How do voters react to shocks that are outside the control of politicians? We address this question by studying the electoral impact of wildfires in Spain in the period 1983-2014. This context allows us to study (a) the effects of fires at different locations and times, as opposed to a specific disaster; (b) the heterogeneous effects by time relative to election day; and (c) the effects on elections for all levels of government. Using a difference-in-difference strategy, we find that an accidental fire up to 9 months ahead of a municipal election increases the incumbent party’s vote share by up to 8 percentage points, whereas a fire earlier in the term does not affect the election results. In addition, fires have no effect on regional or national elections. We discuss the possible mechanisms behind the results in light of the main theories on electoral accountability.
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