Presidential cabinets include on average more nonparty ministers than governments in any other form of democracy, and critics of presidentialism have argued that this compromises representativeness, accountability, and governability. Yet cabinet partisanship in presidential democracies remains poorly understood. Existing studies argue that the partisan composition of cabinets reflects the degree to which presidents prioritize building legislative support. We demonstrate that a better understanding of government formation requires attention to a second dimension of choice: agency risks. Focusing on the relationship between presidents and their own parties, which is at the core of every presidential government, we show that party-affiliated ministers are not always reliable agents for presidents and that presidents appoint nonpartisan ministers to limit agency loss. We test this argument using original data on the partisanship of single-party cabinets in 12 Latin American countries and find support for the key claims.
AlemánE.TsebelisG. (2011). Political parties and government coalitions in the Americas. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 3(1), 3-28.
2.
Amorim NetoO. (2006). The presidential calculus: Executive policy-making and cabinet formation in the Americas. Comparative Political Studies, 39, 415-440.
3.
Amorim NetoO.SamuelsD. (2010). Democratic regimes and cabinet politics: A global perspective. Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudos Legislativos, 1(1), 10-23.
4.
BlondelJ. (1991a). Are ministers “representatives” or “managers,” “amateurs” or “specialists?” Similarities and differences across Western Europe. In KlingemanH. D.StossR.WeßelsB. (Eds.), Politische Klasse und politische Institutionen (pp. 187-207). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
5.
BlondelJ. (1991b). The post-ministerial careers. In BlondelJ.ThiébaultJ. L. (Eds.), The profession of government minister in Western Europe (pp. 153-173). Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
6.
CamerloM.Pérez-LiñánA. (2012, August-September). Presidential approval and technocratic survival. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2105307
7.
CameronC. A.TrivediP. K. (2009). Microeconometrics using Stata. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
8.
CameronM. (1997). Political and economic origins of regime change in Peru: The eighteenth brumaire of Alberto Fujimori. In CameronM.MauceriP. (Eds.), The Peruvian labyrinth: Polity, society, economy (pp. 37-69). University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
9.
CampR. A. (2010). The metamorphosis of leadership in a democratic Mexico. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
10.
CareyJ. (2003). Discipline, accountability, and legislative voting in Latin America. Comparative Politics, 35, 191-211.
11.
CareyJ. (2007). Competing principals, political institutions, and party unity in legislative voting. American Journal of Political Science, 51, 92-107.
12.
CareyJ.ShugartM. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas. Electoral Studies, 14, 417-439.
13.
CentenoM. A. (2010). Democracy within reason: Technocratic revolution in Mexico. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
14.
CentenoM. A.MaxfieldS. (1992). The marriage of finance and order: Changes in the Mexican political elite. Journal of Latin American Studies, 24, 57-85.
15.
CentenoM. A.SilvaP. (Eds.). (1998). The politics of expertise in Latin America. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
16.
CheibubJ. A. (2007). Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and democracy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
17.
CheibubJ. A.PrzeworskiA.SaieghS. M. (2004). Government coalitions and legislative success under presidentialism and parliamentarism. British Journal of Political Science, 34, 565-587.
18.
ClaveriaS.VergeT. (2014, April10-15). Moving up or moving down? Explaining post-ministerial occupation in advanced industrial democracies. Paper presented at the 2014 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Salamanca, Spain.
19.
ConaghanC. (1994). Loose parties, floating politicians and institutional stress: Presidentialism in Ecuador, 1979-1988. In LinzJ. J.ValenzuelaA. (Eds.), The failure of presidential democracy (pp. 328-359). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
20.
CoppedgeM. (1997). A classification of Latin American political parties (Kellogg Institute Working Paper No. 244). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame.
21.
CoppedgeM. (1998). The dynamic diversity of Latin American party systems. Party Politics, 4, 547-568.
22.
CorralesJ. (2000). Presidents, ruling parties, and party rule: A theory on the politics of economic reform in Latin America. Comparative Politics, 32, 127-149.
23.
CorralesJ. (2002). Presidents without parties: The politics of economic reform in Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
24.
CoxG.MorgensternS. (2002). Epilogue: Latin America’s reactive assemblies and proactive presidents. In MorgensternS.NacifB. (Eds.), Legislative politics in Latin America (pp. 446-468). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
25.
CrispB. F.Escobar-LemmonM. C.JonesB. S.JonesM. P.Taylor-RobinsonM. M. (2004). Vote-seeking incentives and legislative representation in six presidential democracies. The Journal of Politics, 66, 823-846.
26.
DewanT.MyattD. P. (2010). The declining talent pool of government. American Journal of Political Science, 54, 267-286.
27.
DominguezJ. I. (1997). Technopols: Freeing politics and markets in Latin America in the 1990s. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
28.
DowdingK.DumontP. (2009). Structural and strategic factors affecting the hiring and firing of ministers. In DowdingK.DumontP. (Eds.), The selection of ministers in Europe (pp. 1-20). New York, NY: Routledge.
29.
EisenstadtT. A. (2003). Thinking outside the (ballot) box: Informal electoral institutions and Mexico’s political opening. Latin American Politics and Society, 45(1), 25-54.
30.
HaggardS.McCubbinsM.ShugartM. S. (2001). Conclusion: Policymaking in presidential systems. In HaggardS.McCubbinsM. (Eds.), Presidents, parliaments and policy (pp. 319-324). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
31.
HallerbergM.MarierP. (2004). Executive authority, the personal vote, and budget discipline in Latin American and Caribbean countries. American Journal of Political Science, 48, 571-587.
32.
HuberJ. D.KernellG.LeoniE. L. (2005). Institutional context, cognitive resources and party attachments across democracies. Political Analysis, 13, 365-386.
33.
HuberJ. D.Martínez-GallardoC. (2008). Replacing cabinet ministers: Patterns of ministerial stability in parliamentary democracies. American Political Science Review, 102, 169-180.
34.
IndridasonI. H.KamC. (2008). Cabinet reshuffles and ministerial drift. British Journal of Political Science, 38, 621-656.
JonesM. (2005, February-March). The role of parties and party systems in the policymaking process. Prepared for the Workshop on State Reform, Public Policies, and Policymaking Processes, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC.
37.
JonesM. (2010). Beyond the electoral connection: The effect of political parties in the policymaking process. In ScartasciniC.SteinE.TomassiM. (Eds.), How democracy works: Political institutions and arenas in Latin American policymaking (pp. 19-46). Cambridge, MA: Inter-American Development Bank.
38.
KamC.BiancoW.SenedI.SmythR. (2010). Ministerial Selection and Intraparty Organization in the Contemporary British Parliament. American Political Science Review, 104, 289-306.
39.
KiewietD. R.McCubbinsM. D. (1991). The logic of delegation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
40.
KitscheltH.FreezeK. (2011). Programmatic party system structuration: Developing and comparing cross-national and cross-party measures with a new global data set. Retrieved from https://web.duke.edu/democracy/paper.html.
41.
KitscheltH.HawkinsK.LunaJ. P.RosasG.ZechmeisterE. (2010). Latin American party systems. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
42.
LinzJ. J. (1994). Presidential or parliamentary democracy: Does it make a difference? In LinzJ. J.ValenzuelaA. (Eds.), The failure of presidential democracy (pp. 91-150). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
43.
LupiaA. (2003). Delegation and its perils. In StrømK.MüllerW. C.BergmanT. (Eds.), Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies (pp. 33-54). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
44.
MainwaringS.BejaranoA. M.PizarroE. L. (Eds.). (2006). The crisis of democratic representation in the Andes. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
45.
MainwaringS.ShugartM. S. (1997). Conclusion: Presidentialism and the party system. In MainwaringS.ShugartM. S. (Eds.), Presidentialism and democracy in Latin America (pp. 394-439). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
46.
MartinL. W.VanbergG. (2011). Parliaments and coalitions: The role of legislative institutions in multiparty governance. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
47.
Martínez-GallardoC. (2011). Designing cabinets: Presidential politics and cabinet instability in Latin America (Kellogg Institute Working Paper No. 375). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame.
48.
MüllerW. C. (2000). Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work. European Journal of Political Research, 37, 309-333.
49.
RaileE. D.PereiraC.PowerT. J. (2011). The executive toolbox: Building legislative support in a multiparty presidential regime. Political Research Quarterly, 64, 323-334.
50.
RomeroV. (2007). ¿Uno para todos y todos para uno? Una teoría sobre la relación del presidente y su partido político. [All for one and one for all? A theory of the relationship between the president and his or her party]. In Espinoza ToledoR.WeldonJ. (Eds.), Para qué sirve el poder legislativo (pp. 111-130). México City, Mexico: Editorial Porrua.
51.
SáezM. A.FreidenbergF. (2001). Organización y funcionamiento interno de los partidos políticos en América Latina.[Organization and internal workings of political parties in Latin America]. In SaézM. A.FreidenbergF. (Eds.), Partidos políticos de América Latina (pp. 11-30). Salamanca, Spain: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca.
52.
SaieghS. (2010). Jugadores activos o apéndices del ejecutivo? Una evaluación del papel de los legisladores latinoamericanos en la toma de decisiones. [Active players or rubber stamps? An evaluation of the policymaking role of Latin American legislatures ].Política y Gobierno, 17(1), 3-24.
53.
SamuelsD.ShugartM. S. (2010). Presidents, parties, prime ministers: How the separation of powers affects party organization and behavior. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
54.
SchleiterP.Morgan-JonesE. (2010). Who’s in charge? Presidents, assemblies, and the political control of semipresidential cabinets. Comparative Political Studies, 43, 1415-1441.
55.
ShirkD. A. (2005). Mexico’s new politics: The PAN and democratic change. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
56.
StarrP. K. (1999). Monetary mismanagement and inadvertent democratization in technocratic Mexico. Studies in Comparative International Development, 33(4), 35-65.
57.
StrømK. (2000). Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 37, 261-290.
58.
StrømK.MüllerW. C.BergmanT. (Eds.). (2008). Cabinets and coalition bargaining: The democratic life cycle in Western Europe. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
59.
TaylorS.BoteroF.CrispB. F. (2008). Pre-candidates, candidates, and presidents: Paths to the Colombian presidency. In MorgensternS.SiavelisP. (Eds.), Pathways to power: Political recruitment and candidate selection in Latin America (pp. 271-291). University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
60.
TeichmanJ. A. (2001). The politics of freeing markets in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and Mexico. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
61.
ValenzuelaA. (1994). Party politics and the crisis of presidentialism in Chile: A proposal for a parliamentary form of government. In LinzJ. J.ValenzuelaA. (Eds.), The failure of presidential democracy (pp. 91-150). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
62.
WallackJ. S.GaviriaA.PanizzaU. (2003). Political particularism around the world. World Bank Economic Review, 17, 133-143.
63.
WiesehomeierN.BenoitK. (2009). Presidents, parties, and policy competition. The Journal of Politics, 71, 1435-1447.
64.
ZuccoC. (2009). Ideology or what? Legislative behavior in multiparty presidential settings. The Journal of Politics, 71, 1076-1092.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
