Often, one or more of the parties participating in an election refuse to comply with the announced results and frequently resort to extra-legal strategies to dispute electoral outcomes. Such protests frequently turn violent, occasionally with major repercussions for political stability and the process of democratization. But, why do some political parties use legal avenues to reject electoral outcomes whereas others go outside of the established legal routes? Based on the original data from new democracies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union from 1990 to 2009, I show that political parties are more likely to reject electoral outcomes using extra-legal means when election-related institutions have been changed prior to an election. This study demonstrates the importance of accounting for pre-election day factors when analyzing post-electoral disputes. It also contributes to the literature by presenting a new conceptual framework for studying electoral compliance.
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