Governments in the Global South have historically lacked bureaucratic capacity in peripheral areas, making it difficult for them to maintain order and implement their preferred policies. This paper explores when central states invest in establishing bureaucratic presence. We argue that twentieth-century peasant mobilization provided an important impetus for incumbents to create bureaucratic agencies. Using a novel dataset of bureaucratic presence and municipal-level data on peasant collective action in mid-twentieth-century Peru, we show that the Peruvian president responded to peasant mobilization by investing in new bureaucratic offices that could respond to peasant demands. We further demonstrate that these investments in bureaucratic offices endured, enabling the implementation of pro-peasant policies and reducing violence during the Shining Path insurgency of the late 20th century. This suggests a surprising reversal: early peasant mobilization is associated with a long-term reduction in later rural unrest.
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