Often it is argued that the EU depoliticizes political issues as bureaucrats and nonmajoritarian institutions are key in the policy-making process. However, recent research rejects this perspective and shows that domestic political cleavages organize the European political space. This article demonstrates that (a) political cleavages affect the organization of policy networks among Euro-level bureaucrats, politicians, and societal interests; and (b) that the institutional organization of government facilitates the emergence of advocacy coalitions mobilizing these political cleavages. The empirical analysis demonstrates that the European political space is dominated by a cleavage between a progrowth coalition and a sustainability coalition. Furthermore, it shows that political officials occupy a pivotal position enabling them to mediate between these two coalitions. Finally, data on the actors’ resource reputations suggest that in granting access, public officials attach considerable value to the public support coalitions enjoy.
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