What are the political consequences of economic globalization? Since the 1990s, scholars of European party politics have noted the rise of extremist parties, especially right-wing populist ones, and the decline of mainstream left and right parties. This paper focuses on the association between globalization in terms of trade, capital and labor flows, technological change, and popular support for extreme right parties. I examine these relations at the regional and individual level in 15 advanced industrial democracies in Western Europe from 1990 to 2018. Globalization, especially in the form of trade, is associated with growing vote shares for extreme right parties. Technological change in the form of automation increases support for extreme right parties. The financial crisis enhanced support for populist right parties and strengthened the negative relationship between trade shocks and declining support for mainstream left parties. And the use of social welfare compensation seems unable to dampen these political trends.1
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