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Abstract

This doctoral thesis examines the influence of relative performance and managerial incentives on corporate financial misrepresentation, and then tests the relationship between misrepresentation and subsequent operating performance, including the moderating effects of change in board composition and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover. Using a hand-collected data set from several archival sources of company records, the study includes a combination of estimation techniques, including categorical dependent variable and fixed-effect methods, all conducted using a matched sample of misrepresenting and nonmisrepresenting firms. The author draws several important conclusions from the empirical analyses. First, CEO incentive pay and poor relative performance increase the likelihood of misrepresentation. Second, misrepresentation impairs subsequent operating performance, although this negative effect can be partially offset by CEO replacement and increased board independence. The study advances our academic understanding of corporate misconduct and contributes to academic theory across research literatures, including strategic management, organization theory, and business ethics.

Keywords

firm misconduct financial misrepresentation executive pay firm performance corporate governance

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Financial Misrepresentation: Antecedents and Performance Effects

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