Losing Touch: The Rhetorical Cost of Governing

Abstract

The electoral ‘cost of governing’ is widely considered a law-like phenomenon. However, costs of governing are not limited to the electoral dimension. This paper highlights and documents an unappreciated nonelectoral cost of holding government office: diminished rhetorical simplicity. I argue that the functional demands of running government compel government members to speak less simply than is electorally optimal. I refer to this effect as 'the rhetorical cost of governing'. I test this theory using rich data on individual legislator careers and parliamentary speech in Denmark across three decades. Consistent with the theory, government membership reduces rhetorical simplicity. Additional analyses suggest the effect is transitory and is driven by constraints on issue emphasis. I then provide experimental evidence of downstream electoral consequences, showing that respondents prefer politicians using simple language. The results enrich our understanding of the costs of governing, the opposition advantage, and the mass grievances fueling populist political movements.