How do autocrats build support? This study argues that autocrats create and maintain participatory technologies—elite-mass communication strategies that promote two-way interaction between citizens and leaders—to foster support. Participatory technologies provide citizens with the opportunity to have a limited voice in otherwise closed political systems. I test this theory through a series of two nationally-representative survey experiments in Russia. Results suggest that awareness of participatory technologies increases approval of President Putin and improves perceptions that there are opportunities for voice in politics. This finding departs from previous research that suggests public opinion is influenced primarily by participation. Furthermore, I demonstrate that these effects can be directly attributed to the communicative format of these strategies, not to issue resolution or leadership effects. Finally, I demonstrate that effects are dependent upon individuals’ political sophistication and political priors, contributing to political polarization and opening up the potential for backlash against the regime.
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