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Abstract

Do US lobbying patterns extend to other countries? To date no study has systematically compared US lobbying patterns with those of other countries using observational data. Taking advantage of similar lobbying disclosure rules in the US and Canada, we create a cross-country lobbying dataset. We focus on the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) to control for timing, salience, and issue scope. This helps us attribute differences in firm mobilization and trade lobbying strategies across the two countries to differences in political institutions. Strikingly different USMCA lobbying patterns emerge. Within the same industry, trade associations, the executive branch, and in-house lobbyists play a larger role in Canada. Meanwhile, well-established determinants of US lobbying fail to explain patterns of mobilization and the use of external lobbyists in Canada. These findings provide insights into comparative lobbying studies and indicate that some stylized facts about lobbying are unique features of the US political system.

Keywords

lobbying trade mobilization access United States Canada

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Mobilization and Strategies: Comparing Trade Lobbying in the US and Canada

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