We consider the behavior of an incumbent that can deploy local public goods and private goods to buy votes, and is unable to verify vote choice but capable of monitoring voter turnout, a common scenario in secret-ballot polities. As advanced by recent literature, the ability to monitor turnout rather than vote choice implies that politicians should use targetable private goods to mobilize voters. However, politicians also deploy non-excludable local public goods, which have low mobilization potential because of free-rider incentives. We argue that vote-buying politicians reserve local public goods for loyal constituencies (where they enjoy support from most voters that bother to turn out) and provide private goods in other constituencies where they gain from motivating less committed supporters to turn out. We test aggregate-level implications of our theory on Venezuela’s social programs.
AdamsJDowJMerrillS (2006) The political consequences of alienation-based and indifference-based voter abstention: applications to presidential elections. Political Behavior28(1): 65–86.
2.
AlbertusM (2013) Vote buying with multiple distributive goods. Comparative Political Studies46(9).
3.
CalvoEMurilloMV (2009) Selecting clients: partisan networks and the electoral benefits of targeted distribution. In: 2009 meeting of the American Political Science Association.
4.
ChenJ (2011) Voter income and the mobilizing effect of distributive benefits. Unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan, MI.
5.
CorralesJPenfold-BecerraM (2007) Social spending and democracy: the case of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. LASA Forum38(1): 20–22.
6.
CoxGW (2009) Swing voters, core voters, and distributive politics. In: ShapiroIStokesSCWoodEJ. (eds) Political Representation. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 342–357.
7.
CoxGWMcCubbinsMD (1986) Electoral politics as a redistributive game. Journal of Politics48: 370–389.
8.
DixitALondreganJ (1996) The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics. Journal of Politics58(4): 1132–1155.
9.
DunningTStokesSC (2007) Clientelism as persuasion and as mobilization. In: 2008 meeting of the American Political Science Association.
10.
EU EOM (2006a) Final report: parliamentary elections Venezuela 2005. Technical Report, European Union Election Observation Mission.
11.
EUEOM (2006b) Final report: presidential elections Venezuela 2006. Technical Report, European Union Election Observation Mission.
12.
FinanF (2004) Political patronage and local development: a Brazilian case study. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California Berkeley, CA.
13.
Gans-MorseJMazzucaSNichterS (2009) Who gets bought? Vote buying, turnout buying, and other strategies. In: 67th annual national congress of the Midwest Political Science Association.
14.
GingerichDWMedinaLF (2013) The endurance and eclipse of the controlled vote: a formal model of vote brokerage under the secret ballot. Economics and Politics25(3): 453–480.
15.
HawkinsKA (2010) Who mobilizes? Participatory democracy in Chávez’s Bolivarian revolution. Latin American Politics and Society52(3): 31–66.
16.
HawkinsKRosasGJohnsonM (2010) The Misiones of the Chávez government. In: SmildeDHellingerD (eds) Participation and Public Sphere in Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
17.
HsiehCTOrtegaDMiguelE. (2009) The price of political opposition: evidence from Venezuela’sMaisanta. Working Paper 14923, NBER.
18.
KayBH (1996) “Fujipopulism” and the liberal state in Peru, 1990–1995. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs38: 55–98.
19.
KingGLangcheZ (2006) The dangers of extreme counterfactuals. Political Analysis14(2): 131–159.
20.
KitscheltH (2000) Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities. Comparative Political Studies33(6/7): 845–879.
21.
KitscheltHWilkinsonS (2007) Citizen-politician linkages: an introduction. In: KitscheltHWilkinsonS (eds) Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22.
LindbeckAWeibullJW (1987) Balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition. Public Choice52(3): 273–297.
23.
LizzeriAPersicoN (2001) The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives. American Economic Review91(1): 225–239.
24.
MagaloniBDíaz-CayerosAEstévezF (2007) The erosion of party hegemony, clientelism and portfolio diversification: the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL) in Mexico. In: KitscheltHWilkinsonS (eds) Patrons or Policies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
25.
MartinelliC (2006) Elections as targeting contests. Working Paper 0601, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
26.
Molinar HorcasitasJWeldonJA (1993) Electoral determinants and effects of PRONASOL. In: CorneliusWCraigALFoxJ (eds) Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico: the National Solidarity Strategy. San Diego, CA: Center for US-Mexican Studies.
27.
NichterS (2008) Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot. American Political Science Review102(1): 19–31.
28.
OrtegaDRodríguezF (2008) Freed from illiteracy? A closer look at Venezuela’s Misión Robinson literacy campaign. Economic Development and Cultural Change57(1): 1–30.
29.
PalfreyTRRosenthalH (1985) Voter participation and strategic uncertainty. American Political Science Review79(1): 62–78.
30.
Penfold-BecerraM (2007) Clientelism and social funds: evidence from Chávez’s Misiones. Latin American Politics and Society49(4): 63–84.
31.
PiattoniS (2001) Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation: the European Experience in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
32.
PlaneDLGershtensonJ (2004) Candidates’ ideological locations, abstention, and turnout in U.S. midterm senate elections. Political Behavior26(1): 69–93.
33.
Rocha MenocalA (2001) Do old habits die hard? A statistical exploration of the politicisation of Progresa, Mexico’s latest federal poverty-alleviation programme, under the Zedillo administration. Journal of Latin American Studies33: 513–358.
34.
RodríguezF (2007) Sharing the oil wealth? Appraising the effects of Venezuela’s social programs. LASA Forum38(1): 22–25.
35.
SchadyNR (2000) The political economy of expenditures by the Peruvian social fund (FONCODES), 1991–95. American Political Science Review94(2): 289–304.
36.
ShefterM (1977) Parties and patronage: England, Germany, and Italy. Politics and Society7: 403–451.
37.
StokesSC (2005) Perverse accountability: a formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. American Political Science Review99(3): 315–325.
38.
StokesSC (2007) Political clientelism. In: BoixCStokesSC (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 604–627.
39.
The Carter Center (2005) Observing the Venezuela presidential recall referendum: comprehensive report. Atlanta: The Carter Center.
ZippJF (1985) Perceived representativeness and voting: an assessment of the impact of “choices” vs. “echoes”. American Political Science Review79(1): 50–61.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
