How do formal institutions emerge and change after a civil war? Complementing explanations focused on distributional conflict and the promotion of post-war peace and democracy, we argue that ideology plays a central role in shaping the most fundamental formal institution: the constitution. Using data from 153 civil wars between 1944–2016, we find that in the post-war period: (1) Victorious revolutionary socialist (RS) and secessionist rebels are more likely to promulgate new constitutions; (2) Victorious incumbents are more likely to adopt constitutional amendments; (3) Non-Maoist RS rebels enact constitutions with more symbolic content and rights compared to the incumbent or other victorious rebels. We illustrate the mechanisms behind these findings with a comparative analysis of multiple constitutional transitions in Cambodia. Our results underscore the importance of research on ideology and armed conflict as groups with ambitious goals for social transformation remain a powerful force for political change worldwide.
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