What explains regional variations in the frequency and form of mass categorical violence? I first develop then test, via process tracing, a theory to answer this question. Employing process tracing in Central Java during the 1965–66 Indonesian Killings, I argue that these variations are conditioned by state intelligence capacity. Low intelligence capacity forces troops to rely upon civilian elites for information. This provides opportunities for civilian elites to widen targeting criteria, increasing the number of victims. Due to logistical constraints, security forces are also more likely to opt for lethal violence when they have low intelligence capacity, as they frequently struggle with caring for such large numbers of detainees. I further illustrate these findings by comparing the provinces of West Java and East Java. Data for this project is drawn from diplomatic archives, internal military publications, and a series of interviews with victims and participants in the Indonesian Killings.
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