What types of leaders are effective in organizing public goods that require community contributions? In many settings, both citizens and state agencies provide financing, labor, and oversight of local projects. This article analyzes the effects of elected Members of Parliament (MPs) and hereditary chiefs in facilitating co-produced public goods in Zambia. MPs have electoral motivations to provide public goods but may not be well-positioned to organize community contributions. Chiefs lack electoral incentives but typically have long time horizons and local social connections. I analyze the effects of both types of leaders on the provision of co-produced public goods through a natural experiment. I take advantage of lapses in leadership following the deaths of leaders in office to show that chiefs have a significant effect on co-produced public goods but MPs do not. Auxiliary analysis suggests that chiefs’ effect on community contributions depends on the length of their time horizons.
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