and civil security cooperation.
At the societal level, a study commissioned by the NCM shows that only 1 in 10 respondents across the Nordic countries say that cooperation about managing the Covid-19 pandemic worked well, while half of the respondents said it worked poorly or very poorly (Stende, 2021). And while existing studies show a generally positive attitude towards Nordic cooperation (Andreasson and Stende, 2017; Stende, 2021 further elaborated below), the same studies show considerable variation among the Nordic publics in terms of desire for cooperation and focus of such cooperation. It is in this context of competing expectations that we now proceed to our analysis, initially focusing on methodology and data collection.
Methodological points of departure
In order to study citizens’ trust in their government’s civil preparedness and their views on international cooperation within this area, we have collected unique data from all five Nordic states. The data have been gathered through pre-recruited online panels in each of the five Nordic countries. Although recruited separately in the five countries, the respondents have answered the same set of questions, and the surveys have all been based on a probability sample. The data have been weighted in accordance with gender, age, place of residence and education in order to represent the most accurate picture of the Nordic populations. Still, there may be some variation between the samples and the populations due to statistical constraints; this is in particular true when it comes to age in the Icelandic case, with higher response rates among older respondents. While this should be taken into account when the results are evaluated, we maintain that the samples in general give us a good overview of the Nordic citizens’ perceptions.
In Table 1, we report the size of the samples for each country, the number of respondents, the time of data collection as well as the organization who carried out the data collection.
Technical reports of the five surveys.
Note: Table 1 reports time periods of data collection, sizes of sample, number of respondents and net response rates.
As seen in Table 1, the response rates vary substantially, reflecting differences in survey design. Still, it is high enough also on the Danish case to allow for thorough analysis of perceptions of civil preparedness and international cooperation also among different subgroups in the Nordic countries.
The respondents were asked a number of questions relating to our research questions. The questions in the surveys centred around issues of confidence in civil preparedness on the national level, perceived responsibility of different actors for civil preparedness, threat perceptions and preferred international cooperation within civil preparedness (see Appendix 1 for the full set of survey questions).
Based on these questions, we are able to study both variations in institutional trust among the populations within the different Nordic countries and their preferences in terms of international cooperation. The question on threat perceptions makes it possible for us to analyse whether the Nordic populations share a similar world view in terms of security threats, which may affect how fruitful Nordic cooperation on civil defence may be.
Given different understandings of civil defence and civil preparedness, the survey included an introduction to the respondents where civil preparedness was described as
non-military activities intended to protect the [Danish/Finnish/Icelandic/Norwegian/Swedish] population before and during crises and ultimately war. This includes the activities of various public and private parties which are designed to ensure the resilience of society, maintain functions (such as access to electricity, the Internet, food and medicines) and strengthen the national defence.
We now turn to our empirical analysis.
Analysis: trust in government and perceptions of responsibilities, threats and international cooperation – Nordic perspectives
As was noted above, the citizens of the Nordic countries have generally high levels of interpersonal as well as institutional trust. However, our inquiry into institutional trust in the specific area of civil defence yields a more complex picture. The first question posed in our surveys in the Nordic countries was: To what extent do you have confidence in the civil preparedness of the public authorities of [your country]? There is a clear variation among the Nordics, to the effect that Finnish respondents have a markedly higher degree of trust in their public authorities than people in the other Nordic countries have: 75.6% of the Finnish respondents say that they trust the government’s preparedness to a high or very high degree. Conversely, Sweden stands out as the country where respondents have the lowest degree of trust among the surveyed countries, at 27.3%. In Iceland, 59.4% say that they trust the public authorities, whereas in Denmark, the figure is 46.9% and for Norway 31.1%. It can be added that Sweden is the only country with a negative balance (high/very high trust – low/very low trust), at −7.
This variation is a bit surprising given the high levels of trust across the Nordics in more general studies of institutional trust, as was noted in the section on Nordic public opinion above. While our survey data cannot explain this variation, a number of potential explanations may be of relevance, including the experience of the management of the pandemic, the elusiveness of the notion of ‘civil defence’, the administrative structure of the country and, related, the complexity of the distribution of responsibilities in society regarding civil defence. Concerning specifically Sweden, one may hypothesize that not only the experience of the management of the pandemic but also the timing of the study mattered, as it took place after a prolonged period of waiting for ratification of NATO membership in the context of a domestic discussion of the need to enhance the capacity of the ‘total defence’ (comprising military and civilian dimensions).
Turning to the question of distribution of responsibilities for preparedness, Table 2 displays a degree of variation among the Nordic countries also in this context.
Perceptions of distribution of responsibilities for preparedness (percent large or very large responsibility).
Note: The question was: How much responsibility do you deem the following parties to have for ensuring civil preparedness in [your country]? Table 2 reports the percentage of respondents answering ‘large/very large responsibility’ (Likert scale 4–5).
A number of observations stand out. A central point concerns the similarities between Swedish and Finnish respondents, with a high degree of responsibilities placed with the national and local authorities, but also citizens, the corporate sector and, to a somewhat lesser degree, civil society. One may assume that this is a reflection of the total defence principle that has defined the defence policy of these two countries during, and especially regarding Finland also after, the Cold War. In contrast, it can be noted the relatively low figure among Danish respondents regarding the responsibility of the private sector for the provision of civil defence, and for Norway regarding the responsibility of citizens and even more pronounced, civil society. Regarding international organizations, it is furthermore of interest to note that all countries except Sweden place a higher responsibility on NATO than the EU. Taken together, it can be concluded that there does not exist a uniform Nordic public view of the distribution of responsibilities concerning civil defence.
In the next step, we turn to the security challenges as perceived by the Nordic publics in order to capture the respondents’ understanding of the relevant priorities of the policy area of civil preparedness. Here, we can conclude that there is a relatively high degree of consensus among the Nordic countries. In Table 3, we show the three areas of most concern to the different Nordic respondents. As can be seen, worries about the spreading of information to destabilize democracy is a major concern in all five countries. Also supply of medicines is a key source of worry; only in Denmark this is not among the top three areas of concern. Terrorism, and to a lesser degree war, feature among the top three. Perhaps not so surprising, Icelanders place natural disasters as the number one concern.
Top three threat perceptions among Nordic citizens (percent worried or very worried).
Note: The question was: How worried are you about the following happening in [your country]? Table 3 reports the percentage of the respondents answering ‘worried/very worried’ for the top three alternatives of each country (Likert scale 4–5). In addition to the items included in Table 3, the question also included items prolonged power outage, prolonged disruption of the Internet, pandemic and interrupted supply of food. None of these were ranked top three in any of the countries. The different threats included in the survey are inspired by threats mentioned by national agencies in the Nordic countries responsible for civil preparedness and crisis management (e.g. see DSB 2019; Finnish Government 2023; MSB 2018). Some countries mention more threats than others and we have therefore merged some threats into broader categories that still can be seen as relevant for all the five Nordic countries.
Turning to our second line of inquiry – regarding Nordic perspectives on enhanced cooperation in civil defence – the figures in Table 4 return a set of major observations. While the results discussed above reflects a high degree of variation between the Nordics regarding the confidence they hold in the civil preparedness of the public authorities of their countries, these variations do not seem to travel across the Nordic borders. The Swedish respondents stood out above, as they had considerably lower confidence in the civil preparedness of their national authorities, compared to the respondents from the other Nordic countries. Turning to the preferences for enhanced cooperation with individual Nordic countries, the preferences regarding cooperation with Sweden do not stand out in a negative sense. Sweden is rather a country many of the other Nordic citizens prefer to enhance cooperation with. Instead, two other observations are noteworthy. First, the overall low levels of preferred enhanced cooperation with other Nordic countries among the Danish respondents. The percentage among the Danes answering to a high or very high degree regarding preferences on enhanced cooperation with other Nordic countries varies between 23.1% (Iceland) and 41.4% (Sweden). In contrast, the results from the Norwegian respondents vary between 74% (Iceland) and 87.4% (Sweden). A second key observation is how the results vary along geographical proximity and already existing patterns of cooperation. Preferences regarding enhanced cooperation with Iceland are consistently the lowest among the respondents from the other Nordic countries, while the Finns, Norwegians and Swedes prefer enhanced cooperation with Finland, Norway and Sweden. 7 These three countries share land borders and already have a developed trilateral cooperation on civil defence.
Preferences for enhanced cooperation with individual Nordic countries by nationality (percent high or very high).
Note: The question was: To what degree should [your country] collaborate more on civil defence with the following countries? Table 4 reports the percentage of the respondents who answered ‘high or a very high degree’ (Likert scale 4–5).
Turning to Nordic perspectives on enhanced cooperation in civil defence within multilateral institutions, Table 5 shows a generally high demand for enhanced cooperation on civil defence at the Nordic level. Again, especially so in Sweden, Norway and Finland. Notably, Danish respondents are clearly the less interested in Nordic cooperation and, importantly, also the only ones not placing cooperation in Nordic forums as the prioritized forum/level for cooperation. This is in line with the previous research discussed above. Regarding cooperation in NATO and the EU, all countries but Sweden prioritize NATO ahead of the EU; Swedish respondents are, on the other hand, most positive of all respondents regarding Nordic and EU cooperation and at the same time the least interested in enhanced NATO cooperation.
Preferences for enhanced international cooperation in the area of civil defence (percent large or very large extent).
Note: The question was: To what extent should [your country] collaborate more on civil defence within the following organizations? The figures report the percentage of the respondents who answered ‘large/very large extent’ (Likert scale 4–5).
These results are also confirmed and further elaborated in the linear regression analysis reported in Table 6. Here, the different groups of citizens are coded into dummy variables, the results thus reflect the correlation between being of nationality X – compared to the mean value of all nationalities – and being in favour of enhanced Nordic cooperation on civil defence.
Effect of nationality on enhanced Nordic cooperation on civil defence (unstandardized b-estimates from OLS regressions).
Note: Table 6 reports the bivariate effects from five Nordic nationalities; [nationality] (1), others (0). The dependent variable on enhanced Nordic cooperation is based on the question: To what extent should [your country] collaborate more on civil defence within the following organizations? Among the items following this question was within Nordic institutions. To a very low degree (1), to a very high degree (5). The b-estimate reports the unstandardized b-coefficient from OLS regressions. The standard error is reported within parentheses.
p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
As seen in Table 6, there are significant effects for all nationalities on the preferences for enhanced Nordic cooperation on civil defence. Being a Finn has a rather weak positive effect on preferences for enhanced Nordic cooperation, while being a Norwegian or a Swede has stronger positive effects on the preferences for enhanced Nordic cooperation. On the other side of the spectrum, the results show how being a Dane or Icelander has a negative effect on preferences for enhanced Nordic cooperation, with the strongest negative effect in the case of the Danes.
The results reported in Tables 4 to 6 further problematize more general studies on Nordic cooperation. In a study commissioned by NCM in 2017, more than 90% responded that Nordic cooperation is important or very important, and two-thirds (68%) said that they desire even more Nordic cooperation (a higher figure than found in a similar study in 2006) (Andreasson and Stende, 2017). There is a clear variation among the Nordic five, however, where the Swedish public was more positive to deepened cooperation than the rest of the countries. 8 An NCM study in 2021 conveys a similar picture: 86% of the respondents in the Nordic countries deemed Nordic cooperation important or very important and 60% wanted deeper cooperation (Stende, 2021). But as previously, there is substantial intra-Nordic variation, with Swedish respondents most in favour of deepened cooperation and Danish counterparts least so. 9
Looking specifically at perceptions of cooperation in the field of security and defence, the different Nordic publics have somewhat different views on the desirability of further such cooperation. In the 2017 NCM study, security and defence-related issues were overall picked as the most important area to cooperate about (followed by education and health and social policy) (Andreasson and Stende, 2017). Interestingly, however, whereas the Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish publics all pointed out security and defence as clearly the most important area for cooperation, Danish respondents had it as the fourth priority and Icelandic respondents only in a shared 12th place.
In 2021, the picture regarding areas in need of further Nordic cooperation looked significantly different. The group of Finland, Norway and Sweden again held similar views – this time placing combating transnational crime in first place, followed by security and defence (Finland and Norway) and climate and environment, closely followed by security and defence (Sweden). Denmark had security and defence matters only in fifth place (climate and environment in top) and Iceland only in 11th place (education in top) (Stende, 2021).
Our study thus confirms the results in previous studies, with general Nordic support for enhanced cooperation within security and defence matters, here more specifically on civil defence, but with Denmark, and to some degree Iceland, as negative outlier(s). Interestingly, this follows the priorities observed on the political level, where Finland and Sweden, but more recently also Norway, have prioritized Nordic cooperation, but where Denmark has given the Nordic cooperation a third order priority (cf. Wivel, 2018).
Finally, given the results reported on the confidence in the civil preparedness of the public authorities of the specific countries and the results reported in Tables 5 and 6, we have reasons to analyse if there is an effect between the confidence in the national civil preparedness and the preferences for enhanced Nordic cooperation. As discussed in our theoretical section, we have contradicting expectations on this relationship, where we, on the one hand, can expect negative confidence in the civil preparedness of national authorities to create a demand for Nordic cooperation, while we, on the other hand, can expect trust across levels, to the effect that those who have confidence in national authorities should then also have confidence in international cooperation and therefore prefer enhanced Nordic cooperation.
As seen in Table 7, it is the latter expectation that is confirmed. Nordic cooperation within civil defence is accordingly not seen as a substitute for weak national civil preparedness. Instead, the results, under control for nationality, reflect a positive effect from strong confidence in the preparedness of national authorities on positive preferences for enhanced Nordic cooperation. Those who trust national authorities seem to also trust international institutions. This becomes even clearer in the case of EU and NATO, with a stronger positive relationship between confidence in national authorities and positive preferences for cooperation on civil defence within these institutions.
Effect of confidence in national authorities on preferences for international cooperation within civil defence among the Nordic populations (unstandardized b-estimates from OLS regressions).
Note: The left part of Table 7 reports the effects from the independent variable confidence in the preparedness of domestic authorities in civil defence, based on the question: To what extent do you have confidence in the civil preparedness of the public authorities of [your country]? on preferences for enhanced cooperation on civil defence. Low confidence (1), high confidence (5). The right part of Table 7 reports the effects from the independent variable low confidence in the preparedness of domestic authorities, based on the question: To what extent do you have confidence in the civil preparedness of the public authorities of [your country]? Low or very low confidence (1), others (0). Dependent variables about cooperation are based on the question: To what extent should [your country] collaborate more on civil defence within the following organizations? This question was followed by three items: within Nordic institutions, the EU and NATO. To a very low degree (1), to a very high degree (5). The b-estimate reports the unstandardized b-coefficient from OLS regressions. The results are under control for nationality (see Appendix 2 for the full multivariate regressions).
p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
As Table 7 reports, there is a positive effect of having strong confidence in national authorities on preferences for different forms of international cooperation. Focusing specifically on ‘low-trusting’ Nordics with weak confidence in national authorities (the right part of Table 7), we find that these respondents have negative preferences for international cooperation in general. However, the effect of having low confidence in the national civil preparedness has stronger negative effects on the preferences for enhanced cooperation within the EU and NATO, compared to cooperation within Nordic institutions. Although we can observe a negative effect also in the latter case, this effect is much weaker. Based on these results, we can conclude that the potential for Nordic governments to win support for international cooperation on civil defence among low-trusting Nordic citizens is greater in the case of Nordic cooperation, compared to cooperation with EU and NATO.
Concluding remarks: continuous variation among the Nordics
We started out this article by noting mixed expectations for enhanced Nordic cooperation within civil defence, given established patterns of cooperation but also historic variation within defence and security policy. These mixed expectations have, to a significant degree, been confirmed in this study.
Regarding the first research question on shared perceptions about trust, distribution of responsibilities and the severity of different potential threats to society on the national level, we found significant variation of trust in the civil preparedness of national governments. Finland stood out as the country where the citizens have the highest level of trust, with Sweden at the other end of the spectrum – the variation between 75.6% (Finland) and 27.3% (Sweden) of the respondents expressing trust to high or very high degrees is indeed significant. Turning to the distribution of responsibility, the most interesting variation observed is that between Finland and Sweden, on the one hand, and the other Nordic countries, on the other. While the Finnish and Swedish respondents distribute the responsibility rather evenly between government and non-government actors, the respondents from the other three countries let the government actors carry the burden of responsibility. We can here see a more elaborated total defence model in Finland and Sweden. Finally, regarding the threat perceptions, we see some similar patterns across the Nordics, but with some variation not least to national conditions like the likelihood of natural disasters in Iceland.
We can thus draw the conclusion that despite some similarities, the Nordics do not seem to depart from the same position when they approach Nordic or other forms of international cooperation within civil defence. This pattern returns when we approach the issue of desire for deeper international cooperation in the area of civil defence. Here, the two most significant results are the low level of support for enhanced Nordic cooperation among the Danish respondents, both in terms of enhanced cooperation with individual Nordic countries and enhanced cooperation within Nordic institutions, and the low level of support for enhanced European cooperation among the Icelandic respondents. While the latter result is less challenging for the prospects for cooperation among the Nordics, the low level of support among the Danes for further Nordic cooperation is worth more attention. This result, together with the strong support for such Nordic cooperation among respondents in Finland, Norway and Sweden, points in the direction of a pro-Nordic subgroup among the Nordics. Moreover, we find a generally positive effect of trust in national authorities’ preparedness for civil defence on international cooperation, across the Nordics. Among low-trusting citizens, however, the effect is negative (albeit less so regarding Nordic cooperation compared to EU cooperation and NATO cooperation).
Returning to institutional trust, we have reasons to believe that the variation in both trust in national preparedness and the variation in call for further Nordic cooperation pose a problem for plans for joint Nordic crisis management. Since these results are well in line with the development on the political level with a deeper cooperation between Finland, Norway and Sweden, we have reasons to draw the conclusion that our results indicate a potential for enhanced cooperation among some Nordics, but not all. While this variation poses a challenge for plans for joint Nordic crisis management, it may also indicate less likelihood of a coherent Nordic bloc within EU and NATO structures.
Footnotes
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
| Model | Enhanced cooperation on civil defence: NATO | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| b | SE | ||
| 1 | (Constant) | 4.053*** | .011 |
| Low_trusting_Nordics | –.299*** | .026 | |
| 2 | (Constant) | 3.846*** | .025 |
| Low_trusting_Nordics | –.264*** | .027 | |
| Danish | .354*** | .035 | |
| Finnish | .209*** | .030 | |
| Icelandic | –.073 | .038 | |
| Norwegian | .395*** | .033 | |
Note: The table reports the effect from the independent variable low confidence in the preparedness of domestic authorities, based on the question: To what extent do you have confidence in the civil preparedness of the public authorities of [your country]? Low or very low confidence (1), others (0). Dependent variable about enhanced NATO cooperation on civil defence is based on the question: To what extent should [your country] collaborate more on civil defence within the following organizations? This question was followed by three items: within Nordic institutions, the EU, and NATO. To a very low degree (1), to a very high degree (5). The b-estimate reports the unstandardized b-coefficient from OLS regressions. The results are under control for nationality dummies, with Sweden treated as the reference category.
p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Magnus Hagevi for important support when working with this article, and to Dylan Pashley for excellent research assistance.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Swedish Civil Contingency Agency grant number 2017-99591.
